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Abstract 
America forged a successful way of war that relied on adaptation, and this trait was not 
simply an adjunct to industrial might as a reason why the Allies won World War II. An 
American penchant for organization and corporate management allowed for mass production of 
war material, which clearly contributed to Axis defeat.  However, to claim that the Axis Powers 
were merely overwhelmed by an avalanche of weapons and supply is reductionist.   
This dissertation contends that adaptability was as much an American way of war as mass 
production and overwhelming firepower.  The particular nature of American adaptability and its 
contribution to Allied victory are exhibited in the Army’s use of animal power during a conflict 
synonymous with mechanized warfare and advanced technology. The application of pre-modern 
technology in a modern, machine-driven war was not archaic. On the contrary, the nature of 
American adaptability allowed the Army to move forward by retreating down a culturally 
constructed hierarchy of modernity and employing the traditional mode of animal transportation.  
The Army’s technological regression from motors to mules in North Africa, the Mediterranean, 
and China-Burma-India during World War II is the focus of this work. 
 Americans possessed material abundance in campaigns across Western Europe and the 
Central Pacific in 1944 and 1945, as German and Japanese prisoners attested. Mountains of 
artillery shells, fuel, and food, however, did not exist in the backwater “sideshows.”  American 
military success on the periphery was not due to material abundance, nor to a greater sense of 
determination.  America won the backwater campaigns because the nature of American 
adaptability was cultivated over the centuries and converted from a way of life to an American 
way of war. 
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Abstract 
America forged a successful way of war that relied on adaptation, and this trait was not 
simply an adjunct to industrial might as a reason why the Allies won World War II. An 
American penchant for organization and corporate management allowed for mass production of 
war material, which clearly contributed to Axis defeat.  However, to claim that the Axis Powers 
were merely overwhelmed by an avalanche of weapons and supply is reductionist.   
This dissertation contends that adaptability was as much an American way of war as mass 
production and overwhelming firepower.  The particular nature of American adaptability and its 
contribution to Allied victory are exhibited in the Army’s use of animal power during a conflict 
synonymous with mechanized warfare and advanced technology. The application of pre-modern 
technology in a modern, machine-driven war was not archaic. On the contrary, the nature of 
American adaptability allowed the Army to move forward by retreating down a culturally 
constructed hierarchy of modernity and employing the traditional mode of animal transportation.  
The Army’s technological regression from mechanization and motors to mules in North Africa, 
the Mediterranean, and China-Burma-India during World War II is the focus of this work. 
Americans possessed material abundance in campaigns across Western Europe and the 
Central Pacific in 1944 and 1945, as German and Japanese prisoners attested. Mountains of 
artillery shells, fuel, and food, however, did not exist in the backwater “sideshows.”  American 
military success on the periphery was not due to material abundance, nor to a greater sense of 
determination.  America won the backwater campaigns because the nature of American 
adaptability was cultivated over the centuries and converted from a way of life to an American 
way of war.
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Introduction 
 
A Biblical story states that Samson found a jawbone of an ass, took it, and slew his 
Philistine enemies, or as Samson declared, “Heaps upon heaps, with the jaw of an ass have I 
slain a thousand men.” Samson fashioned himself a handy weapon, and in dramatic fashion 
killed his opponents.  Three thousand years later, men continue improvising weapons, still utilize 
the venerable ass, and persist in slaying “heaps upon heaps” of men.  History is rife with 
examples of weapons development and military innovation, regardless of the time, place, or 
people.  America certainly contributed to the long history of battlefield evolution, and the 
particular nature of American adaptability was especially evident during World War II.  
America forged a successful way of war that relied on adaptation, and this trait was not 
simply an adjunct to industrial might as a reason why the Allies won World War II. True, an 
American penchant for organization and corporate management allowed for mass production of 
war material, which clearly contributed to Axis defeat.  However, to claim that the Axis Powers 
were merely overwhelmed by an avalanche of weapons and supply is reductionist.  The ability to 
adapt was an equal partner to mass quantities of war material, superior firepower, and, “brute 
force” utilized by America to help destroy the Axis during World War II.1   
This dissertation contends that adaptability was as much an American way of war as mass 
production and overwhelming firepower.  The nature of American adaptability and its 
contribution to Allied victory are exhibited in the Army’s use of animal power during a conflict 
                                                 
 
1
 John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War, (New York: Viking), 1990.  
Ellis argues that the Allies, particularly the Americans, lacked martial finesse and simply bludgeoned the Axis into 
submission with overwhelming industrial output. A more nuanced counter argument is found in Richard Overy, Why 
the Allies Won, (New York, W.W. Norton), 1996; see also Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of 
World War II, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1994. 
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synonymous with mechanized warfare and advanced technology. The application of pre-modern 
technology in a modern, machine-driven war was not archaic. On the contrary, the nature of 
American adaptability allowed the Army to move forward by retreating down a culturally 
constructed hierarchy of modernity and employing the traditional mode of animal transportation. 
The Army’s technological regression from motors to mules is the focus of this work.  
A recent Army study defined adaptability as “an effective change in response to an 
altered situation.” A veterinary science course defined adaptability as “the problem-solving 
aspect of survival.”2  Both definitions are applicable in the study of adaptability and an American 
way of war. During World War II, the U.S. Army effectively changed their mode of supply in 
theaters where motor transport failed by moving much needed supplies with animal transport.  
The process of making these changes to survive and successfully prosecute war in theaters with 
forbidding terrain and primitive infrastructure are presented in subsequent chapters.  
Adaptability is hardly unique to America. All nations exhibit adaptive traits as a matter of 
survival.  However, at the risk of stating the obvious, nations adapt differently and American 
adaptability during World War II was unique. First, U.S. material prosperity influenced 
adaptability compared to other nations. An overabundance of resources and mass production of 
material allowed America the luxury of technological advances not shared by most countries. 
Germany, for example, employed over 750,000 horses and mules to transport supplies during the 
invasion of Russia because the German military relied on animal power in 1941, and never 
developed a fully motorized transport system during the war. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, 
                                                 
 
2
 Rose A. Mueller-Hanson, Susan S. White, David W. Dorsey, and Elaine D. Pulakos. Research Report 
1844, Training Adaptable Leaders: Lessons from Research and Practice, (Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research 
Institute, 2005), v; See also Dr. James R. Coffman, “The Horse as a Window to the World,” Course Number ASI 
330, Kansas State University, Spring 2005. 
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was fully motorized and rapidly becoming completely mechanized when war began, which was a 
process that required widespread adjustments. The nature of U.S. Army adaptability was greatly 
affected by America’s material prosperity.3 
American adaptability also differed because of its flexibility in theaters with challenging 
terrain. One of the major flaws in Germany’s invasion of Russia was their lack of resources to 
modernize fully; Germany depended on animal-powered transport, the result of which was 
supply deficiencies. By way of comparison, in the rugged theaters of North Africa, the 
Mediterranean, and CBI, America’s motorized military adapted by deploying animal power thus 
contributing to overall Allied success.  Material abundance was seldom a concern in these 
peripheral areas. Equally important to mountains of material was the ability to adjust, 
particularly when supplies were scarce and only mountains existed. The Army’s use of beasts of 
burden constituted an innovative and creative method of labor that made the U.S. military more 
adaptable and thus superior to its enemies in certain theaters during World War II. 
Adaptability is a characteristic often overlooked as a major contribution to Allied victory 
because it is overshadowed by staggering industrial output.  Adaptability occurred at all levels of 
the U.S. military, including the strategic and tactical.  American war planners made the strategic 
decision to defeat Germany first prior to formal U.S. involvement. The dedication to the 
Germany first strategic goal was steadfast.  Yet, the fluid nature of prosecuting a global war 
involved serious adjustments.  For example, the number of troops and material sent to fight 
Japan in the South Pacific far surpassed those sent to Europe at the end of 1942.  Even though 
                                                 
 
3
 Janusz Piekalkiewicz, The Cavalry, 1939-1945, (Harrisburg, PA: Historical Times, Inc., 1997), 43; Klaus 
Christian Richter, Cavalry of the Wehrmacht, (Atlgen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1995); Mark C. Yerger, Riding 
East: The SS Cavalry Brigade in Poland and Russia, (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History,1996).  
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America was devoted to Germany first, the strategic necessity of stopping Japan temporarily put 
mobilization efforts intended for Europe on hold.
4
   
Another example of upper echelon adaptability was the strategic decision for a cross-
channel invasion of Western Europe.  American war planners, notably George C. Marshall and 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, pushed hard for an early, rapid build-up of U.S. forces in Great Britain 
for the anticipated invasion of mainland Europe, preferably France.  In a controversial decision, 
President Roosevelt demonstrated operational flexibility and opted for an invasion of North 
Africa instead.
5
  
Nowhere is the American knack for innovation and adaptability more evident than in the 
mundane tasks of logistics.  American military doctrine in twentieth century placed a premium 
on massive firepower, resulting in unbelievable expenditures of ammunition.  The result was a 
great strain on logistics.  American factories produced ammunition in large quantities, but getting 
it to forces in the field was another problem.   
The U.S. Army hoped to ameliorate transportation setbacks with technology, particularly 
motor transport.  In the interwar years (1919-1941), the Army evolved from animal power to an 
almost completely motorized force. Prewar maneuvers and operational plans counted on 
American troops riding into battle, supplied by a steady stream of motor transport.  The harsh 
reality of combat operations in remote, undeveloped locations proved these peace-time notions 
were misguided.   
                                                 
 
4
 Maurice Matloff, American Military History, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 
U.S. Army, 1969), 435-440. 
  
 
5
 For a recent work on America’s decision to invade North Africa and the Mediterranean, see Joseph E. 
Perisco, “Did Roosevelt Doom Us to a Longer War?” Military History Quarterly Spring 2012, Volume 24, No.  3, 
pp 74-79. 
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The Army’s first forays into combat were in areas with non-existent roads and 
impassable terrain, causing a temporary break in the supply chain.  A solution was found after 
the Army improvised, regressing to the more basic form of animal-powered transportation.  
Army mules, which had been replaced by truck transportation before the war, were hastily 
reinstated, and the flow of supplies resumed.  The Army’s decision to regress technologically to 
animal powered supply can be easily overlooked.  Logistics lacks glamour and if logistics is 
actually pondered, then fleets of tanks, planes, and trucks are simply more impressive than pack 
mules.  The effect of American mass production on the war effort cannot be discounted, and the 
Army’s use of several thousand mules did not determine the war’s outcome.  Yet, the Army’s 
decision to use mules is noteworthy because it demonstrates an adaptive quality that was as 
essential to victory as material or technological superiority.
6
  
The Army of 1942 was almost fully motorized and rapidly becoming mechanized, so it 
seems paradoxical that a technologically advancing Army reverted to animal power for some of 
its supply transportation requirements.  However, the technologically regressive application of 
animal power was hardly illogical, but rather demonstrated flexibility in the face of challenging 
conditions.  Necessity was not exactly the mother of invention, but it certainly required adopting 
proven if “obsolescent” methods, an extraordinarily surprising response from an institution not 
often associated with visionaries.
7
 
                                                 
 
6
 Everett B. Miller, United States Army Veterinary Service in World War II, (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1961), ix. Hereafter cited as Miller, AVS in WWII. Approximately 
60,000 mules were procured or requisitioned, and around 16,000 shipped overseas.  An unknown number of animals 
were requisitioned in theater, but AVS estimates are in the thousands.  
 
7
 Army struggles with modernization are well documented by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks 
and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); and 
Matthew D. Norton, Men on Iron Ponies: The Death and Rebirth of the Modern U.S. Cavalry, (Dekalb, IL: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2009). 
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The theaters in which the Army used animal transportation were devoid of an 
infrastructure system for supporting large motorized and mechanized forces.  Likewise, many 
American war planners questioned the value of war on the perimeter, preferring instead for a 
direct assault against Germany and Japan.  Consequently, resources for American forces 
operating in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and China-Burma-India (CBI) were always in 
short supply.  Material scarcity generated creativity and ingenuity that allowed American troops 
to defeat opponents, and do so occasionally using superior firepower, but the Army never 
operated with abundance in these theaters.
8
 
Victory over the Axis involved the use of “brute force,” but this was hardly the sole 
source of triumph.  Whether lavished with supplies, as in West Europe, or receiving lower 
priority in the backwaters of North Africa, Italy, or CBI, the Army continuously adjusted.  Mass 
mobilization and mass production were crucial because they created the sledgehammer with 
which the Allies crushed the Axis.  The main factor for Allied victory, however, was the legions 
of competent individuals determined to carry and swing that hammer, often doing so in the most 
spartan environments.  
Cases of adaptability abound in all branches of service, particularly in the unglamorous 
realm of logistics.  A prime example was the floating dry docks, an enormous, and enormously 
consequential, innovation.  Floating dry docks were not warships, but primarily served a 
logistical purpose and, thus these peculiar vessels are largely overlooked in most accounts of the 
                                                 
 
8
 A detailed explanation of “motorization” (usually associated with supply transportation) and 
“mechanization” (usually associated with armor and armored fighting vehicles) is included in Chapter 1. For a 
theater-specific examination of Army adaptability in the austere environment of CBI see James Ehrmann, “Ways of 
War and the American Experience in the China-Burma-India Theater, 1942-1945,” (Unpublished Dissertation, 
Kansas State University, 2006). 
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naval war.
9
  The Navy had long realized that some method of ship repair was required for 
operating at great distances from home port facilities.  Ship damage and wear were inevitable, 
and returning to base for repairs was often impractical if not impossible.  But the Navy brought 
port facilities closer to the combat areas with the floating dry dock.  Floating docks were not 
new, as some were in use as early as 1900, but the early dry docks lacked mobility.  Most were 
built in large pieces, then moved piece-meal and re-assembled at a final destination where the 
docks remained a permanent fixture. The Bureau of Yards and Docks conducted studies during 
the 1920s and 1930s to develop a truly mobile floating dry dock, that is, a movable repair 
facility.  
In 1933, the Bureau built ARD-1 (Auxiliary Repair Dock), a dry dock that revolutionized 
mobile port facilities.  The U-shaped ARD-1 was a hull with a closed bow (front) and an open 
stern (rear).  A bottom-hinged flap gate could open and close the stern, allowing ships needing 
repair to enter into the submerged dock.  The dock was raised by pumping water from ballast 
compartments and the main basin. The ARD-1 was equipped with a diesel-driven electric power 
plant, a pumping plant, numerous repair shops, and living quarters for the crew. The ARD-1 was 
the first dry dock that was largely self-sustaining and capable of accompanying a fleet anywhere. 
The Bureau deployed some thirty ARD-class docks from 1942-1945, with each dock improved 
by the incorporation of war-time experience. 
10
  
The Pacific war heightened the Navy’s urgent need for dry docks, particularly mobile dry 
docks capable of serving the largest classes of warship.  ARD-class docks possessed mobility but 
                                                 
  
 9 U.S. Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of 
Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946, Volume 1, Part II, The Continental Bases, Chapter 9, 
Floating Drydocks, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (1947), 209-226.  
 
 
10
 Ibid., 209.  
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lacked lift capacity, and all efforts to enlarge them were unsuccessful.  Construction of such a 
massive structure required an enormous basin in which to build the behemoth.  Towing a vessel 
of this size presented a multitude of problems, including protection against storms and enemy 
attacks. The solution was a dry dock of sectional design, or the Advance Base Sectional Dock 
(ABSD).  The ABSD had ten sections. Each section consisted of a bottom pontoon and two wing 
walls. Navy construction crews placed each section transversely atop 50-foot outrigger platforms 
and, when assembled, the dock measured 927 feet long and 256 feet wide and had a lift capacity 
of 90,000 tons.  
The construction, transportation, and deployment of an ABSD were monumental tasks 
involving several complicated steps, some of which themselves required further only ingenuity. 
For example, the two wing walls of an ABSD section were upright, but the walls were hinged at 
the bottom so that they could be folded inboard.  This reduced wind resistance and lowered the 
center of gravity, both measures crucial for towing in rough seas.  Navy construction crews 
raised the walls into the normal position upon arrival at the advanced base.
11
   
Raising the wing walls was no mean feat.   Each wall was 20 feet wide and 55 feet high, 
and Navy construction crews raised walls upright using two jacks.  The jack consisted of a long 
telescoping box strut and a 500-ton hydraulic jack.  According to the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks,  
Closely spaced matching holes were provided in the outer and inner boxes of the 
strut through which pins were inserted to permit holding the load while the jacks were 
run back after reaching the limit of their travel.  After the wing walls were in the vertical 
position, they were bolted to the bottom pontoon around their entire perimeter. The 
sections of each dock were successively brought together and aligned by means of the 
matching pintles (pins) and gudgeons (sockets). Heavy splice plates were then welded in 
                                                 
 
11
 Ibid., 212-214. Construction crews were from the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks, Navy Civil 
Engineer Corps, the Seabeas, and Navy enlisted men.  
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position from section to section across the joints at the wing walls, at top and bottom, and 
on both the inside and the outside faces of the wing walls.
12
 
 
Fully assembled ABSDs required a minimum depth of 80 feet, and were moored by thirty-two 
15-ton anchors, fourteen on either side, and two at either end.  The ABSD was anchored in 
protected harbors to reduce potential storm damage.  Unlike the mobile ARD-class, the larger 
floating dry docks were more fixed.  However, they still guaranteed the Navy greater flexibility, 
allowing the fleet to cut the umbilical cord of a home port.  
One hundred fifty five floating dry docks were constructed by private contractors for the 
Bureau of Yards and Docks, and 78 saw service in advance areas.  One of the greatest challenges 
was provisioning the docks upon arrival at their destination.  A titanic amount of men and 
material deployed with each floating dry dock, and auxiliary vessels with shops, storage, and 
personnel accommodations accompanied each floating dry dock, creating what was akin to 
floating cities.  According to the Bureau of Yards and Docks,   
The ARD docks, in particular, were fine freight carriers and seldom left for their 
overseas bases with an empty center chamber. On the contrary, they usually carried their 
own work barges, small boats, dredges, cranes, locomotives, piling, and other supplies 
too numerous to mention.
13
 
 
Exhibiting a characteristic American way of war, the dry dock crews utilized every scrap and 
square inch of shipping space to bring their home port to the advance area.   
America’s construction, deployment, and operation of floating cities is irrefutable 
evidence for the school asserting that America and its Allied benefactors smothered foes with 
material.  Easily missed among the mountains of material, however, were the ingenuity, 
innovation, and adaptability necessary to orchestrate these resources.  The abundance of 
                                                 
  
 
12
 Ibid., 214-215.  
 
13
 Ibid., 224. 
10 
 
newsreels displaying combat and weaponry overlooks an American proclivity for organization, 
systems application, and the capability to make adjustments, but these skills were part of an 
American way of war just as valuable as mass-produced, superior firepower.  
 The Army Air Force also substantiates the argument that America contributed more to 
Allied success than mere material.  The United States produced nearly 300,000 aircraft from July 
1940 to August 1945, with some 230,000 planes procured by the Army Air Force.  Primary 
recipients of the remaining aircraft were the U.S. Navy, Great Britain, and Russia.  The story of 
wartime aircraft production is impressive, as these fantastic numbers attest.  Yet, the production 
of hundreds of thousands of aircraft was only part of the story.  The delivery of aircraft around 
the world is another fascinating part of the narrative.
14
     
Moving nearly 300,000 aircraft world-wide required an effective transport system.  
According to Army Air Forces history:  
Pearl Harbor produced feverish improvisations in deployment of combat units in 
response to a rapidly changing strategic and tactical situation.  In the months immediately 
following 7 December 1941 aircraft allocations were in a constant state of flux….  But 
the enormous demands of the air war produced a huge outpouring of planes from the 
factories which made mandatory a distribution machine dwarfing anything previously 
contemplated by the AAF.
15
 
 
The development of an aircraft transport system was a work in progress.   
An American tendency is to approach problems systematically, and the U.S. military is 
no exception, frequently applying various systems to the myriad problems encountered during 
peace or war. The U.S. military also lacks talent in predicting or avoiding problems, some of 
which appear quite obvious such as moving several hundred thousand planes around the world or 
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the necessity for pack animals in mountain warfare.  Fortunately, an ability to adapt is another 
American characteristic that counters some of the deficiencies in farsightedness.  And while 
“system” implies a certain level of rigidity, structure, and routine, the U.S. military maintained 
flexibility during World War II, making adjustments until effective systems were applied, 
problems solved, and enemies defeated.  
 No effective method of aircraft transport existed prior to World War II. In 1940, the 
Army Air Force considered developing special ships to move assembled or partially assembled 
aircraft.  Funding allowances did not permit the advancement of the idea beyond the planning 
phase.  Navy aircraft carriers worked best for aircraft transportation, but the number of carriers 
for Navy operations was short, much less for helping out their Army comrades in arms.  The 
onset of war touched off a titanic increase in demands for shipping tonnage. The deployment of 
U.S. forces and supplying these and Allied forces stretched shipping space to the limit.  German 
U-boat activity added to the strain.  Shipping space was at a premium, and according to the 
Army Air Forces, “It was necessary to establish a control of shipping resources which was fully 
as tight as any other resources control system established during the war.”16 
 Various methods of aircraft transport were attempted.  Pilots of the Air Transport 
Command and civilian members of the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs) ferried planes 
to their destination.  Bombers and transport aircraft had longer range and could often make the 
journey if it was broken into segments.  Ferrying fighters and smaller aircraft was not an option 
because of their limited range.  Army Air Force technicians disassembled aircraft, which were 
placed in crates, loaded, and shipped.  The crating method proved time consuming and 
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expensive, due primarily to the uncrating and re-assemblage of aircraft.  Fully assembled, deck-
loaded aircraft were optimal.  The planes were easier to prepare for shipment, though the basic 
task of weather-proofing aircraft from exposure was tedious and time-consuming.  Fully 
assembled aircraft were also easier to unload, and the aircraft were nearly combat-ready on 
arrival. Unfortunately, most cargo ships could carry only five or six assembled aircraft. 
17
  
Several different vessels were used to transport aircraft.  Barges loaded with fully 
assembled aircraft were towed by another ship, both of which made easy targets for enemy 
submarines.  The Army Air Force requested the use of the Navy’s escort carriers to move Army 
aircraft.  The Joint Chiefs refused, deciding that escort carrier service in combat roles and 
convoy protection was more pressing than transporting aircraft.
18
 
One of the most novel vessels to transport aircraft was developed by Seatrain Lines, an 
innovator in rail and water transport.  Seatrain introduced ships during the 1930s capable of 
carrying one hundred fully loaded railroad cars.  Special cranes lifted the loaded railcars from 
adjacent tracks on to one of four decks aboard the ship. The ship’s decks had railroad track upon 
which the loaded railcars were placed.  The unloading and reloading of railcar content was 
unnecessary while portside, which saved time and minimized damage from multiple loadings. 
The process was reversed upon arrival at the destination.  The enormous size of Seatrains made 
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them viable aircraft transporters, but their use in this capacity was limited as the Army opted to 
move armor instead of aircraft by Seatrain.
19
  
Large size and adequate deck space made tankers a very practical alternative for aircraft 
transportation.  A main drawback, however, were the difficulties involved with lashing the 
planes to the tanker’s deck. Tankers required special prefabricated stands to hold the aircraft in 
place, which were costly to construct and installation was time-consuming.  Each stand held a 
particularly type of aircraft, and the stands were seldom adjustable for different models. Tankers 
proved more valuable at moving petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) and were never able to 
transport aircraft to theaters around the world in the numbers demanded.  
In the summer of 1943, the Army Air Force pressed for the development of a devoted 
aircraft transport.  Tests showed that converted Liberty ships worked well.  The ships were 
imperfect, for example, aircraft could not fly off of the ship’s deck, but these vessels were fairly 
easy to convert from existing ships.  The modified Liberty ships, designated the ZEC-2, proved 
so successful at aircraft transportation that the War Shipping Administration allocated funds to 
build a dozen of them.  The Army Air Force received eight ZEC-2s in February 1944, and 
requisitioned nineteen more in April 1944. The ZEC-2 carried forty-two fully assembled aircraft, 
less than the fifty-six carried by escort aircraft carriers but considerably more than the fourteen 
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carried by tankers. Production of the ZEC-class aircraft transport was steady until the war 
ended.
20
   
The ZEC-class aircraft transports epitomized the American way of war during World 
War II.  Boeing, Lockheed, and several other corporate giants built mass quantities of aircraft, 
but the means to move the planes to war zones was missing.  Ingenuity and adaptability 
overcame the problem of aircraft transportation and, once the missing link in the supply chain 
was found, then a steady application of “brute force” followed. 
The late Russell Weigley broke new ground in 1973 when he proposed that the United 
States fought wars in a marked, American fashion.  Weigley divided the U.S. military narrative 
into two distinct parts.  In the first phase, the resource-poor United States depended on wars of 
attrition that exhausted opponents.  The second phase occurred after the United States grew 
economically, especially after substantial industrial growth.  No longer strapped for resources 
and better able to afford the growing costs of war, an American way of war emerged that 
emphasized victory through annihilation.  Weigley contends that the North applied the second 
phase during the Civil War campaigns of Generals Grant and Sherman.  The annihilation phase 
reached its zenith in World War II after America harnessed its industrial power and military 
might for the complete and unconditional destruction of the Axis Powers.
21
   
Few theses in U.S. history have been more analyzed and criticized than Weigley’s 
“American way of war.”  One of its most cogent critiques is Brian Linn’s article, “The American 
Way of War Revisited,” in which Linn asserts that (among other things), Weigley does not 
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provide a clear definition of annihilation or attrition; that reducing national strategy into either 
attrition or annihilation is constraining and fails to consider alternatives, such as deterrence; and 
that it forgets that from the Civil War until the middle of World War II the American way of war 
was dominated by improvisation and practicality due to thin military budgets.  Linn continues to 
provide an implicit counter to the Weigley thesis and elucidate his views on an American way of 
war in The Echo of Battle: the Army’s Way of War, in which Linn examines how the military 
(including planners, warriors, and intellectuals) struggled to define war, and have never reaching 
a consensus on the way wars should be fought.
22
   
One aspect of Weigley’s thesis that has received widespread acceptance is the belief that 
American industrial output and mass productivity determined how the United States conducted 
war and defeated its enemies.  Conventional wisdom holds that America’s greatest contribution 
to Allied victory in World War II was less about battlefield exploits and more about mass 
production on the assembly line.  America simply out-produced its opponents and then 
annihilated them.   
In Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War, British historian 
John Ellis bluntly asserts that Allied victory was due to material preponderance and the 
enormous advantages the Allies enjoyed in firepower and supplies.  Victory was not a foregone 
conclusion, but Ellis insists that Allied victory was inevitable based on simple arithmetic:  the 
Allies produced more of the things necessary to wage all-out war than their Axis opponents.  
Ellis also states that, because of their vast superiority in war material, the Allies grew more and 
more dependent on massive firepower—brute force as he calls it—to defeat their foe.   
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“The American Army does not solve problems—it overwhelms them” is on the header of 
Ellis’s conclusion.  An American way of war existed that substituted mass firepower for finesse.  
In the end, according to Ellis, the Allies “inched forwards with extreme circumspection, only 
making progress as they did by resort to an overwhelming superiority of fire.”  There were 
hardly any strokes of military genius, but rather Allied forces lavishly equipped by American 
industry and dependent on sheer material superiority bludgeoned the Axis to death.
23
  
Contradicting Ellis is Williamson Murray and Allan Millett, co-authors of A War to be 
Won: Fighting the Second World War.  Murray and Millett echo Ellis’s sentiment that economic 
strength was important to ultimate victory, but that material superiority never by itself proved 
decisive.  According to Murray and Millett, winning World War II required the combined arms 
warfare, mass mobilization of industry, and flexibility when making strategic decisions that 
balanced ends against means. Another vital component to Allied victory, and a uniquely 
American way of war, was the contribution of “citizen soldiers,” who. Murray and Millett say, 
lacked tactical sophistication yet possessed tremendous adaptability and a talent for on-the-job 
training, so that “their learning curve was steady and steep.”24   
Keeping with the theme that victory went to those with the biggest or most guns is 
Richard Overy’s Why the Allies Won. Though not specifically about adaptability or an American 
way of war, Overy’s work provides a much clearer understanding of adaptability in defeating the 
Axis. Overy emphasizes economic mobilization and industrial might as a cornerstone to Allied 
success.  Indeed, one of Overy’s strong points is his use of statistics to illustrate how the 
belligerents compared in the war on production.  The strategic bomber plant at Willow Run, 
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Michigan, known as the “Grand Canyon of the Mechanized World” is one example Overy uses 
to demonstrate America’s knack for ingenuity and mass production, and how vital these talents 
were to the war effort.
25
 
However, Overy argues that winning also required something beyond better planes and 
bigger battalions.  Victory also depended on the moral resources of the belligerents.  Overy 
examines early Allied failures and asserts that a crucial element to Allied success was their self-
examination and then their necessary corrections.  Allied war planners, particularly the 
Americans, “stretch[ed] their strategic imaginations to embrace ways of warfare that were more 
ingenious and effective.”26  American leaders made changes against an opponent who grew 
complacent and operationally arthritic.  Beyond mass production Overy shows that the American 
adaptability developed into a “way of war” that greatly contributed to Allied victory.   
Michael Doubler’s Closing With the Enemy examines U.S. Army adaptability at the 
tactical level across Western Europe.  His narrative on the evolution of American combined arms 
warfare compelling argues that American success did not derive exclusively from superior 
firepower.  German defenses in the Norman hedgerows initially stymied American troops. A 
simple solution was discovered after a Second Armored Division non-commissioned officer 
blended ingenuity and brute force.  Sergeant Curtis G. Culin had the idea of taking German 
landing and beach obstacles, which were in ample supply, and welding them to the front of 
American armor. Sergeant Culin supervised the construction and the first hedgerow cutting tank 
was created from scrap iron pulled from a German road block. Tank dozers capable of busting 
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through the natural barriers soon appeared across the Norman countryside. The device was so 
successful that First Army commander, General Omar Bradley, ordered the Ordnance Section to 
assemble a fleet of tank dozers capable of busting through the natural barriers. American tanks 
powered through the breached hedgerow and applied heavy fire to suspected German positions.  
Doubler acknowledges the importance of firepower and material abundance. He also asserts that 
resources were no more decisive than an American talent for being quick studies in “the 
schoolhouse of war.”27 
American reliance on superior firepower, material abundance, and advancing technology 
is irrefutable in a number of theaters and campaigns, such as the Eastern Front, Western Europe, 
or Central Pacific.  Yet advantages in firepower, supplies, and technology were hardly the rule in 
war on the periphery.  America’s earliest combat ventures were in backwaters, lacking 
infrastructure and low among the Allies’ strategic priorities. Consequently, the resource-poor 
troops deployed to these areas did not rely on the triad of firepower, supply, and advancing 
technology.  Instead, they depended on ingenuity and economy in the peripheral theaters of 
North Africa, the Mediterranean, and CBI.   
Historians of war on the periphery most often view these theaters from the perspective of 
strategic value.  The argument over strategic goals and operations persisted throughout the war, 
and became no less acrimonious after hostilities ceased in 1945.  The debate, then and now, 
centers on the best strategy to defeat the Axis: a direct assault on enemy capitals or an oblique 
approach.  An indirect line of attack was chosen by Allied political leaders, at least until Allied 
(notably American) forces were mobilized sufficiently to conduct outright attacks against Axis 
centers of war.  Victory did not stop criticism of Allied war planners, and after nearly seventy 
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years of post-mortem, the debate still rages, not over why or how the Allies won but how they 
could have done so sooner.  
The logical approach to studying war on the periphery is to proceed by theaters and from 
such a study one gleans countless examples of adaptability’s prominent role as an American way 
of war in World War II.  In 1970, Trumbull Higgins summarized the first twenty-five years of 
scholarship on the Mediterranean Theater (MTO), asserting that most historians viewed the 
theater as Anglophobes or Anglophiles, colored by anti-colonial sentiments and Cold War bias.  
Generally, British historians regarded the MTO as vital and resented American reluctance to 
view it otherwise.  Americans tended to see the MTO as a waste that diverted much needed 
resources from a cross-channel assault on Western Europe.  An overwhelming sense of 
irrelevance hung over the MTO after the Normandy invasion.  “All roads lead to Rome, but 
Rome leads to nowhere” was a sentiment shared by many Americans serving in the MTO, and 
was shared by those writing about it in the decades immediately following the war.
28
   
Contemporary scholarship is more approving of the American initiation of war on the 
periphery, particularly operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean.   Rick Atkinson began 
his “Liberation Trilogy” with An Army at Dawn: the War in North Africa 19421-1943 followed 
by The Day of Battle: the War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944.  Atkinson asserts that American 
war planners, namely President Roosevelt, made the correct decision in sending troops to North 
Africa and Italy, which allowed the United States to gain much needed experience and grind 
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down Axis troops.  Likewise, Douglas Porch’s The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater 
in World War II contends that the MTO was “pivotal” to the second front in France and overall 
German defeat.  And while the MTO is no longer viewed exclusively as a strategic cul-de-sac, 
the debate over the strategic value of war on the periphery versus war on the enemy heartland(s) 
endures.
29
 
Consent supporting American operations in China is more elusive.  China was to be 
America’s great Asian ally waging war against Japan.  China received significant aid and 
military training from the United States, but with the exception of some tactically successful 
campaigns in Burma, American strategic goals did not bear fruit in CBI. The reasons for China’s 
lackluster performance as an Allied Power are numerous, and so are assessments of the value of 
the CBI Theater to the war effort.  
30
 
However, waging war in the backwaters was indispensable to Allied victory. The war 
was truly global in scope, becoming one of history’s greatest corporate undertakings, and 
necessitating mass mobilization by the belligerents.  It also required seeking out and destroying 
opponents regardless of locale.  As Murray and Millett affirm, victory demanded the death and 
destruction of soldiers and civilians alike, in “terrible killing battles,” and lengthy campaigns.  
Winning could not be achieved quickly, because waging such a war was a massive, time 
consuming process.  Neither was the war confined to places of convenience.  Contrary to 
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predictions by armor advocates in the 1930s, the next major war was not constrained to places 
with roadways and developed infrastructure.  Rather, forces were deployed to trackless deserts, 
snowy mountains, and dense jungles because these were also arenas “where important wars are 
fought.”31    
The role of adaptability in the American way of war has not been fully explored, 
regardless of whether examining central or secondary theaters in World War II.  James 
Ehrmann’s unpublished dissertation makes a great effort at documenting the role of American 
adaptability through a study of logistics in the CBI Theater.  The present dissertation is hardly 
definitive, but it will also include the austerely supported Allied efforts in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean, where ingenuity and improvisation replaced material superiority as an American 
way of war. The Army’s regression to and reliance on animal power in these theater backwaters 
demonstrates one aspect of the U.S. military’s adaptive nature, and the Army’s use of animal 
power in World War II is the framework upon which this dissertation is built. 
32
   
America’s contribution to Allied victory transcends material.  America practiced a unique 
way of war centering on adaptability, and the nature of American adaptability was equally vital 
to Allied success.  One facet of the Army’s ability to adapt, in a sense regressing to move 
forward, can be seen in the multifunctional use of mules in World War II.  
 Americans possessed material abundance in campaigns across Western Europe and the 
Central Pacific in 1944 and 1945, as German and Japanese prisoners attested. Mountains of 
artillery shells, fuel, and food, however, did not exist in the backwater “sideshows.”  American 
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military success on the periphery was not due to material abundance, nor to a greater sense of 
determination.  America won the backwater campaigns because the nature of American 
adaptability was cultivated over the centuries and converted from a way of life to an American 
way of war.
23 
 
 
Chapter 1: Of Mules and Men 
 
 The mission of pack transportation is simply stated:  transport loads on the backs of 
animals over terrain that is difficult or impassable for wheeled or tracked vehicles.
1
  Over many 
millennia militaries around the world have employed beasts of burden, including dogs, horses, 
donkeys, oxen, camels, elephants, and llamas.  The varied types of horses and their highly 
adaptable nature allowed horses a widespread popularity as pack animals. The history of horse 
domestication is unclear. The most convincing evidence indicates that charioteers regularly 
employed horses in Mesopotamia around 2,000 BCE. The most successful sumpter, however, 
has been the mule.
2
  
 Mule breeding first occurred in Egypt and Mesopotamia where domesticated donkey and 
horse populations were increasing around 1,500 BCE. Breeding in the wild between donkeys and 
horses was possible. However, it is most likely that humans manipulated the breeding of donkeys 
with horses since the mule offspring displayed top qualities as pack animals. Mule populations 
rose during the Greco-Roman periods, with widespread deployment of pack mules by Roman 
legions.  Peasant farmers and royalty alike used mules extensively during the Middle Ages to 
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pack and pull heavy loads, though horses garner more attention than mules in contemporary 
accounts and art.  
 Mules in America trace their lineage to Spain. Columbus imported Spanish donkeys to 
the New World, as did Cortez who introduced horses and donkeys to the Aztecs of Mexico 
in1519. The horses were of Arabian stock and the donkeys were descendents of the North 
African wild ass, both of which were tailored for the arid climate of Mexico. The North 
American equine population rose as European imports grew and as Spanish and Native 
Americans bred horses. They also bred donkeys (or burros) with horses, and the mule population 
gradually increased.  
 Mules proved hardy, being able to withstand a variety of climates, and subsist on low 
quality food sources. They became a good economical choice for farmers scratching out a living 
on the frontier of colonial America. Wealthy American colonists bred mules. George 
Washington received a gift from Spanish royalty in 1788 that included some of the first 
Mammoth Jack stock.  A standard donkey weighs 450 to 500 pounds and stands 36 to 54 inches. 
Mammoth Jacks weigh over 550 pounds and measure over 54 inches. By the 1820s Mammoth 
Jack imports from Europe were steady, and by the 1840s breeding of Kentucky and Tennessee 
thoroughbreds with Mammoth Jacks produced exceptionally large, durable mules known as 
American Mammoth Jacks. Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee became the nation’s top mule 
producing states by mid-nineteenth century.  
 U.S. imports of European jack stock tapered off by the 1870s. American mule breeders 
were hardly concerned as the number of American Mammoth Jacks rose steadily in the early 
Twentieth century. The “Roaring Twenties” found America’s automobile craze moving into high 
gear, but the number of registered American Mammoth Jack stock peaked in 1920 at 5,000,000 
25 
 
animals.  The Army would have a vast pool from which to draw whenever the need for pack 
animals arose.
3
  
 The reason for mule superiority as a pack animal is genetic.  Cross breeding Equus asinus 
(donkeys) with Equus caballus (horses) produced the mule hybrid. That is, when a donkey 
breeds with a female horse, the offspring is a mule. Occasionally male horses breed with female 
donkeys, producing a hinny, but the conception rate from such couplings is low and mortality 
rates are high. The offspring in either case are called mules. Regardless of gender, all mules are 
sterile and cannot reproduce.  Mules are a textbook example of heterosis or hybrid vigor, which 
is the improved or increased function of any biological quality in a hybrid offspring.  
 Mules excel as pack animals because hybrid vigor allows them to posses the best 
qualities of each parent. The mule’s large, thick head and long ears resemble a donkey, as do its 
thin legs and small hooves. Mule hooves are smaller, requiring smaller shoes, and their feet are 
harder than horses, which makes mules resistant to foot injury and disease. The smaller hooves 
produce less weight displacement, but this can be detrimental when operating in boggy soil 
because the animal is apt to sink.  
 The height and body shape of mules resemble a horse, particularly their neck and hind-
quarters. The mule’s mane, tail, and coat are also horse-like, though their skin differs. The skin 
of a mule is much tougher than a horse. Consequently, mules are less prone to develop saddle 
sores or skin injuries and can withstand extended periods of heat or rain.  Similar to their parents, 
mules can be quite noisy, combining a donkey bray and horse whinny to make a raucous sound 
that the Army was obliged to excise during combat operations in World War II.  
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 Beyond physical appearance, hybrid vigor is most apparent in mule temperament and 
labor capacity. Mules possess the endurance and patience of a donkey, along with a donkey’s 
weight-bearing capabilities and sure-footedness. Because of their similarity in size, the mule 
shares the power and strength of a horse. Mules also possess the courageous nature of horses, 
though aficionados of either animal disagree to what extent this characteristic is shared. Mules 
are preoccupied with self preservation, making them seem more stubborn than brave.  However, 
with minimal training mules can contend with the most alarming circumstances.  
 One donkey-like characteristic of mules is their herd mentality. Mules generally remain 
bunched up, even when their lives are threatened. Horses, like most herbivorous prey animal, 
will bolt from the first sign of danger. Mules are exceptional in the combat pack role because 
they become essentially impervious to fire. The down side of this habit is that when troops need 
mules to scatter, such as during an artillery or air attack, the mules remain clustered and sustain 
heavier losses. 
 Another by-product of hybrid vigor is mule weight and size. Mules are often larger than 
their parents. An average horse weighs 1,100 pounds and is about 54 to 64 inches high. A 
standard donkey weighs 450 to 500 pounds and stands 36 to 54 inches. The average Army pack 
mule weighed 1,000 pounds and was around 60 inches tall.  Like most equine, mules are 
measured by hands, which is the equivalent of four inches. Thus, an average mule would be 
fifteen hands high.  
 Daily food and water consumption for a standard sized pack mule is 19 pounds (10 
pounds of hay and 9 pounds of grain), and 10 gallons of water (roughly 80 pounds).  A horse 
needs slightly more food, requiring 24 pounds (14 pounds of hay and 10 pounds of grain), and 10 
gallons of water.  The five pound weight difference in the daily food intake between a mule and 
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a horse seem minor, but the variation of a few pounds become major considerations when 
calculating the amount of material to pack and the number of animals to move it.
4
   
 In cases where terrain is exceptionally rugged and devoid of grazing and water sources, 
the number of animals required to haul forage and water for the pack train outnumbered those 
animals moving combat equipment and supplies. One of the main disadvantages to pack 
transportation is the forage requirement of its animals, particularly when the animals are required 
to carry their own forage and water. Payloads of other cargo must be reduced, making pack 
transportation “very uneconomical.”5 When every ounce of cargo must be factored and only 
essential items can be loaded, the mule’s reduced food requirement give them an edge over 
horses as pack animals. 
 The U.S. Army employed three distinct classifications of pack animals. First, there were 
cargo pack trains, which moved heavy, bulky items secured to saddles by ropes. Second, there 
were artillery pack units, which moved heavy howitzer parts, communication equipment, and 
ammunition secured to saddles with special arches and hangers. The first two units moved 
slowly at the walk or amble. Third, there were horse cavalry units, which moved lighter loads on 
specially equipped saddles with hangers designed to maintain balance at the walk, trot, and 
gallop. Cargo and artillery units preferred mules, and used them almost exclusively. Cavalry 
units preferred horses, though mules were also used. Mules are quick and capable of maintaining 
a gait or gallop, though horses can maintain a gallop for longer distances. The use of Army horse 
cavalry in World War II was negligible. The employment of cargo and artillery pack units, 
however, was widespread and is the focus of this dissertation.  
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 Pack unit success depended on three things. First was the selection of animals.  
According to FM 25-7: 
  In general, a pack mule should be from 14 3/4 to 15 1/2 hands in height and weigh 
 1,000 to 1,200 pounds. He should be compact, stockily built, and have a short neck; 
 short, straight, strong, and well-muscled back and loins; low withers and croup [rump]; 
 large barrel [belly] with deep girth; straight, strong legs; and good feet. In addition to 
 desirable physical proportions, pack animals should be gentle and have friendly 
 dispositions. They should have no fear of man and should be free of vices and vicious 
 habits.
6
  
 
Procuring properly proportioned mules was not difficult. Even though the United States was 
shifting toward full motorization, the quantity of healthy mule stock remained high. Finding 
mules with “friendly dispositions” proved more difficult, and finding large quantities of qualified 
personnel was equally problematic.  
 Selection of personnel was also instrumental in pack unit success. According to FM 25-7, 
“The mobility of pack transportation in the field depends in a great measure upon the gentleness 
and willingness of the pack animals.”  Obtaining pack animal “willingness” depended largely on 
the men training the mules. Pack trainers were “selected because of their knowledge and lack of 
fear of animals. Their personal qualities should include patience, kindliness, and firmness.”7  
Like finding “friendly” mules, finding qualified personnel was a tall order. Many Americans 
retained their knowledge of animal husbandry, in spite of the steady migration from rural to 
urban centers.  Finding and recruiting those with the kind of knowledge was another challenge 
for the Army, particularly once the war began and time was of the essence.  
 The third element to pack unit success was conditioning and training. Training on the 
types of terrain over which the pack units operated was crucial. Thus, the implementation of 
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carefully planned training programs involved “extensive practice in packing all types of loads, 
and marching of the animals under full loads over all types of terrain.”  Daily marches over 
varied terrain conditioned mules and men for overseas deployment.  The training curriculum 
included gentling, or breaking instinctual fears and developing confidence between mules and 
men, as well as leading, riding, and standing.  Once mastered, packing followed.  
 Packing took several days to learn. After around ten days of riding, pack troops placed an 
empty or unloaded pack saddle on the animal. Pack troops increased the weight each day added 
until reaching the mule’s full load of around 250 pounds.  Troops made the mules stand quietly 
while they adjusted loads, and then the troops ordered their mule to move slowly for short 
distances.  
 A unique characteristic of mules is their fondness for mares. Keeping a mare with the 
mules makes them more docile. Also, attaching a bell to the mare’s neck improves handling 
because the mules associate the bell with the mare’s presence. The bell mare, often led by a 
mounted rider, leads the pack mules in a herd at a slow gait around the pen. The herding 
principal worked well for Army mules in certain circumstances, particularly in wider, open areas. 
It was not effective, however, in the narrow confines of jungle trails or mountain ledges. These 
conditions required individual trooperss leading one or two mules. 
 A crucial component of successful pack unit training was what the Army called “battle 
inoculation,” or getting the mules mentally conditioned to the many sights, sounds, and odors of 
the combat zone. Most mules quickly learned to disassociate the sensory overload of battle from 
pain and harm to themselves.  Inoculation included exposure to motor parks, where engines 
roared, metal banged, and heavy equipment ran; low flying aircraft, artillery and gunfire of all 
calibers; and various odors including gasoline, smoke, and “disintegrating flesh and rotting 
30 
 
vegetation.”  Battlefield training also involved crossing narrow bridges, jumping ditches, 
walking up and down steep inclines, and “taking slides confidently and without hesitation.”8 The 
unshakable nature of mules to battle stress was another positive trait that furthered their 
reputation as excellent combat pack animals. 
 Army pack mules carried three types of saddles. The largest was the Phillips cargo pack 
saddle. It weighed 95 pounds and all pack trains, pack artillery units, and heavy infantry weapons 
units (such as machine guns and mortars) used model. The frame was made of steel arches, steel 
hanger bars, aluminum side bars, spring steel ribs, and aluminum bottom bars, all of which 
provide a single unit upon which troops packed various loads.  
 The saddle frame included two pads. The pads cushioned the weight of the frame and 
cargo against the animal’s back. Each pad was made of leather reinforced internally by 
aluminum alloy ribs. Curled horse hair filled the pads, which maintained resiliency and leather 
thongs kept the pads in place. Five holes in the back of each pad allowed troopers to make quick 
adjustment of the leather thongs. Attached to the lower corner of each pad was an aluminum bar 
with footrests, which keeps the pads off the ground when not in use.  
 A leather-trimmed piece of canvas covered the frame and pads, protecting them from the 
elements. The cover included various cinches and breeches to prevent the saddle from riding 
forward or backward along the animal’s back. A woven mohair pad served as a cushion between 
the saddle pads and the animal’s back. The mohair quickly conformed to the animal’s back, 
eliminating most of the friction. The saddle and pads were designed to reduce animal discomfort 
and make for easy adjustments.
9
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 The second most commonly used saddle was the Phillips cavalry pack saddle. The 
cavalry pack saddle weighed 45 pounds and designed around an aluminum alloy frame. It 
included pads, though not as thick as the cargo pack saddle. Like the cargo pack saddle, it 
included an assortment of cinches, breeches, and d-rings for hanging items, but the Phillips 
cavalry pack saddle was for riding by pack masters. It was not intended to haul cargo, thus it did 
not include the weight or trappings of its larger cargo pack saddle counterpart.  
 Later in the war (1944), the Army designed a third saddle, called the Phillips cavalry 
pack saddle, Modified (or China Special). The China Special weighed around 70 pounds and was 
similar to the earlier cavalry pack saddle in that it was smaller than the larger cargo pack saddle. 
It was designed for animals approximately 800 pounds and accommodated the shorter native 
animals from Australia and CBI. However, the China Special was not for riding. The frame 
included steel arches (instead of aluminum alloy) and much thicker pads. It also had a special 
breast collar to minimize slippage of high-riding loads, particularly the howitzer loads of pack 
artillery units.
10
 
 Troops carefully placed cargo on the saddle and they lashed or tied it to hangers on the 
saddle. Troops placed a large piece of canvas, called a manta, around the cargo. The manta 
protected the articles from sun, rain, dust, and the insatiable appetite of most mules. Assorted 
hitches then fastened and secured the manta-wrapped cargo. Optimally, two men placed the 95 
pound saddle on the mule, and assisted one another with the cinching. It was much easier for two 
men to pass rope back and forth over and around the mule, no matter how still the mule stood. 
Often mule skinners worked alone, developing considerable upper body strength and a knack for 
knot-tying.  
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 The typical pack unit included approximately 300 mules and 75 men divided into four 
categories of personnel, though the term “muleskinner” loosely applied to all men working with 
mules.
11
  First were packers, whose responsibilities included training and basic animal care, 
maintaining equipment, preparing cargo, slinging, lashing, and hitching all loads.  At the end of 
the day, the packers removed all loads, fed, watered, and groomed their mules, and repaired 
lines. The cargador oversaw packers and assisted the packmaster. He assigned specific mules and 
equipment to packers and instructed packers as to the type of load each mule should carry, 
making sure that loads were balanced. Cargadors also served as saddlers and repaired damaged 
tack.  
 The pack master was “responsible for the presence, care, and maintenance of all pack 
equipment and animals of his unit.”12 The pack master rode the column constantly checking and 
adjusting loads and monitoring the condition of mules and men.  The pack train commander was 
the officer in charge of the pack train and supervised the march. The commander maintained 
contact with the forward echelon and preceded the train to find suitable bivouac, including cargo 
areas, supply depots, and picket lines. Preferable bivouac sites had protection from air and 
artillery strikes, close proximity to water, and an open grazing area. The commander made sure 
that all animals were fed, watered, and groomed, all equipment repaired, and cargo 
systematically arranged and readily available. 
 Textbook training and mule capabilities projected that a pack train could move twenty 
miles daily, with mules carrying 200 to 250 pounds of cargo over “non-mountainous” terrain. 
When pack units encountered mountains, which was almost always the case in missions 
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requiring pack mules, commanders reduced the march distance to ten to fifteen miles daily, 
though the load remained the same. In some cases the distance travelled was greater (such as 
General Truscott’s Third Infantry in Italy) or it was greatly decreased (such as Colonel Hunter’s 
force in Burma). However, most pack units maintained these averages. The pack transportation 
mission was accomplished as firepower and supplies were delivered “on the backs of animals” to 
places where vehicles could not travel. Such were the capabilities, responsibilities, and 
challenges of mule units and the soldiers who operated them.    
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Figure I-1. A fine example of a pack artillery mule. The 240-pound front trail howitzer 
piece secured to the 95-pound Phillips cargo pack saddle required exceptionally stout 
animals serving as “gun” mules. (Image available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
vetscor, accessed August 1, 2012). 
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Chapter 2: Shifting Gears 
A basic understanding of logistics is necessary to appreciate Army adaptability and 
animal power in World War II. Inhu the 1830s, Antoine Henri Jomini theorized that the art of 
war rested on three pillars: strategy, grand tactics, and logistics. The term “logistics” derives 
from the Greek word “logistikos,” meaning “skilled in calculating,” and computation is a vital 
component of logistics. However, the main task of logistics is supply and transportation. An 
adage goes “amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.”  Indeed, tactics have a heroic 
appeal and, perhaps, military history is still governed by the Clausewitzean ideal that the primary 
function of soldiers is to use the tools of war, not fashion or provide them. Nevertheless, the 
greatest tactics cannot be successfully employed without supplying first those who are executing 
the plans. Contrary to most film and general battle histories, well-equipped troops do not simply 
appear, fight, and then exit the battlefield.  Instead, battles are a complicated, multi-stepped 
process that involves attention to details, i.e. logistics. The larger the army, the greater the 
logistician’s task of orchestrating and supplying men with material needed for battle. 1  
Huge armies using mass firepower characterized wars during the early to mid twentieth 
century. Thus, the task of supplying beans and bullets increased to unimagined levels. Success 
went to the side that not only out produced opponents, but also adapted and kept a continuous 
flow of supplies to their troops.  From December 1941 to September 1945, the U.S. produced 
some 84,000 tanks, 2.2 million trucks, and 350,000 artillery pieces; and shipped over seven 
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million troops overseas. The days of an army subsisting off of the land, akin to Napoleon or 
Sherman, were over. In World War II, the U.S. Army did not minimize supply lines, but rather 
produced a “series of endless conveyor belts,” and while the supply chain grew longer, the Army 
frequently adjusted so that supplies continually moved down the chain.
2
 
Like most armies during the first half of the twentieth century, the U.S. Army adopted 
strategy and tactics that relied on mass numbers and mass firepower. The dependence on more 
men and more guns required a system that provided continuous supply, and here is where the 
U.S. Army differed. Unlike their rivals, the U.S. Army improved their supply system, and often 
lavished their troops with supplies.  According to Richard Leighton, “By employing myriads of 
ships, trucks, and other transport, stocking supplies in depth on a huge scale, and copying the 
managerial techniques of American big business, the U.S. Army was able to achieve a continuity 
and volume of supply…” that could not be equaled.3 Leighton’s statement is uncontestable, but it 
should not be misinterpreted or used to reduce America’s main contribution to one of simple 
mass production during World War II. The “myriads of ships” and mountains of material must 
not overshadow the equally important element of adaptability. The U.S. military employed 
unparalleled quantities of material, but the mountains of material were inconsequential without 
the ability to adapt their supply system to the war’s changing landscape. 
Sustained advancement of armies requires continuous resupply, and they follow standard 
elements of a supply system. The basic supply system includes procurement and collection, 
followed by the transportation of supplies. Transportation of supplies for the U.S. military 
occurred in the following manner. Material moved by rail to an American port, then shipped to a 
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foreign port, and moved to a railhead. Material then moved from the railhead to a truck depot, 
and finally trucked to supply depots where it was collected at convenient distribution points near 
the front. Adhering to this supply system was easier during World War I because of the static 
positions, which allowed supplies to be amassed at distribution points very near the front. The 
mobility of World War II, however, strained the supply chain because stockpiles were forced to 
keep pace with fluid battle lines. Breakthroughs by one’s own forces were nearly as complicating 
as those by the enemy, because keeping pace and continuously supplying the voracious appetite 
of the combat arms was nearly impossible. 
Continuous supply was further challenged by the destruction of infrastructure. Retreating 
enemy forces often destroyed rails, roads, and bridges. Likewise, the careful interdiction of 
supply lines by Allied forces was just as problematic. For example, months of preliminary air 
strikes against French transportation networks preceded the Normandy invasion in an effort to 
reduce German counterattacks. However, the methodical destruction of roads and rails by Allied 
air power rendered these supply lines unusable by Allied ground forces attempting to break out. 
Feverish efforts to rebuild damaged infrastructure, combined with the creative and “lavish use of 
all forms of transportation available,” eventually allowed the Allies to break out of Normandy.4 
The supply chain grew longer as Allied forces advanced further toward Germany, and the 
vital railroad link in the chain had been destroyed. A partial solution to this problem was found 
by using trucks. Trucks were normally the last link in the supply chain, and usually operated 
short distances. However, the Army altered their supply system and replaced the missing railroad 
link with trucks in the supply chain. Trucks hauled supplies greater distances and moved 
quantities far exceeding the amount normally planned in Army supply tables.  
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Plans for the Normandy invasion calculated a slow initial drive, allowing supplies to keep 
pace with the advance. The Army was to gradually move east toward the Seine River, where they 
would regroup and supplies would catch up. Supplies were to be stockpiled before proceeding on 
toward the Rhine. Initially, things went pretty well according to plan. Trucks and reserve 
stockpiles grew quickly on the Normandy beach head, and no immediate breakout occurred. 
Three weeks after the initial landing (D+21), some 177,000 trucks and one-half million tons of 
supplies sat on the beach at Normandy. Unfortunately, the port at Cherbourg was not operating, 
and no pipelines were available to move mass quantities of fuel to Allied forces slowly moving 
away from the beach. Then, during the last week of July 1944, the First and Third Armies broke 
out, rapidly moving east and further away from supply stocks at Normandy. Fuel reserves were 
quickly consumed and trucks made daily runs hauling fuel from the beach to the front. 
The plan to regroup near the Seine River did not happen. The First and Third Armies 
pursued the fleeing Germans, with some ninety percent of all supplies still at depots back at 
Normandy. In about one month’s time, the First and Third Armies jumped three hundred miles 
beyond their supply stocks, and in thirty days they moved a distance that was expected to take 
seventy.  By D+90, when the Army planned to be nearing the Seine River for a scheduled build-
up, advance elements of the Third Army were two hundred miles beyond the Seine River. The 
supply system was in chaos and Army forces ground to a halt.
5
 
The ports and railroads were inoperable, so without any advanced planning an impromptu 
solution was found. Trucks replaced the missing links in the supply chain, and continuously 
hauled supplies over three hundred miles down a one-way loop highway system. The Red Ball 
Express, as it was known, originated at St. Lo and ended at Versailles near Paris. The non-stop 
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convoy travelled down two restricted-access routes, with deliveries coming from the northern 
route and returns made along the southern route. Operating from late August to early November 
1944, the Red Ball Express moved 500,000 tons of supplies, kept the Army advancing, and 
allowed support troops to rebuild the ports and railroads that sustained the final Allied drive into 
Germany.  The feat of the Red Ball Express illustrates how a system-driven Army successfully 
adjusted on the fly and replaced a missing link in the supply chain.
6
  
Rapid, “blitzkrieg” advances did occur, but this type of war was not a hard, fast rule. In 
many areas, such as the Mediterranean Theater and China-Burma-India, terrain often hindered 
continuous supply. The pace of war slowed down, but supply needs remained high. When the 
Army’s supply system of ships, rails, and trucks encountered terrain difficulties, another link was 
added to the supply chain by using pack animals. Truck and motor transportation could not move 
supplies to troops fighting in mountains or jungles, and the Army soon realized that animal 
power was the most efficient supply method in these areas. Returning to animal power for supply 
purposes seems logical and very apparent in retrospect, but this switch was not so obvious to 
those who fought for decades to replace pack animals with motors and machines. 
  The focal point of this work is animal power in the U.S. military, specifically the use of 
mules by the Army in World War II. The work does not begin with much mention of mules or 
the Army. Instead, its beginning is at the end of the nineteenth century with the birth of what 
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James J. Flink called “automobility.”7  The early American history of automobiles is a logical 
point of origin for the present work. First, the period perfectly demonstrates American 
adaptability, which is the main theme of this work. Second, examining the period will clearly 
show the depth and breadth of America’s “car consciousness” which developed over a fairly 
short period. Third, American automobile history illustrates that during the late 1930s America 
was well on the road to complete automobile dependency, so that by World War II it was an 
even greater feat of adaptability to shift gears again and use animal power in certain theaters of 
war.  
 In June 1895, twenty two automobiles competed in a race was conducted from Paris to 
Bordeaux and back to Paris, France. Nine of the vehicles finished the 727-mile endurance test. 
The results of this race were not lost on the American public and its impact was two-fold.  First, 
many Americans viewed this event as proof that the day would soon come when animal power 
was replaced by a more advanced form of transportation:  the internal combustion-gas-powered 
motorcar.  Second, the race inspired Americans to adopt a largely European innovation and adapt 
it to their needs, leaving a uniquely American mark on the automobile and indelibly changing 
American culture. Countless American automotive periodicals were published, and only five 
months after the Paris-Bordeaux-Paris race Horseless Age proclaimed: “All signs point to the 
motor vehicle as the necessary sequence of methods of locomotion already established and 
approved. The growing needs of our civilization demand it; the public believes in it; and await 
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with lively interest its practical application to the daily business of the world.” 8  The statement 
was overly enthusiastic, but it did herald a growing, widespread shift in American attitudes 
regarding transportation. In 1899 approximately 2,500 motor vehicles were produced in the 
United States.  By 1910 approximately 458,000 were registered in America.
9
 Clearly the country 
was in an epic, transitional period that would necessitate adaptability on an equally grand scale.  
The nation was shifting gears, and even those in conservative, rural America were 
gradually warming to the idea of motor transportation and mechanization. Motor transportation 
became a weapon used by farmers to battle railroad monopolies and rising transportation costs. 
Mechanization, primarily in the form of tractors, improved farm production and greatly increased 
crop yields. The number of tractors produced did not start rising until 1920, and the number of 
draft animals actually increased from 1910 until shortly after World War I.  Around 1920, 
however, animal power began a continual decline, with motor transport and mechanization 
making a steady, rapid rise in American agriculture.
10
  
The United States Army, as with most institutions steeped in tradition, has generally been 
considered a bastion of conservatism. It is not surprising that the Army was slow to embrace 
motorization and mechanization.
11
  Yet, similar to the impact of automobiles on the American 
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public, the Army experienced radical change compliments of automobility. The change 
experienced by the Army during the first four decades of the Twentieth century was more 
evolutionary than revolutionary. Nonetheless, the technological advances in the first half of 
twentieth century dramatically affected the development and characteristics of the U.S. military; 
and few advances in technology had as significant an impact on the Army as the adoption of 
automotive technology.
12
 
Most European powers found within the first decade of the twentieth century that motor 
transport was superior to animal-driven transportation of military men and material. By 1914 
animal power had been largely replaced by motor vehicles, though the scope and scale of The 
Great War proved that these countries were still woefully unprepared to meet the supply 
demands of total war. The U.S. Army was not as far-sighted as their European counterparts.  
The Quartermaster Department Equipment Board formed in 1900, but showed little 
interest in motorization other than as a novel curiosity. A few members of the Board became 
advocates of motor vehicles, such as Captain J.M. Carson of the Quartermaster Department. 
Carson pointed out the weaknesses of horse and mule power, particularly the difficulties in 
maintaining and training draft animals, and the slow speed of animal power as compared to 
motor vehicles. Carson recognized that motor vehicles could not completely replace horses and 
mules for carrying men and supplies in the field or off-road, but motor transportation could move 
larger quantities of men and supplies from railheads to forward depots, thus “eliminating huge 
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trains of wagons and herds of animals.” He also proposed that motor vehicles could move sick 
and wounded much quicker than animal power. Captain Carson’s recommendations were flatly 
rejected as the Board concluded that “aside from the limited use which may be made as an 
adjunct to our present methods of transportation, the machines are of no value to the Army.”13   
Two issues hindered motorization of the Quartermaster Department and supply service in 
the early twentieth century.   First, auto manufacturers were hesitant to produce military vehicles. 
Automotive firms saw little profit in making a limited number of motor vehicles for the Army 
when these companies could mass produce and sell growing quantities to an enthusiastic buying-
public. Similarly, auto manufacturers had a genuine concern that military contracts would be 
cancelled due to budgetary constraints. Defense spending was meager, and for a time annual cuts 
were such that companies were reluctant to commit to Army contracts, fearing the very real 
possibility of the Army defaulting on its promises. Second, a general sense of apathy toward 
motorization and mechanization dominated the supply services and combat arms. Both were 
governed by an older generation of officers who clung to tradition and saw little, if any, benefit 
in converting to motorized or mechanized forces.  This attitude, combined with severe fiscal 
limitations, fueled widespread indifference to technological advancements by the Army in the 
early 1900s. 
14
 
In 1910, attitudes toward motorization began slowly changing in the Army. The rapid rise 
in automobile production and ownership by the public was one reason. Likewise, the reliability 
and durability of automotive vehicles steadily improved, making automobiles more attractive for 
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military purposes. Improvements in vehicle quality provided the few auto advocates something 
with which to counter opponents of motorization and mechanization in the military.  
Army maneuvers provided excellent case studies for the potential use of motor vehicles. 
The Massachusetts maneuvers in 1909 included the use of between fifteen and twenty motor 
vehicles. Most were used as ambulances and the transportation of supplies. Detailed records 
were kept and Army officers observing the maneuvers concluded that trucks were “considerably 
more economical than horse-drawn transport.” 15 Also, all vehicles in the Massachusetts 
maneuvers were standard, commercial-grade trucks, which were “able to handle all the difficult 
road conditions they encountered” and “were able to move rapidly, without significant 
mechanical problems, in spite of the difficult road conditions.”16  One final note regarding the 
Massachusetts maneuvers was that the Army owned none of the vehicles used in the operation. 
Most were rented daily or were the personal vehicles of officers and men participating in the 
maneuvers. These actions illustrate that a shift (albeit a slight one) toward motor transportation 
was taking place. The use of privately owned or rented vehicles also typifies the adaptive nature 
of American military personnel. 
Further evidence of the Army’s changing attitude toward motorization was seen in 
reports. According to the U.S. Army Infantry Equipment Board’s twelve month study: “The 
extensive use to which automobile transportation has been developed in commercial life…leads 
to the belief that it can be advantageously adapted to our military necessities and urges the 
careful consideration of the subject.”  The Board also included a caveat: “It is not the belief of 
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the Board that automobile transportation should ever entirely replace the present animal 
transportation for the reason that many occasions and conditions will always arise when such 
transportation will be necessary....”17 Whether or not the Board was being cautious or far-sighted 
to suggest the use of both forms of transportation is difficult to determine. However, the Army’s 
intention to begin implementing motorized transportation was clear.  
Field and durability tests were conducted by the Quartermaster Department in 1912. 
Beginning on February 6, 1912 five commercial motor trucks departed Washington, D.C. and 
travelled to Richmond, Charlotte, North Carolina, Atlanta, Georgia, Nashville, Tennessee and 
then Louisville, Kentucky on to Fort Benjamin Harrison near Indianapolis. Three trucks 
continued the journey on to Dubuque, Iowa, where they supplied an infantry regiment in the area 
until the maneuvers and tests were completed in July 1912. The mission was tiny and not without 
problems, but was considered a success by the Quartermaster Department, as the motor vehicles 
were able to withstand rugged conditions.
18
 
Support for motor vehicles grew, but some in the Army complained about using 
commercial vehicles and wanted, instead, a vehicle that was made to military standards. As one 
officer mused, if a company produced a vehicle specifically for military use, then mules would 
become “a thing of the past soon to be relegated to the zoo.”19  Animal power, particularly 
mules, was still a long way from becoming a relic of the past, but motorization for supply 
purposes progressed and in 1916 the principal of motor transport appeared to be coming of age.  
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On March 9, 1916, Mexican rebels led by Francisco “Pancho” Villa attacked Columbus, 
New Mexico, killing fifteen American civilians. The United States’ response was swift as 
General John J. Pershing and some 10,000 troops entered Mexico the next day. The Punitive 
Expedition was conducted from March 1916 until February 1917. Nearly all Regular Army 
troops were involved and over 112,000 National Guard troops were mobilized, creating massive 
logistical and supply headaches. The success of the Punitive Expedition has been the subject of 
much debate, but America’s foray into Mexico unquestionably provided excellent schooling for 
Army logisticians and supply services.
20
 
The Punitive Expedition exemplified the military’s adaptive nature. The Expedition into 
Mexico was the first time the Army utilized motor transportation on any sizable level, as well as 
aircraft, though on a diminutive scale. However, animals remained the prime mover of men and 
material because mechanical problems continued to occur. These break-downs were aggravated 
by Mexico’s harsh conditions and the heavy toll on motor trucks steadily rose.  
Commercial trucks by 1916 had improved in durability, but off-road operations in 
northern Mexico proved quite different compared to cross-country endurance tests on American 
roads. The Army had yet to receive a standard military-grade vehicle and was forced to utilize 
machines that were straight “off the rack” or the same vehicles mass-produced and sold for 
civilian use. Most of the vehicles were of sound quality, but simply not built to handle the rigors 
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and abuse of military operations under abysmal conditions.
21
 Similarly, the commercial vehicles 
that had previously been in Army service or had proven most durable were in short supply when 
operations in Mexico commenced.  
The Quartermaster Department came up with a simple and quick solution to the motor 
vehicle shortage.  As there was no time for the usual road- tests, the Quartermaster ordered all 
interested truck manufacturers to apply with an ad hoc committee composed of Quartermaster 
Department members. The manufacturers were “given authority to place their trucks on the line 
of communication at Columbus, N. Mexico for demonstration and test.” The results were 
“carefully observed, and upon their performance…subsequent purchases were made.”  These in-
the-field trials rapidly reduced the shortage of vehicles as over twenty different truck companies 
supplied vehicles to the Army during the Punitive Expedition.
22
   
The gap quickly closed between the quantity of trucks needed and the number in service 
in Mexico, but the rapid increase in vehicles generated new problems. The first was a lack of 
qualified drivers. The first companies to answer the Quartermaster’s call for motor trucks 
provided civilian drivers and even some mechanics. This practice eventually proved problematic. 
Civilian personnel were familiar with motor vehicles, but Army regulations were a more foreign 
concept, and the Quartermaster Department was forced to adopt a more selective process when 
procuring truck drivers.  
Any troops with prior knowledge of auto mechanics, motor transportation, or basic 
driving skills were deemed qualified to serve in the growing motor pool. A competitive 
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examination was generated to develop a more competent corps of drivers, but with dubious 
results. One non-commissioned officer admitted after receiving his sergeant-chauffeur’s license 
that he knew nothing of driving a truck. He had taken a correspondence course in auto mechanics 
and passed the exam even though he had never driven a vehicle. Over time, however, the Army 
was able to refine their methods of selection and the quantity of qualified driver-mechanics 
rose.
23
 
Another serious problem concerned spare parts and repairs. During the year-long Punitive 
Expedition, the Army used a variety of truck types made by several manufacturers. 
Interchangeable parts existed, but were uncommon and no system of organization had been given 
serious thought prior to the Expedition. Quartermaster requests for standardization had fallen on 
deaf ears prior to 1916. Now, with the crisis at hand, the Army was forced to depend on the 
ingenuity of the officers and troops involved. For example, a gasoline truck broke a spring, 
requiring the mechanic some five hours to build a new spring because no spares were on hand 
and the truck was a different make than the other trucks in the company.
24
  The Army 
experienced a variety of growing pains during this time of transition, but remained adaptable 
during operations in Mexico.  
The dawn of motorized warfare in Mexico was not completely without promise. The 
lackluster performance of motor transportation during the Punitive Expedition hardly indicated 
that motorized forces would immediately replace animal power or that mules would soon 
become zoo specimens. However, through trial and error and a steep learning curve Army forces 
gathered a wealth of experience during the year-long operation. Mexico became a laboratory 
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where motor transport theories were tested. Some of them failed, some proved successful, and 
some became an amalgamation of animal and motor power that led to the successful completion 
of supply missions.  
The lessons learned during the Expedition proved invaluable to an Army about to embark 
on a trans-oceanic war, including the improved coordination of National Guard troops, the 
application of more mobile warfare, and the use of advancing technology. This last attribute 
would be magnified over the next thirty years, and as the scope of conflicts grew, so too did 
America’s ability to adapt. Eventually there would be more machines than animals, but each 
conflict required the judicious application of both. 
General Pershing and U.S. forces were recalled from Mexico in February 1917, thus 
ending the Punitive Expedition. Two months later, the United States declared war on the Central 
Powers, and the country mobilized for World War I.  A great irony was that one of the world’s 
most industrialized—and rapidly becoming the most auto-driven—society went to war with a 
pathetic number of trucks, almost no mechanization, and a little armor borrowed from the 
French. The Army, particularly the Quartermaster Department, tried to improve the quantity of 
its motor pool, which, one should recall, had not even existed just a few years earlier. In June 
1916—during the Punitive Expedition—some 600 vehicles were in Army use. By June 1918, 
over 82,500 trucks were in the Army’s motor pool.25  
The most pressing problem associated with this quantum increase in vehicles was a lack 
of standardization. The Army and auto manufacturers tried to cooperate and develop standard 
vehicles. The Quartermaster Department and the American Society of Automobile Engineers 
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attempted to establish criteria for standard truck designs. Headway was made in the development 
of standard military trucks, but the process was time-consuming. It was not until the end of 1917 
that a standardization policy was adopted, and it was well into 1918 before the policy was 
implemented and a standard type of vehicle arrived for Army use in France.
26
  The U.S. military, 
as well as their French and British Allies, demanded quantity during the initial phases of 
American mobilization, and simply could not wait to produce a standardized truck fleet.  
Organization was sacrificed for numbers, and the war was over by the time the Army began 
addressing the problem of disorganization.
27
   
The reality was that no transportation panacea existed for the Army in 1917 and 1918. 
Motor transportation clearly had advantages over animal transport: motor trucks moved supplies 
faster than animal power. Motor trucks consumed large quantities of fuel, but the fuel was in 
many ways easier to ship and store than grain and feed for animals, and shipping space for a 
trans-Atlantic voyage was at a premium. Likewise, motor fuel could be stored for indefinite 
periods of time, sometimes months, compared to grain, which had a much shorter shelf-life.   
The quality of automotive and motor transportation had improved, and Army advocates 
of motor transportation produced glowing reports of vehicle durability. Reports notwithstanding, 
Army vehicles remained frail, primarily because the Army was forced to rely on commercial-
grade vehicles, which were simply not designed to meet the rigors of military operations. Also, 
the greater problem for motor transportation remained the lack of standardization. The Army 
used some 274,000 vehicles in 1918, with over 200 different makes and models. Keeping these 
vehicles maintained proved an almost insurmountable task; half were non-functional at any given 
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time. Spare parts for this massive, varied quantity nearly paralyzed Army transport. As a supply 
officer observed: “fields as large as five or six acres were stacked as high as buildings with spare 
parts….  We were trying to segregate them, in other words put Packard parts in one place, Ford 
parts in another, Dodge in another, and Cadillac parts and so on….  There were so many parts 
that no one really knew what was there….”28 The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was in 
dire straits regarding the delivery of supplies. In the end, however, and largely through trial and 
error, the AEF’s supply services created a system that managed, maintained, and operated the 
AEF’s diverse motor fleet. 
Three things saved the AEF regarding logistics and supply in 1918. First, the Army began 
to adapt at the administrative level, creating a bureaucratic framework to ameliorate some of the 
logistical headaches, such as vehicle maintenance and spare parts supply.  The War Department 
issued a General Order in April 1918 establishing the Motor Transport Service, followed in 
August by the creation of the Motor Transport Corps (MTC). The MTC had authority to procure, 
maintain, and repair all motor vehicles. MTC personnel were trained, maintenance schedules 
kept, and the motor pool system developed. A standardization board formed in October 1918 
and, while the war was a mere months from ending, the issue of standardization that had 
bedeviled the Quartermaster Department since the genesis of motor transport was finally 
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addressed. Parts of this framework remained intact after World War I and expedited the shift 
from animal power to motor transportation.
29
 
Second, the continued use of animal power in many ways saved the floundering motor 
transport pool.  In October 1918, the AEF had over 51,000 trucks, automobiles and motorcycles 
in France. Over 163,000 horses and mules augmented these motor vehicles. Advocates of motor 
transportation argued that animal power was expensive and slow, two undeniable charges. Yet 
the development of motor vehicles at this point was such that few were truly capable of off-road 
movement. The fact remained that there were places where motor vehicles could not travel. The 
only mode of transportation that had a reasonable chance of delivering supplies remained the 
time-tested horse and mule; and occasionally even this durable source of transportation failed.
30
  
The horrendous conditions of the roadways and surrounding countryside made it virtually 
impossible to move across “the morass of the battle zone.” Vehicles and animals together, along 
with several hundred thousand men created unimaginable scenes of congestion. In the Saint-
Mihiel sector fifteen divisions were concentrated, with a single division occupying 
approximately nineteen miles of road space. In the Meuse-Argonne area alone some 3,500 motor 
trucks and 93,000 horses and mules were crammed to supply AEF operations in September 1918.  
Supplying front-line troops of the AEF was most arduous, the difficulty of which was only 
exceeded by combat operations. However, severe shortages of motor vehicles, horses and mules, 
transport personnel, and viable roadways were not insurmountable. At critical moments the 
delivery of supplies always managed to come through and keep the AEF moving. 
31
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Finally, the war ended. It is reasonable to assume that had the war continued for several 
more months, the supply system in all likelihood would have been strained to the breaking point. 
It is doubtful that the ad hoc transportation network of motors and mules could have sustained 
the Meuse-Argonne offensive, much less supported additional offensive actions. The 
consumption rate of supplies available was so high that stocks were nearly depleted at the time of 
the Armistice. Trans-oceanic shipping struggled to keep up with supply and overland 
transportation of supplies was hindered by a paucity of vehicles, animals, and service personnel. 
All of these problems were compounded by failures of the AEF to coordinate and organize what 
supplies they actually had on hand. Experience and advanced planning would have ameliorated 
some of these logistical problems. However, as Huston asserts, “experience of the kind required 
was experience that neither the AEF nor any other army had, for the support of such a force at 
such a distance from its homeland…was a pioneer effort in 1917 and 1918.”32  Unfortunately, 
much that was learned regarding transportation during these pioneering days on the Western 
Front was forgotten as soon as the AEF demobilized.  
 America attempted to focus on domestic affairs immediately following World War I.  Yet 
despite widespread public indifference and drastically reduced defense spending, innovation and 
adaptability occurred within the Army. Development in aircraft, ships (particularly aircraft 
carriers), submarines, and armor saw quantum improvements. Among the most evolutionary 
areas of improvement for the Army during the interwar period (1919-1940) were the movement 
of men and material and the increase of firepower. Change was a constant battle against a stingy 
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Congress, an unsupportive public, and intra-service rivalry, but the Army was not completely 
stricken with atrophy and managed to evolve.
33
   
The Army was able to motorize and mechanize during the interwar period because of the 
American public’s full embrasure of auto-transportation during these two decades. As President 
Warren G. Harding proclaimed to Congress in April 1921, “The motorcar has become an 
indispensable instrument in our political, social, and industrial life.”  Horse culture and animal 
power was being replaced as automobiles became an integral part of American life.  By the mid 
1920s, over 55 percent of the 27.5 million American families owned at least one car; and by 
1929 all states were collecting gasoline taxes.
34
 
The Great Depression did little to deter the American preoccupation with automobiles 
and driving. After 1929, new automobile sales leveled out temporarily and people drove older 
cars as the Depression wore on, but American still drove.  As Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd 
noted, it was “not unusual to see a family drive up to a relief commissary in 1935 to stand in line 
for its four or five dollar weekly food dole.”  Car ownership and operation proved to be among 
the most Depression-proof markets and routines in urban America.
35
 
Rural America, likewise, began adopting auto-transportation during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Farmers only grudgingly embraced motorization and mechanization.  In this regard American 
agriculture’s conservatism was similar to that of the military, and those in the Army echoed 
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many of the challenges raised by opponents to mechanization on the farm. Tractors prior to the 
1920s were less reliable, and animals had greater efficiency, pulling power, and mobility in poor 
field conditions. The quality and reliability of tractors improved and the animal power advocates 
gradually lost credibility. But it was in efficiency that tractors made the greatest improvements: 
farmers could simply plow more acres per day with tractors. Draft animals still possessed some 
usefulness, particularly in wet fields, but “good farming” was measured quantitatively. Horses 
and mules simply could not keep pace with tractors regarding the amount of acres covered per 
unit of time, and the shifting of gears from animal power to motorization/mechanization lurched 
forward across America’s farmland in the interwar period.36 
Progressive farmers looked at tractors from an efficiency and economic viewpoint. 
Reactionary opponents to mechanization critically viewed tractors from a reliability viewpoint. 
And when this tack lost credibility the reactionary argument switched to on economics 
arguments (such as the lost jobs and occupations of blacksmiths and veterinarians) and emotion 
(an American way of life will be lost as these skills and traditions are replaced). Little common 
ground was found in this dispute over farm power choices. Tractor advocates tended to overstate 
the abilities of mechanization and downplay the benefits of animal power. Opponents of 
mechanization boasted that “a mule is the only fool proof tractor ever built.”  Still a handful of 
others rode the fence and proposed using both tractor and animal power. Eventually, though, 
agriculture made the shift from horses and mules to motors.
37
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The similarities were striking between the agricultural community and the Army 
concerning arguments for and against motorization and mechanization. Progressive-minded 
military leaders continued to highlight the mobility and cost-efficiency of motorization. The 
more reactionary camp downplayed any positive aspects of motorization and proclaimed the only 
reliable, proven source of transportation was animal power. Reactionaries also played the 
emotional card, arguing that an American military tradition would be lost if horse-mounted 
cavalry were replaced by a mechanized, armored force. The interwar years witnessed great 
resistance to motorization, but in the end the Army adapted to and fully embraced motor-
transportation and mechanization. 
One area in which auto-transportation had improved by the 1920s was in reliability, and 
the War Department became convinced after World War I that complete motorization was not 
only the best solution to the Army’s transportation needs, but in light of continued advances in 
automotive technology it was inevitable. Secretary of War John W. Weeks noted in 1921, “…the 
War Department has been devoting every effort possible to replacing the horse and mule by 
motorized elements. This is virtually accomplished except for those elements which must cross 
over open ground away from the roads.”38   
The Army may have had the desire to motorize, but it was severely hampered by a 
miserly Congress that was supported by a peace-minded and isolationist public. These restraints 
were felt immediately after World War 1, when the American populace was determined to “bring 
the boys home” and de-mobilize. By June 1919 over 2 million men had been discharged from the 
U.S. armed forces; and by January 1920 only 130,000 remained in the Army. The Army 
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possessed over 100,000 motor vehicles, but no mechanics, operators, or technicians.
39
  The Army 
hardly fared better throughout the 1920s under the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover 
Administrations, and the restraints to defense spending became all the more acute during the 
depression-plagued1930s. Nonetheless, against all odds and obstacles, the Army motorized and 
mechanized.   
 Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1920 (NDA-1920) to establish a military 
policy that would address some of the problems experienced during America’s mobilization for 
World War I. One of the major challenges for the U.S. Army was how to accommodate new 
technologies, such as armor and motor transportation, which had proven to be effective, or at 
least had great potential, during the Great War. The final version of the National Defense Act fell 
short of radically revamping the U.S. military, due largely to a President, Congress, and public 
that desired a return to “normalcy” and grew more convinced that any serious threat to national 
security was quite remote. In spite of these obstacles and under the restrictions of NDA—1920, 
the Army attempted to forge ahead with motorization and mechanization.
40
  
Aside from budgetary concerns and public antipathy, another seemingly insurmountable 
obstacle to Army motorization and mechanization came from within the Army itself. The arms 
most reliant on animal power, including the cavalry, artillery, and Quartermaster, were loath at 
first to support motorization and mechanization over animal power.  As one officer noted in 
1920, soldiers  
 [M]ay have very conservative views regarding replacing animals for combat 
transport, and he is certainly correct unless the substitute can do everything the horse has 
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been able to do in the past. Assuming this one vital condition to be met, every other 
consideration is most decidedly in favor of the motor. It is cheaper to operate, the volume 
and tonnage of fuel and oil is less than that of forage, it does not eat when not working, 
requires less men and less training of these men, it is easier to transport by rail or water, 
requires less space on the road, is not subject to fatigue, is less vulnerable to gas, bombs, 
and enemy fire, does not create the unsanitary conditions that the horse does alive or 
dead, and is easier to camouflage; but it must be repeated that all these advantages are 
negligible in war unless the motor combat transport can do as well as the horse in getting 
material to the place needed at the time needed.
41
 
 
The officer summarized most of the advantages possessed by motorization and mechanization 
over animal power, but stopped short of proclaiming machine supremacy. On the contrary he 
suggested that animal power still had a place on the battlefield, at least until a machine was 
produced that could go anywhere an animal travelled. He represented the cautious few that 
recognized the utility of gas-powered motorization in battle, but were circumspect enough to 
realize the necessity of animal power on the field of battle. Most of his military colleagues were 
not as far-sighted. 
 The Cavalry arm stubbornly resisted motorization and mechanization, particularly in the 
early 1920s as the cavalry returned from a lackluster showing in World War I and resumed their 
principal duty of patrolling the Mexican border. The Cavalry was in its element when operating 
in a region that was dominated by formidable terrain, and proponents of animal power and horse 
cavalry were quick to point out the necessity of such forces for national security. Similarly, the 
Cavalry arm could justify their place because mechanization (tanks) and motorization (trucks) 
still suffered from some reliability problems and mechanical break-downs in the years 
immediately following World War I.  As technology improved, however, and the dependability 
of motor vehicles increased, the Cavalry arm began to resist motorization primarily on emotional 
grounds. Many in the Cavalry arm were struck with romanticism and the nostalgic notion that the 
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power of man and beasts won wars, not machines; and some argued this belief until well after it 
was disproved.
42
   
Others realized that the cavalry, and the Army in general, must shift from a largely 
animal-powered constabulary force to a national army capable of conducting motorized, 
mechanized total war.  In the summer of 1927, U.S. Secretary of War Dwight Davis observed 
maneuvers of a British experimental tank and armored car force.  Shortly thereafter the Army 
Chief of Staff gave the Army G-3 a simple order to “Organize a Mechanized Force.”43   Again, 
the desire to change existed, but it met with obstacles and opposition. The “Experimental 
Mechanized Force” as it was called, gathered at Fort Meade, Maryland in July 1928.  Its 
performance and reception were hardly encouraging.  The World War I-vintage trucks and 
antiquated, foreign-built tanks repeatedly broke down; and public opposition to the maneuvers 
was rife as state government officials refused to allow armor on highways for fear of destroying 
tax-payer roads.
44
 The Experimental Mechanized Force quickly disbanded, but the drive toward 
mechanization was unstoppable. Or as the First Cavalry Division commander in Fort Bliss, 
Texas noted, “When the cowboy down here is herding cattle in a Ford we must realize that the 
world has undergone a change.”45  
The country was shifting gears, literally and figuratively. And while the Army might not 
have experienced a revolution during the interwar years, it was undeniably in a dramatic, 
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evolutionary phase.
46
  The shift toward motorization became more apparent in 1931, as Army 
Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur announced, “Every part of the Army will adopt 
mechanization and motorization as far as practicable and possible.” MacArthur was clear in his 
assessment of the continued use of animal power, stating “as a means of transportation, he [the 
horse] has generally become, next to the dismounted man, the slowest means of transportation;” 
and horses and mules “may remain only where they cannot be replaced by the motor.”47  A field 
artillery officer at the Army War College observed “the care of animals is a passing art, but most 
of the men know something about motors and are keenly interested to learn more.”48  Major 
General George Van Horn Moseley, the Deputy Chief of Staff, was more succinct: “My idea is 
to replace the horse by motor.”49  Needless to say some of those in the Cavalry took this as a 
direct threat to their livelihood, military tradition, and national security 
George Patton was one of the more reserved proponents of mechanization, who, 
ironically, would later be hailed as one of the greatest armored commanders in World War II. In 
the early 1930s, Major Patton was more of an animal power advocate, observing that horses truly 
possessed all terrain capabilities and warned that it was foolish to rely too heavily on machines 
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or to “pin our whole faith on their efficacy.”50  In a colorfully-worded critique of mechanization, 
Patton referred to the “blithesome theories of the self-styled mechanists or scientific warriors 
who are so exhilarated by the gaseous exhalations of their pet machines as to be oblivious to the 
necessity for more prosaic arms.”51  Three years later, Patton continued to express his doubts 
about the Army’s total mechanization and complete replacement of animal power when he 
wrote, “History is replete with countless other instances of military implements each in its day 
heralded as the last word—the key to victory—yet each in its turn subsiding to its useful but 
inconspicuous niche.”52  At this point in the evolution of motorized and mechanized warfare, 
Patton rode the fence and advocated both forms of power.  He believed that the most effective 
policy was cautiously to implement motorization and mechanization, but he realized that animal 
power (a more “prosaic” arm) would always have its place.  
One of the most devout proponents of animal power, and critic of motorization and 
mechanization, was Brigadier General Hamilton Hawkins. Like other reactionaries within the 
cavalry, Hawkins over-emphasized the utility of animal power and never missed an opportunity 
to point out the shortcomings or potential failures of motorization and mechanization. As 
General Hawkins wrote, “Mechanized forces may assist but cannot replace cavalry on these 
cross country missions, because, in spite of unproven assertions that large numbers of 
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mechanized forces can travel speedily across country, no reliance can be based upon these 
assertions.”53 
  Animal power advocates remained in the Army, and animals remained a part of the 
Army’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO/E). For example, a 1936 general requirement 
per the War Department Mobilization Plan called for a total of 90,000 animals to service tactical 
field artillery units.  The total motorization and mechanization of the Army was still far from 
complete. However, it should also be noted that the total strength of horses and mules on hand 
was approximately 5,500, a significant shortfall from the 90,000 required in the TO/E.
54
  
In the mid-1930s, the Army produced detailed recommendations for the most efficient 
use of horse and mule power. In a memo to the Adjutant General, the Chief of Cavalry, General 
Leon B. Kromer, remarked that “conditioning of remounts (replacement animals) prior to issue is 
inadequate” and that unconditioned mounts were “fatal to mobility.” He further noted that “a link 
in the chain of supply is missing” because of inferior animal conditioning, and that “a system 
comparable to the replacement system by which recruits are processed, fitted out, trained, and 
conditioned” should apply to remounts.55  General Kromer was not the most ardent opponent of 
mechanization and motorization. He was best known as supporting the implementation of both 
animal and motor power, particularly within the Cavalry arm, but in 1936 he still remained loyal 
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to those supporters of animal power, and sincerely believed it to be the most proven method of 
supply. 
Mixed signals about the motorization and mechanization emanated from high levels. In 
1937, Secretary of War Harry W. Woodring wrote to U.S. Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona:  
Referring to your letter of October 13, 1937, regarding certain pending legislation 
designed to motorize the entire Army and Marine Corps, permit me to submit the 
following. The War Department has not submitted any legislation designed to motorize 
the entire Army, nor is any such legislation under consideration. Further, it is not 
contemplated that there will be any curtailment to remount activities. 
 
The Secretary went on to explain that a decrease in the number of horses had occurred, but it was 
related purely “to reductions in appropriations” and not because of a widespread push to 
motorize the Army.
56
 
Perhaps the most ardent supporter of horse cavalry and most vitriolic opponent of 
mechanization was General John K. Herr.  Appointed Chief of Cavalry in 1938, Herr resisted the 
Army’s transition to mechanization, arguing “we must not be misled to our own detriment to 
assume that the untried machine can displace the proved and tried horse.”57 Resistance appeared 
futile as the numbers of horses and mules steadily dwindled during the mid 1930s. Cut backs in 
horse flesh began around 1935 when appropriations for Fiscal Year 1936 only underwrote about 
ten percent of the remounts needed in the Cavalry and Field Artillery. As a memo went on to 
explain: “Under present plans, the purchase of mules for replacements will be extremely limited. 
Replacements will not exceed 10% of present allowances. Serviceable animals will be retained 
for use as replacements…and animals not suited for extended field use will be disposed of...” or, 
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as a subsequent bulletin explained, “destroyed or put out to pasture.”58  In 1936, the War 
Department did not allocate any remounts (replacement horses and mules) to cavalry and field 
artillery units that were in the process of mechanization and motorization. In other words, the 
number of horses and mules on hand would not decrease, but there would be no replacement for 
these mounts either. In 1937, the Army was short of its authorized number of horses and mules 
by 1,903 animals; it was estimated that the Army would be short by 1,300 animals in 1938.
59
   
As animal power declined, the war of words between partisans of mechanization and 
animal power continued. The most outspoken advocate of mechanization and motorization was 
Adna Chaffee, considered to be the “father of the armored force.”  In 1927, Chaffee turned down 
the opportunity to serve as the Chief of Cavalry, instead taking an assignment to the training 
section of the General Staff. It was in this position that Chaffee developed his ideas about 
motorized and mechanized warfare.  Chaffee envisioned a “union of all arms,” including horse 
cavalry, armored cars, tanks, tracked artillery, and motorized infantry and support troops. In 
1931, Chaffee explained: “The main point is this that we, as soldiers, must recognize the 
tremendous strides which our automotive industry has made since the last war. If we neglect to 
study every possible usage of this asset in our next war, we should not only be stupid, we should 
be incompetent.”60   
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Chaffee’s proposals met fierce opposition.  Motorization and mechanization were 
expensive, even if defense spending had not been as paltry as it was during the interwar years. 
Public indifference and Congressional disapproval for new military innovations left progressives 
such as Chaffee fighting an up-hill battle. In 1934, Army maneuvers at Fort Riley using both 
horse and mechanized and motorized cavalry proved the worth of the gasoline engine. 
Reactionaries, such as Hawkins and Herr, still resisted every move toward mechanization, 
causing Chaffee angrily to note: “Those fellows at [Fort] Riley ought to understand that the 
definition of cavalry now includes troops of any kind equipped for highly mobile combat and not 
just mounted on horses. The motto of the School says, ‘Through Mobility We Conquer.’ It does 
not say ‘Through Mobility On Horses Alone We Conquer.’ ”61 These maneuvers proved that 
both animal and motorized and mechanized power still had places on the battlefield, but neither 
camp was amenable to the idea of a mixed force.  
Chaffee and the progressives may have been frustrated at the slow pace of mechanization, 
but the Army was clearly moving toward a motorized and mechanized force. The number of 
horses in Army use declined rapidly during the late 1930s, and mules hardly fared better.  The 
following memo typified the Army’s shift from mules to motors: “In view of recent orders which 
will eventually motorize the 2
nd
 Division, it is directed that the purchase of mules for the current 
fiscal year be suspended until further order.”62 
In early 1939, the Adjutant General’s Office announced: “As the approved motorization 
program for the Army progresses and draft mules thereby become excess, it is desired to 
eliminate all unnecessary maintenance of the Army of such animals, by effecting prompt 
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disposition.”63  According to the War Department:  “Economical accomplishment of the Army’s 
approved motorization program visualizes the substitution of motors in place of animals… To 
this end, it is desired that the present allowances of draft mules…be reexamined to determine 
whether complete elimination of or any reduction in the number of draft animals…may be 
practicable.”64  Motorization of the Army was shifting into high gear. Ironically, the demand for 
these “excess mules” dramatically increased within a few years, forcing the Army to adapt once 
more.  
One of the last defenders of animal power was General John K. Herr, who, in spite of 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, continued to champion horse cavalry and animal 
superiority in modern, mechanized war.  Herr used the Cavalry Journal as his forum to promote 
the benefits of animal power and highlight the disadvantages of mechanization. Articles 
published during the summer of 1939 lauded Poland for wisely developing a premier horse 
cavalry for its national defense. The articles, most likely written by General Herr, proclaimed 
that Polish cavalry were ready for modern war and prepared to battle mechanized enemies. The 
German Army invalidated such claims in September 1939.
65
 
 Motorization and mechanization proponents seized upon the German “blitz” of Poland as 
irrefutable evidence against animal power. The German armor, air, and ground forces were 
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driven by the gasoline engine and were able to annihilate Polish horse cavalry and foot soldiers.  
As a Cavalry Journal article noted in the winter of 1939, “The army whose destructive, striking 
effort was based on mechanization, aviation, and motorized infantry swept the enemy from the 
battlefield.
66
  June 1940 witnessed the fall of France to the German war machine, and the voice 
of animal power advocates became lost in the roar of mechanized warfare. Images of German 
mechanized forces blitzing across Europe convinced the Army that the future must rely on 
motors and machines, not horses and mules. General Chaffee predicted, “In any important war 
involving armies and fought in terrain where important wars are fought, mechanized cavalry is a 
vastly more powerful, mobile, and decisive force than an equal or greater force of horse 
cavalry.”67 
 Army maneuvers in 1940 and 1941 saw a steady increase in motorized and mechanized 
forces. The main focus of these maneuvers was Regular Army and National Guard units training 
in field operations, but another key purpose was to give motorized and mechanized forces 
experience in these controlled field exercises. One of the largest maneuvers was held across 
Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana from June through September 1941.  
The exercise in Arkansas was typical of the maneuvers. One corps of Regular Army 
troops was pitted against a corps of National Guardsmen. The Regular troops included “highly 
mobile forces, richly endowed with mechanization” versus the National Guard force that was 
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comprised of “slower infantry divisions…with almost no mechanization.”68  Headaches were 
plentiful, not the least of which was terrain and lack of infrastructure. The staff decided that the 
original site was too rugged—heavily wooded and crisscrossed by streams and rivers. They 
eventually settled on another densely wooded region with only one concrete road and the 
secondary roads required much maintenance and repair before the exercise commenced.  
The two forces finally engaged, but the highly mechanized Army force was unable to 
encircle and annihilate the less mobile National Guard troops. The National Guardsmen were 
able to retreat and delay the mechanized forces by using the rugged terrain and destroying what 
few roads and bridges existed.  The final phase of the exercise ended in a draw as the 
mechanized Regular Army force cut off the National Guard force’s line of retreat, but was never 
able completely to over-run the Guardsmen. A post-maneuver report noted the number one 
consideration is “that terrain is the key to successful military operations and it should be studied 
profoundly.”69 Unfortunately, this point was forgotten as the Army rushed to mechanize. 
The animal power reactionaries were wrong, but so, too, were the myopic motor-men 
who failed to develop contingencies for animal power’s use when conditions dictated. The most 
motorized and mechanized nation on earth shifted gears, and the Army, with the exception of the 
horse cavalry, adapted to technological advances. As ineffective and interrupted as it was, the 
Army’s transition to motorization and mechanization happened. The help of innovators, such as 
Moseley, Chaffee, McArthur, and Patton, pushed the Army—a rigid, conservative institution—to 
adopt motorization and mechanization.  The Army was hardly advanced or cutting-edge 
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regarding motorization and mechanization and was certainly not a true reflection of American 
society, which that was becoming completely dominated by “automobility.”  Nonetheless, by 
1941-42 the Army had every intention of driving across the battlefield in the next war. What was 
unknown at the time was that the Army would be forced to adapt again when deployed to 
theaters that left motors and mechanization at a standstill. The Army did not get to start in places 
“where important wars are fought,” but rather in undeveloped, backwaters where animal power 
reigned supreme. The Army was forced to regress in order to move forward. 
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Figure 2-0.  Motorized machine gun company pass cavalry troops during the Punitive 
Expedition to Mexico, 1916-1917. Troops carried Lewis machine guns mounted on Ford 
Model T trucks (Kentucky National Guard). 
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Figure 2-2. Tractor-trailers portee Army cavalry during Louisiana maneuvers in 1940. One 
tractor-trailer could move eight horses or mules (Cavalry Journal September-October 
1940). 
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Chapter 3: Everything Old was New Again: North Africa and Sicily 
 The transition from mules to motors steadily advanced in the years preceding World War 
II. The shift was in high gear from the War Department to junior-grade Army officers. Robert E. 
Coffin was a prime example. Coffin graduated from Stanford in 1939 and was commissioned as 
a second lieutenant field artillery reservist. He entered active duty in April 1940 as a field 
artillery officer in the Third Infantry Division. Coffin’s pre-war experience was typical of those 
serving during a time of great transition.  
According to Coffin, the shift began gradually and “the Army didn’t officially go into 
trucks as motive power for artillery until 1936, which was awfully late. Horses had pretty much 
disappeared from most big farms and had been replaced by tractors and trucks and automotive 
kinds of equipment. Following studies at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War College in the 
mid-1930s, the Army decided “that the time was past to go to trucks, but the military budget in 
the 1930s was miniscule and the cost of going from horses to trucks was prohibitive….”1 
Yet, if truck power was cost-prohibitive in the mid-1930s, horsepower also had its 
drawbacks. As Coffin noted:  
Horses were a twenty-four hour a day concern. It was like having a big family of 
small children. They did dumb things like eating the wrong things and then 
getting violently ill. They had to be groomed, and watered and fed seven days a 
week. The life of a soldier was a career of taking care of those damn horses. They 
were good horses…but it was just a constant concern. Trucks, you could park 
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them for a couple of days and come back and they’d be ready to go, but you 
couldn’t park horses.2 
 
Coffin also expressed a nagging fear that the Army was falling behind technologically through 
the continued reliance on horsepower over motorization: 
We always had the feeling that if we got into combat with modern weapons, 
particularly aircraft and tanks, the horses would be vulnerable. We just couldn’t 
quite see, we youngsters, why we were training with these animals when it was 
perfectly obvious that we weren’t going to use them, particularly when we looked 
at newsreels and Fox Movietone news and we could see Hitler’s parades with all 
this truck-drawn and self-propelled stuff.
3
 
By the latter 1930s the Army was in complete transition and retraining, and Lt. Coffin was 
actively involved: 
It was a whole new fresh game because we had to learn about trucks. The 
University of Santa Clara’s ROTC unit was a truck drawn unit and we did have some 
cross training with them, particularly when we went to summer camp at the Presidio at 
Monterey in the summer of ’38. We had to learn truck maintenance, truck operations, and 
truck driving. We learned many things…we were working from six in the morning until 
eight or nine at night. It was about two or three months of pretty intensive work, the 
transition from being a horse soldier to a truck soldier—pretty awesome.4 
 
While troops like Lieutenant Coffin became truck operators and motorized artillerymen, 
the rest of the Army slowly re-armed from 1939 to 1940. The U.S. military’s rearmament and 
mobilization program took on a new sense of urgency in December 1941. It would be November 
1942 before a major offensive operation was launched.  The first half of 1942 was spent trying to 
stem the tide of Japanese forces across the Pacific.  One of the most pressing areas was in the 
southwest Pacific as the United States and allies fought to contain the Japanese in the Solomon 
Islands and New Guinea. The epic naval battles at Coral Sea and Midway in May and June 1942, 
followed two months later by the U.S. landing at Guadalcanal, stymied Japanese plans to invade 
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Australia. In spite of the U.S. commitment to defeat “Germany First,” most American resources 
were sent to the Pacific during the first half of the war.
5
 
 American war planners, particularly Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall 
and Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, were determined to refocus America’s resources 
on the war in Europe. The British and Russian allies heartily agreed with the “Germany First” 
goal, but great discord developed over the grand strategy for defeating Germany. Numerous 
plans were proposed. Most notable were Operation Roundup, a cross-channel invasion from 
Britain to continental Europe in the early spring of 1943, and Operation Sledgehammer, a similar 
cross-channel invasion to be carried out with great haste in the late summer of 1942. Both 
operations were deemed logistical impossibilities and scrapped due to a lack of ships to move the 
vast quantity of men and material required.   
 An alternative to a cross-channel invasion was proposed in Operation Torch, a plan for 
landing American and British forces in Algeria and French North Africa.  Operation Torch found 
support through the political leadership of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. A 
furious debate between the political leadership and those, such as Marshall and Eisenhower, who 
wanted to avoid operations in subsidiary theaters and concentrate on decisive action against the 
Axis. The reality was that neither the United States nor Britain could launch a cross-channel 
invasion in 1942. Both sides lacked resources and training, and, as Dominick Graham noted, 
neither side was “tough enough to meet head on the best soldiers in the world in the most 
difficult of all operations in war, an opposed landing.” Thus, while Operation Torch may not 
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have been the most appealing venture, it was one of the few alternatives that held a modicum of 
hope for success.
6
  
 In July 1942, American war planners agreed to proceed with the Allied invasion of North 
Africa.  Joint operations with the British were set to commence in November 1942. Yet, the 
problem that cancelled the much-desired cross-channel invasion still plagued the Army as they 
scrambled to prepare for a landing in North Africa. The Army had little training in amphibious 
warfare, lacking trained men and landing craft.  U.S. troops assembled and trained in Britain, but 
with the deadline fast approaching, many troops left the United States and sailed directly to 
North Africa.  
On November 8, 1942, some 107,000 American troops landed at Casablanca, Morocco 
and Oran, Algeria. The plan was for U.S. troops to roll up the Axis western flank and the British 
in Egypt to roll up the eastern flank, converging in Tunisia. U.S and British troops made initial 
progress until they reached Tunisia, where German resistance stiffened. Equally problematic for 
the Allies was a dramatic change in the terrain. There were now mountains and thick brush, and 
the few existing roads were heavily mined or blocked by the Germans. Allied operations quickly 
ground to a halt.
7
  
The Army was quickly reminded of supply necessities and obliged to re-learn the art of 
transportation and logistics. Supply is crucial to any military operation, but combat operations in 
mountainous terrain warrant special attention. As Letcher Wigington noted: 
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Sustained combat operations cannot be carried on without supplies. The normal 
channels of supply require road nets, and the expectancy that our motor transport 
will make hauls directly up to our front lines. We quickly learned that this would 
not work in the mountains. We learned that we had more vehicles than we had 
roads. We found that the roads ended and the supplies still had a distance to travel 
before reaching troops. For these reasons, an infantry division must incorporate 
into its mountain operations plans certain essential changes in organization, 
equipment, and operational system.
8
 
Operation Torch planners overlooked the elementary concept of adjusting supply 
demands for rugged terrain. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TO/E) for Operation 
Torch indicate that the planners thought of nearly everything. First, the obvious was included: 
thousands of rounds of ammunition in assorted calibers, various types of food in thousands of 
cases or specialized pallets, and fuel oil by the thousands of gallons. Second, the minor details 
were included: extra firing pins, camouflage paint or “garnishing colors,” batteries, knuckle-
duster trench knives with sheath, rat poison, mosquito repellant, sand flea nets, and even fly 
swatters. Yet, there appears to be little consideration given to the possibility that roads might end 
and terrain would dictate the flow of supplies to front line troops. Military planners thought of 
protecting the troops from pestilence, but failed to include pack animals in the TO/E for 
operations in North Africa.
9
  
This oversight was soon felt in the mountains near Bizerte, Tunisia; and it was in this 
inhospitable land that Army adaptability grew. The need for pack animals was obvious. 
However, using American mules was not an option. Time was critical and the Army could not 
wait for animals to make the trans-Atlantic voyage. Likewise, shipping space was at a premium 
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and the military could ill afford to expend cargo space on mules, since men and material were the 
priority. The Army solution was immediately to impress local animals into service.  
Procuring and employing beasts of burden were beset with difficulty in North Africa. 
First, troops with backgrounds in pack animals were scarce. The Army may have switched to 
“trucks as motive power…awfully late,” but the shift was rapid and widespread. The Army was 
composed largely of “citizen soldiers” from the motorized generation who knew little about 
animal power. Many were given a crash course in basic animal husbandry, and these men, along 
with a cadre of troops raised on the farm, lived the adage that “necessity is the mother of 
invention.” The supply lines began to flow slowly after intense on the job training.  
Second, procuring animals of any kind to serve as pack animals was difficult. The hardy 
American-bred mules were not available, so native donkeys were the only option but were 
lacking in quality. According to General Lucian K. Truscott, Third Infantry Division 
Commander, the experiments with local stock were “unsatisfactory from the standpoint of [the] 
condition of the animals, which had been poorly kept by their former Arab owners.”10  The Army 
allotted $150, 000 as an emergency remount fund for the Second Corps. Quartermaster agents 
scoured the countryside and purchased 218 mules, 95 donkeys, and 28 horses. The native 
population was not particularly willing to give up their animals, many of which fetched a 
handsome price as their owners took advantage of the supply and demand situation. Mules and 
horses rented for about one dollar per day, and donkeys were generally bought for $295 to 
$385.
11
  Finding saddles and forage was another unanticipated obstacle, though not 
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insurmountable. Most natives willing to part with their animals were also willing to sell their 
packsaddles and accouterments. Many of the local nomadic, Bedouins had little forage available 
to sell. Fortunately, the British Army provided small but adequate amounts of forage to U.S. 
Quartermasters as “reciprocal aid.”12   
 The basic supply of food, water, and ammunition slowly resumed as Army planners 
scrambled to assemble men and pack animals. The need for specialized equipment and supply 
soon followed, particularly for the heavy weapons and pack artillery. Early combat operations 
occurred in what was described as “tank country,” flat, open expanses with few roads. As a 
German officer observed, the country was “a tactician’s paradise, and a quartermaster’s hell.”13  
As troops moved through the Sedjenane Valley and converged on Bizerte, the terrain changed 
dramatically, and operations became hellish for tacticians and quartermasters alike.  
 U.S. troops took to the hills to avoid enemy armor and tank attacks. German forces 
moved into the mountains to occupy better defensive positions, and both sides struggled for the 
commanding heights of the Atlas Mountains. Mountain operations required weapons better 
suited for warfare in rugged terrain, chiefly mortars and pack howitzers or mountain guns. These 
weapons featured a high trajectory fire, which was ideal for fire support in broken terrain, and 
pack mules most often moved these guns. As General Clarence Huebner noted: 
To enable the 81 mm mortar and its ammunition to follow the infantry into rough 
country, mules, equipped with… pack saddles must be available. Engineers 
normally follow closely behind the advancing infantry preparing trails which will 
permit supplies to be carried by ¼-ton C&R trucks. Until these trails are built, the 
only means of providing ammunitions and rations is by mule or light animal 
transportation.
14
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Another group with special needs was the Medical Service. Like the infantry and 
artillery, the Medical Service had rapidly grown dependent on motor transportation, particularly 
for the evacuation of the wounded. Alternative methods of transportation were required as U.S. 
troops entered the Sedjenane Valley and mountains outside of Bizerte in early April 1943. A 
Ninth Infantry Division Medical report explained the problem of casualty evacuation as related 
to terrain: 
The terrain in this was featured by steep mountain ranges, heavy and thick 
under brush, very little over-head cover, and almost complete absence of roads. 
The non-availability of roads or paths created a definite problem to our normal 
supply and evacuation lines. Vehicles were of no value in the forward areas, 
therefore most of the medical property and supplies were hand carried in the 
forward areas. Throughout this operation, the Engineers were busily engaged in 
developing trails to be utilized in bringing up supplies, and aiding in the 
evacuation of wounded.  
The extremely heavy under brush and the blackness of the nights impeded night 
evacuation by litter bearers. Mules were utilized to carry casualties in both the 
39
th
 and 60
th
 Infantry areas. It was found necessary to improvise litter carrying 
devices on the regular mule saddle, as no cacolets were available. Many 
difficulties were met in attempting to solve this problem. The method found most 
expedient was utilizing two mules in tandem with Signal Corps lance poles 
fastened to the front and rear mule on the sides of the saddle. This method enabled 
us to fasten the litter, and at times a blanket between the two mules. It was found 
that if a casualty was transported on a single mule, that the ride was more rough, 
and the chances of injuring a patient was greater than with the method of using 
two mules in tandem. Single mules with a casualty on their back invariably 
attempted to lie down and roll over in order to relieve the extra weight on their 
backs. It was found necessary to have at least one medical department man with 
every two mules in the “casualty convoy” to prevent accidents to the casualty. In 
addition to the mule litter carry, there were some areas in which the casualties had 
to be hand litter carried.
15
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Occasionally during the Sedjenane and Bizerte operation, motor vehicles were successfully used 
in the transportation of wounded. The following passage illustrates creative genius, and the 
prevailing American tendency to find and apply a motorized solution: 
In the 47
th
 Infantry area, a railroad track was located approximately in the center 
of the area. By removing the tires from two one-half ton trucks and placing the 
trucks on the rails, it was found that the collecting company could efficiently 
evacuate two battalions by this method. The vehicles were placed on the railroad 
track attached back to back by a small iron bar. In traveling west on the track, the 
lead vehicle furnished the power for the “casualty train.” On the return trip, the 
other vehicle furnished the power. The gauge of the track accommodated the 
truck rims nicely. The rails were broken in several places by shell fire, but were 
readily repaired with wood and sand bags by collecting company personnel. 
Twelve (12) litter casualties could be carried comfortably on the two trucks. This 
“casualty train” rode more easily than an ambulance on the road.16 
Motor transportation of any item was, by and large, an exception to the rule in this particular area 
of fighting. Even during the latter stages of combat and the final assault on Bizerte, terrain 
continued to determine supply movements and the evacuation of wounded. A 9
th
 Infantry 
Division Medical history gives testimony to American adaptability and determination to 
overcome daunting obstacles: 
On 25 April 1943, the Division (9
th
) made a coordinated attack, pushing west 
toward Bizerte. During the attack it was found necessary to supplement the 
collecting companies which were evacuating the 59
th
 and 60
th
 Infantry Regiments 
with approximately one hundred (100) extra litter bearers each. The roughness of 
the terrain again prevented the use of the wheel litter carriers. At one time there 
was a three and one-half (3½) mile hand-litter carry distance in two of the 
Infantry Regiments.
17
 
Allied operations bogged down during the winter months from December 1942 to March 
1943. American forces were stymied by a tenacious German defense, and the Army suffered a 
humiliating defeat at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. However, U.S. forces gradually increased 
in number, supplies moved largely because of improvised pack trains, and the Allies launched an 
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offensive in March. By May 10, 1943, Bizerte was captured and Axis resistance ceased in North 
Africa.
18
  
The value of Operation Torch was questioned before and after it occurred, but the value 
of the hard lessons learned and experience it provided American troops is indisputable. The 
lessons learned would not guarantee success, nor would all of these lessons be fully appreciated 
and implemented in the coming months. However, the experience gained from November 1942 
to May 1943 at least gave the Army a better foundation from which to build, adapt, and prepare 
for the next round. Items and practices overlooked prior to Operation Torch, such as pack animal 
transportation, would be incorporated into future campaigns where terrain was even more 
difficult. 
An important lesson learned from fighting in North Africa was that U.S. troops needed to 
concentrate on aspects of fighting in different environments. Mountain operations were one of 
the most obvious areas in which the U.S. troops lacked training. General Truscott realized that 
more training for mountain warfare was required, since U.S. troops would be fighting in 
mountains for the foreseeable future. Third Infantry troops began basic, mountain training that 
included hill climbing, range estimation, combat firing of all weapons, and night maneuvers. 
Supply missions were also practiced, and successful experiments using burros as pack animals 
were conducted. The object of this training was chiefly to familiarize the troops with operations 
in hilly country.
19
 
U.S. troops also appeared to lack physical conditioning. General Truscott was particularly 
annoyed by what he saw as a lack of physical fitness in American soldiers. Before combat 
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operations ceased in North Africa, Truscott implemented a rigorous training program that 
included log tossing, obstacle course running, bayonet training, and hand to hand combat. The 
most radical (and probably most unpopular) training regimen implemented by General Truscott 
occurred when the Division Commander prescribed a new standard rate of march—five miles in 
one hour, or four miles per hour for a greater distance than five miles. Infantry regiments 
eliminated men who were physically incapable of meeting this standard, even though the Field 
Manual required infantry to march at two and a half miles an hour.
20
 
Third Infantry troops adapted in the field and rigorously trained over the next few 
months. Soldiers in all units, from regimental combat teams to supply companies, rushed to 
apply the lessons learned during the Torch campaign in preparation for the next operation. Their 
investment in training and field modifications soon paid sizable dividends, as they embarked on 
a mission that proved more arduous and rugged than previously experienced. 
The next logical step for Allied operations in the Mediterranean Theater was the invasion 
of Sicily. Dissension remained rife among Allied leaders, with one camp still insisting on a 
cross-channel attack, and the other side promoting a more peripheral, southerly route. As before, 
the cross-channel attack was postponed, and the Allied invasion of Sicily occurred when some 
160,000 men (and a handful of donkeys and mules) landed on July 10, 1943.  
The number of pack animals that accompanied the Army landings at Sicily is unclear.  A 
few far-sighted commanders and troops brought North African animals with them in anticipation 
of fighting in more trackless, mountainous country. Other records indicate that the Army 
anticipated the need for pack animals, but planned to use native animals, which they did in great 
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numbers. Approximately 4,000 pack animals of varying types and quality were used during the 
relatively short 30-day operation in Sicily. Almost all were Italian Army animals or of local, 
Sicilian stock.
21
  
The Army’s use of local, native animals had certain benefits. First, it was cost effective. 
The trans-Atlantic shipment of American mules was expensive, and that assumed ships were 
available to haul the animals. Paying the local population for their animals circumvented the 
shipping costs and avoided some of the logistical problems. Second, mules and donkeys native to 
the Mediterranean region were generally smaller and could not carry as much, but these animals 
proved incredibly tough. They demonstrated an impressive tolerance to the sounds and chaos of 
war, particularly Italian Army mules that showed great indifference under fire. As one American 
soldier observed, “The Sicilian and African mules paid no attention to gunfire. And I have seen 
times…there was one particular…they’s walkin’ a bunch of ‘em down the road, and a mule got a 
little off to the shoulder, hit a land mine, and it just blew his whole quarter and everything 
off….The other mules never missed a step, just walked on around him.”22  Inexperienced 
American mules were fractious and hazardous to the troops around them; and experienced local 
animals became valued for their stoic disposition in combat.  
The use of pack animals in Sicily forced the Army to adapt at all levels and varying 
degrees. A platoon leader or private moving a group of Sicilian mules had to take a crash course 
in Italian, because “giddy up” did not translate into the native language. Relying on local 
animals, the Army also relied on saddles and tack from the local population. The few American 
troops fortunate enough to have experience with mules or the fine art of packing were required to 
re-learn packing with Italian Army animals and accouterments. A double-diamond hitch worked 
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on a Phillips Army pack saddle during maneuvers at Fort Riley, Kansas, but the method and gear 
required serious modification in the combat area near Brolo, Sicily.
23
  
Division-level commanders adapted and changed tactics. Pack animals and animal supply 
remained absent from the TO/E, but commanders began to improvise. Pack trains were cobbled 
together from local sources and successfully integrated into supply plans. Army and division 
veterinarians had served primarily as food inspectors in North Africa. However, veterinarians 
began serving more in their traditional roles as the use of pack animals increased.
24
 
Plans to form a contingent of mounted troops were drawn up, though these plans were not 
fully implemented until the Italian campaign.  General Truscott reported:  
In the Sicilian Campaign I found it necessary to improvise mounted organizations 
and pack trains in order to outflank through the hills strongly held enemy 
positions located behind blown-out bridges and other defiles. The cavalry troop 
was equipped with captured German horses and Sicilian mounts, and Italian 
equipment. The personnel were provided from infantry units, taking anyone who 
had any experience whatever with horses. There was of course no time for proper 
training, nor was the equipment, for the most part improvised, adequate. Owing to 
the lack of proper training, losses in animals and equipment in both the pack units 
and the cavalry troop were excessive. Although inadequately trained and 
equipped, these mounted units rendered important service, especially during the 
latter days of the campaign.
25
 
General Patton complained that had a mounted troop existed, the outcome of the Sicilian 
campaign would have been different. According to General Patton, “It is the considered opinion, 
not only of myself but of many other general officers…, that had we possessed an American 
cavalry division with pack artillery in Tunisia and Sicily, not a German would have escaped….”  
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Never one to avoid hyperbole, Patton overstates his case, but he correctly assessed the Army’s 
need for animal power.
26
   
 Even though Army veterinarians became more involved with animal health, the Army did 
not try to maintain these animals during the abbreviated campaign in Sicily. Instead, the Army 
used them to the point of exhaustion and replaced them from the ample supply of local animals. 
The casualty rate for pack animals in Sicily was alarming. At least one third (of the 4,000 used) 
were killed in action, and scores were “rendered unserviceable because of bad feet, saddlesores, 
and general debility.” There were not enough veterinarians or Veterinarian Service troops 
available to care for the beasts nor enough time to train regular troops or establish an effective 
remount system.  The inefficient policy of animal care on Sicily changed significantly during the 
protracted campaign in Italy.
27
 
 The procurement of local animals in Sicily was reminiscent of operations in North Africa. 
Some animals were commandeered along the route of advance in the early stages of fighting. 
Most animals were either rented for around 50 lire per day or purchased after an Army 
veterinarian made an appraisal and reached an agreement with the owner. Average prices were 
$150 per mule, $120 per horse, $40 per donkey, and $40 for a saddle. The owner received the 
money up front, regardless of whether the animal was killed or returned in poor condition. 
Again, the treatment of the animals was inefficient at times, with little regard to preserving long-
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term animal health or condition, but the procurement process improved compared to the 
haphazard approach in North Africa.
28
 
Procurement of pack animals depended on the local civilian population, and this could be 
problematic. A Quartermaster company report illustrates the supply problem with acquiring local 
mules:  
On Sunday, 8 August left the Office of the Division Quartermaster 
(O.D.Q.M) at 0800 with sixteen (16) trucks, 2 ½  ton. Stopped at Alimena but no 
mules were there. Was promised thirty (30) mules the next day. Proceeded to San 
Catarina and loaded fifty (50) mules on ten (10) trucks.  
On 9 August 1943 loaded thirty-five (35) mules on seven (7) trucks and three (3) 
trucks with saddles and packs at Caltanissetta.  
On 10 August 1943 received twenty-four trucks…. After filling what gas was 
available, loaded four (4) trucks with twenty (20) mules and sent back to the 
O.D.Q.M.  By the time this was done no more mules were available at 
Caltanissetta and it was to (sic) late to get any more.  
On 11 August 1943 went to the Chief of Police in San Catelda who informed me 
that he had released mules early the day before since he had them for two days 
and no food or water was available. Chief of Police told me that he would have 
seventy (70) mules by that afternoon. San Catelda police rounded up fourteen (14) 
mules which were dispatched at once to O.D. Q. M.  Police told me that they 
would have fifty (50) mules at least the next morning.  
On 12 August 1943 at 0900 only four (4) mules had been obtained….29 
A surplus of mules and pack animals was never a problem on Sicily. The shortages 
experienced by the Quartermaster officer mentioned above had a ripple effect on those in 
combat. The 15
th
 Regimental Combat Team Journal reports the following: 
13 August 1943—At 0500, 19 trucks arrived at the 15th Infantry trucking point. 
This was not enough to move even the battalion…. Trucks to move the remainder 
of the battalion and the mules did not arrive until 0700. They were immediately 
sent to SAN ANGELO and unloaded. The tactical loads were placed on the mules 
and the head of the 1
st
 Battalion passed thru SAN ANGELO at 0845. 
Considerable delay was encountered obtaining enough mules for both the tactical 
equipment and supplies, so the 3
rd
 Battalion and Regimental HQ were given 
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priority on the mules and they moved out. The 2
nd
 Battalion did not receive 
sufficient mules to leave San ANGELO until 1345. The supply trains left as 
rapidly as mules became available.
30
 
The frustration of mule shortages was matched by awful terrain, which wore the troops 
down physically and inhibited communication. According to one report, “Even mule packs had 
difficulty negotiating the hills and maintenance of communication proved almost impossible, 
although mounted messengers furnished by the Provisional Horse Cavalry Troop were 
indispensable aids. Contact with our own units…not over 1,000 yards away was frequently 
broken.”31    General Truscott approached an observation post in the area described above and 
wondered why the 30
th
 and 15
th
 Regiments were not advancing. He saw a forward observation 
post located about one mile away and virtually straight down. A mule train was returning when 
General Truscott asked the officer in charge “Crandall, how long will it take me to get down 
there…?”  Major Crandall replied, “Well, sir, I made it in a little over an hour.” General Truscott 
blithely indicated that he would make his way down to the observation post and see what was 
holding up the regiments. To which Major Crandall admitted, “Well, General, it has taken me 
just three and a half hours to come back from there—hanging onto the tail of a mule.”32 General 
Truscott did not bother hiking to the observation post, and he had a much greater appreciation for 
why his troops were advancing slowly. 
Terrain obviously slowed supplies, which influenced the ebb and flow of battle. In one 
instance, mules were unable to re-supply mortar rounds to men engaged in a fierce fight with 
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enemy armor near Brolo. The effect of the mortars on the German tanks and their accompanying 
troops diminished as the ammunition supply dwindled. Fifteen mules had been brought along by 
the U.S. troops trying to dislodge the Germans. The mule train attempted to bring ammunition up 
the hill, but was caught by machine gun fire when it came under observation from the hills south 
of Brolo. All but two mules were killed. The two hapless beasts eventually reached the top of 
Monte Oreole late in the afternoon. A second effort at re-supply of desperately needed 
ammunition was attempted that evening, but was only partially successful. The trip was too long, 
and the toll on mules had been prohibitively high that day.
33
 
The Third Division was instrumental in the drive toward the last German stronghold at 
Messina. The drive from Palermo to Messina was a continuation of the “Battle of 
Transportation” that occurred up to Palermo, and in one respect it was worse: only one main road 
existed along the north coast. The Germans jealously guarded the coastal highway, and it was 
often damaged with mines, craters, and blown bridges. The situation was also aggravated by 
greater demands on lengthening American supply lines.
34
 
The 3
rd
 Division Commander ordered his men to maneuver around the heavily guarded 
highway and outflank the enemy. The plan required operating over terrain so steep and rocky 
that it was impossible to use the normal means of supply beyond very limited distance. 
Anticipating this, the Division Quartermaster and specially selected officers were dispatched by 
General Truscott to purchase as many mules and horses as possible. The infantry were furnished 
with sufficient mules to serve as weapons carriers (pack artillery and mortars) and a special pack 
train to assist these heavier weapons. A second supply train would transport ammunition and 
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rations, with water being procured locally and chlorinated. General Truscott determined that 
pack animals were vital to the success of this mission and was committed to acquiring and 
moving the mules, though it turned out to be done in an unconventional manner.  According to 
an after-action report, the bulk of the animals were transported by 2 ½ ton trucks “due to the 
distance involved in the procurement of animals and their physical delivery to the troops....  This 
was thought to be impossible at first but turned out to be entirely feasible. A minimum number of 
animals was (sic) lost by this method of transport.”35 The unexpected but successful marriage of 
motor and animal transportation reveals the integrated nature of Army supply. The movement of 
Equus asinus in two and one-half-ton trucks also illustrates how Army innovation rose as 
mission difficulty increased. 
By the time the campaign ended, the Army had adopted two unusual methods of supply 
to “see that the combat troops got what they needed” on the mountainous island of Sicily. One, 
of course, was pack animals. Only a handful of officers and men had given this form of 
transportation any thought prior to the war, but the need for animal power was undeniable by the 
conclusion of operations in Sicily. A second novel means of Army supply was the use of U.S. 
Navy landing craft, as “supplies were shuttled along the coast by the Navy in LSTs and other 
craft.”  When General Patton ordered the Third Division to perform an “end-run” on the 
Germans, the U.S. forces—consisting of 650 men, two batteries of field artillery, one tank 
platoon, a platoon of engineers, and a handful of pack mules—loaded into Navy LSTs and 
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landing at Sant’ Agata. Twice more Navy LSTs landed and supplied Army forces along the coast 
of Sicily as they advanced toward Messina.
36
  
Sicily was exceptionally difficult for specific branches of Army service. Bad roads and 
rugged terrain created headaches for artillery. According to one report: 
On the north coast of Sicily the situation was particularly bad since there was only 
one fairly good highway. This resulted in much difficulty…finding suitable 
positions for the artillery. Under Brigadier General William A. Campbell… 
however, in every case these problems were solved, whether by the adoption of 
new types of prime movers for the artillery or the adapting of new devices, such 
as a special ammunition rack on M-7s for the amphibious assault.
37
 
Undoubtedly, one of the new types of artillery “prime movers” was the venerable pack mule, 
since truck-towed artillery pieces could not travel down destroyed roads or over rough terrain. 
Likewise, the M-7 was a self-propelled artillery piece that became an artillery prime mover. It 
was a reliable armored fighting vehicle, but one of the M-7’s main weaknesses was that it could 
only carry a load of twenty-four rounds. Field modifications, and eventual factory production 
alterations, increased the load to sixty-nine rounds. This marked increase in the supply of on-
board rounds was a real boon to the artillerymen. The re-supply of ammunition was often 
impossible by truck, so the M-7 was customized to carry extra ammunition and could keep up a 
greater sustained rate of fire.  
 Terrain affected the Medical Service as well. Fortunately, they were able to apply many 
of the lessons from North Africa to overcome similar barriers in Sicily. Rough terrain was not a 
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serious factor in the opening phases of the American campaign. Medical detachments were able 
to establish colleting stations near the combat area. Casualties were carried in hand litters a short 
distance to points accessible by litter jeeps, from which they were then taken to the ambulance 
loading point. Litter jeeps proved most valuable, cutting down on travel time and navigating 
where regular ambulances could not go. The terrain grew impassable within a few days of 
fighting, and jeeps could no longer operate. Casualty evacuation could only be done by hand or 
mule litters.
38
 
 The Sixtieth Combat Team had one of the most difficult medical problems of any unit in 
the Ninth Division.  One report noted: “On 5 August the unit marched east into the mountain 
area toward MOUNT PELATO. All of this movement was cross-country, the terrain being so 
rough that it was impossible to move vehicles until the Engineers constructed a trail around the 
many mountain ranges.” Heavy fighting was anticipated around Capizzi, and with the area’s 
known terrain difficulties, the unit took extra measures. One hundred ten extra litter bearers were 
attached to the unit (some coming from the 9
th
 Division band), and litter bearer squads were 
placed at 300-to 400-yard intervals to relay casualties back to aid stations. The unit report 
continued: 
In addition, plans were drawn for a litter carrier to be attached to mules. The 
Ordnance Company cooperated nicely and in a relatively short time we had 
twenty workable attachments for mules. This litter carrier was constructed along 
the lines of the French cachelet (cacolet). This device allowed us to carry two 
patients on one mule. Prior to completion of these devices, Signal Company lance 
poles were obtained for keeping mules in tandem. By means of the lance poles it 
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was possible to carry one casualty between the two mules. The use of both of 
these devices was made difficult by the heavy vegetation.
39
 
The casualty collecting company was hindered and movement was extremely difficult 
because of the total lack of roads. The company noted “the collecting station was originally 
established on the only trail leading in the area leading north out of CAPIZZI. During the first 
two days, collecting company men were kept in the vicinity of mule head to lead hand litter 
bearers back to the collecting station.”  Engineers, who used bulldozers to blaze a jeep trail, 
slowly made progress. The trails soon accommodated vehicles, and the movement of casualties 
was greatly simplified. The collecting company report concludes by noting that “the movement 
of this regiment has again proven the value of and necessity for strong, sturdy litter bearers. It 
cannot be emphasized too strongly that litter carrying devices for mules be made readily 
available to any unit engaged in cross-country, mountain warfare.
40
 
 Operations on Sicily were short, only about one month, so the amount of time the Army 
cared for this cadre of pack animals was not lengthy. The Army used around 4,000 animals, with 
around 400 being used by the Ninth Infantry Division. Yet, over this abbreviated period and 
caring for a relatively small number of animals, the Ninth Division Quartermaster noted that 
3,300 pounds of hay and 9,913 pounds of grain were fed from August 4 through August 14, 
1943. The amount of supplies required to care for the supply animals became staggering as 
campaigns grew in scope and duration, forcing the Army to adapt exponentially.
41
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Sicily provided the Army with another wealth of education.  Many of these lessons were 
implemented and expanded as fighting moved to Italy. General Truscott continued to be a 
trendsetter regarding the use of animal power in a motor-bound Army. He implemented a 
familiar program during the interlude between Sicily and Italy.  
After the experience gained in Sicily, it was recognized that pack animals 
are essential to fast-moving operations in mountainous terrain lacking in passable 
roads as is this part of Italy. Although a Pack Troop of 4 Platoons of 50 mules 
each is now in operation, it is felt that at least two more such platoons are 
needed…. Rations, ammunition, water, casualties, radios and wire were 
transported by mule pack. It is believed that a pack platoon should be attached to 
each regiment operating in mountains and that sufficient reserve platoons should 
be maintained to allow complete platoon replacement after each two days of 
active packing. Native animals were found lacking in endurance and size but the 
native pack saddle has proven quite satisfactory. On the other hand, the issue 
Philips pack saddle proved to be too heavy.  
After the Sicilian campaign I intensified the training of the cavalry troop and pack 
train and organized a battery of pack artillery, in anticipation of operations in the 
mountainous country in Italy. Improved equipment was obtained and full 
advantage taken of the four weeks available. These provisional units accompanied 
the Third Division to Italy.
42
    
General Truscott campaigned to highlight the continued need for animal power in places 
lacking roads and dominated by rough terrain, particularly in Italy. He appealed to the upper 
ranks of the Army to implement more animal power in both the supply and combat arms.  
Recent operations of the Third Division in Sicily have shown the distinct 
need for pack animals to facilitate infantry operations in terrain not accessible by 
motor transport. I believe that nearly all Divisions engaged in the operation had 
the same experience. The Third Division landed at Licata with about 90 burros 
from Africa. They were used to transport ammunition and weapons loads during 
the assault phase. There were found to have limited use due to limitations in loads 
and speed. The burros were eventually discarded and replaced by captured or 
confiscated animals, both mules and horses. At the end of the Palermo phase, we 
had accumulated a number of horses and mules equipped with a number of 
captured and improvised pack saddles. During the final advance to Messina, it 
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was necessary to increase greatly the number of pack animals. More than 500 
were in constant use to supply elements engaged in flanking movements through 
the mountains. Losses and wastage among these pack animals was extremely high 
because of crude improvisation and lack of trained personnel to handle them.  
The impossibility of improvising efficient mounted reconnaissance, combat, and 
pack transportation during active operations from untrained personnel is obvious. 
I am firmly of the opinion that if operations contemplate the employment of this 
Division in terrain approaching that in the Sicilian operation that these 
organizations will be worth their weight in gold. In the event that this Division is 
not employed and any other Division may be, I will be glad to release both the 
pack platoon and reconnaissance troop when and where needed because I am 
convinced they will be invaluable to any unit engaged in mountain warfare.
43
 
The regression to the more primitive method of animal transportation was embraced, at 
least at the division and lower levels of the Army. Unfortunately, the upper echelon was slower 
to recognize the need for animal power. General Truscott continually requested support of Army 
commanders for the use of animal power. He also requested that Army leadership recognize the 
specialized personnel required to handle and care for this old but no less vital method of 
transportation. General Truscott’s petitions went unanswered:  
Reference letter, same subject, dated 2 September 1943, copy attached hereto, to 
which no reply has been received to date. Provisional organization of this 
mounted reconnaissance troop, pack train, and pack battery was begun in Sicily. 
These units have been actively engaged in operations since the day they landed in 
Italy, September 18, and have proved of tremendous value to date. As we 
continue the campaign I expect its value to greatly increase. However, it is highly 
desirable that the provisional organization be authorized and the necessary grades 
and ratings be provided. At present these grades and ratings must be taken entirely 
from the Division line units. It is requested that authority be granted for the 
provisional organization of these units as per attached Tables of Organization 
with the necessary grades and ratings.
44
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General Truscott sent General Eisenhower a lengthy letter in which he compared 
operations in Sicily with the first few months of the Italian campaign. Differences included the 
fact that the men were more fit and getting acclimated to the rigors of combat. Another 
difference was the weather. Sicily had been hot; Italy was becoming cold and very wet, adding to 
the overall discomfort of troops and complicating supply lines. Obvious similarities were the 
mountainous terrain, the ongoing demand for animal transportation, and the Army’s failure to 
recognize formally the crucial role played by the men in these animal powered units. General 
Truscott noted: 
In operations such as this in rugged country, infantry battalions will 
largely operate off roads and will spend considerable periods of time in the 
mountains and away from their transportation. Supply, ammunition, and 
communication present real problems in these instances. Our organization is not 
particularly well suited for such operations but can be adjusted with some 
improvising.  
My pack train, pack battery, and mounted troop have been worth their weight in 
gold. You may recall I organized these in Sicily and started them in this campaign 
before their organization was complete and before they were trained. They have 
had their training the hard way but all have certainly done a grand job. 
Incidentally, when I organized them I asked NATOUSA’s blessing upon them, 
that is, I asked authority for the provisional organization for an allotment of 
grades and ratings on a temporary basis while the need existed. I have never 
received a response. Every Division in this theater has need for a similar 
organization.
45
 
General Truscott sent a similar letter and petition to General W. B. “Beetle” Smith in the Army 
Chief of Staff’s Office. Amid the standard military report and information, General Truscott was 
sure to point out the need for animal power, the upper echelon’s oversight at recognizing their 
value, and the adaptability of those men closer to the front.  
I think I wrote you from Sicily that I was organizing a pack train, mounted 
reconnaissance unit, as well as a combination pack and jeep battery of 75 (mm) 
howitzers. We sailed for Italy before the organization was complete but I brought them 
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along. As a matter of fact, they began unloading on Sept. 19
th
 and started into the 
mountains that night and have been going continuously since. Fifth Army has endeavored 
to organize such units, particularly the pack elements, for other divisions here. They are 
certainly needed. This Division could never have accomplished all that it has without 
them. I requested authority… to organize them on a provisional basis and receive an 
allotment of grades and ratings for them. I never received any reply to my request.
46
 
General Truscott never received approval from NATOUSA leadership. Nevertheless, innovative 
division and army commanders recognized the need for battlefield adaptability, and they 
diligently worked to implement these changes so that GIs could better carry on the grim, 
sometimes mundane, business of war.  
Allied forces led by General Patton’s Seventh Army liberated Messina from Axis control 
on August 17, 1943. The city was in ruins, and the bulk of the German forces had escaped across 
the Straits of Messina to the Italian mainland. There seemed to be little cause for celebration. 
American forces had little time to catch their breath before the pursuit continued. 
 Sicily is often seen from the viewpoint of what was not accomplished, most notably the 
destruction of German forces before their evacuation to Italy, or the epic personality clashes 
between Allied leaders as they struggled with coalition warfare. Indeed, undeniable blunders 
occurred, but what these glaring flaws easily overshadow was how the Army adapted. In this 
regard, Sicily was a success. Sicily demonstrated that the Army, while not revolutionary, could 
be quite evolutionary, successfully adapting to each challenge. Superior firepower and brute 
force clearly helped bring about Allied victory on Sicily. U.S. forces were frequently saved by 
heavy artillery that repulsed German attacks. Numerous German accounts suggest that Navy 
gunfire gradually destroyed their ability to fight. However, the expulsion of German forces from 
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Sicily was also accomplished by the sweat and toil of an innovative Army and the animals that 
supplied them.  
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Figure 3-1. African burro impressed into service by 60th Infantry in Tunisia, April 1943. 
(NARA).  
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Figure 3-2. Third Infantry Division lead native donkeys ashore at Licata, Sicily, July 1943. 
(NARA).
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Chapter 4 - Mule Mobilization: From the Farm to the Front 
 
In October 1937, Arizona Senator Carl Hayden wrote Secretary of War Harry H. 
Woodring inquiring about the continued use of animal power by the military. Some of Senator 
Hayden’s constituency had lucrative contracts to provide the Army with replacement horses and 
mules, or remounts, and provide stud services for the Army’s horse breeding program, which had 
originated shortly after World War I. Horse breeders and mule suppliers with Army contracts 
saw a threat to their earnings as the Army motorized in the late 1930s. Thus, Senator Hayden 
wrote the Secretary of War and asked about any “pending legislation designed to motorize the 
entire Army or Marine Corps.”  Secretary of War Woodring replied: “The War Department has 
not submitted any legislation designed to motorize the entire Army, nor is any such legislation 
under consideration. Further, it is not contemplated that there will be any material curtailment to 
remount activities.”1 
It appeared that the upper echelons of the U.S. military were unaware of the rapid 
transition taking place within Army transportation, but within a year of the correspondence 
between the Senator and Secretary of War, the Army had an unmistakable change of direction.  
A memo marked as “Immediate Action” from the Adjutant General to the Quartermaster General 
noted that “in view of recent orders which will eventually motorize the 2nd Division, it is directed 
that the purchase of mules for the current fiscal year be suspended until further orders.” And in 
February 1939 a flurry of communiqués between the Adjutant General and Quartermaster 
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General discussed the “prompt disposition” of Army animals—particularly mules—that were 
“rendered excess” because of Army motorization.2  
The Army was in a period of great transition and suffered from misdirection in the 
months preceding World War II. The combat and supply arms of the Army motorized, but the 
Army Remount Branch continued to procure animals. Prewar mobilization plans called for as 
many as 200,000 animals, and the Remount Branch expanded their purchasing efforts in 1940, 
procuring some 24,000 horses. This was well short of the prewar projections, but still a 
considerable number of animals for an Army that was motorizing. Yet, the horse-mounted 
cavalry era was rapidly fading. The procurement of Army horses in fiscal year 1942 reached 
approximately 2,900, and was suspended in late 1941 as mounted units became motorized. Only 
four horses were purchased for fiscal year 1943, and no horses were purchased in the last three 
years of the war.
3
 
The number of Army mules also declined during the early war years. The Army procured 
4, 279 mules in fiscal year 1941 and only 1,699 mules in fiscal year 1942. However, in fiscal 
year 1943, mule procurement skyrocketed to 10,217. The newly motorized, road-bound Army 
realized that terrain still dictated transportation, and Army transportation reverted to animal 
power in its first campaigns of World War II. The durable, sure-footed mules were superior to 
horses in the pack transportation role, and the demand for mules remained high for the duration 
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of the war since operations continued in mountain areas. Over 14,000 Army mules were 
purchased in the United States from 1944 until the war ended in 1945.
4
  
Animal-powered transportation rapidly declined in the late 1930s, and the Army was 
almost fully motorized by 1941. The number of personnel with knowledge of pack animal use 
and care dwindled as well. However, animal care was second nature to a small cadre of 
experienced Cavalry and Army Veterinary officers and enlisted men. These men were 
visionaries who saw a renewed demand for animal power looming on the horizon. They worked 
feverishly to resuscitate the dying art of pack animal transportation and took the existing Army 
Remount Program, a program that was in its nadir, and improved upon it. The level of 
adaptability exercised by this group of Army officers and men was extraordinary considering 
that a transportation revolution had occurred in the United States from World War I to World 
War II. Yet, at the outbreak of war, and under growing pressure to motorize and mechanize the 
Army, the animal power advocates successfully implemented an old, outmoded system of 
transportation in a newly motorized Army.  
It did not take long for some war planners to see the vital role animals might play in the 
coming hostilities. In a letter written shortly after Pearl Harbor, the War Department informed 
the Western Remount Area of the Quartermaster Corps: 
Registration of all horses and mules between the ages of three and ten 
inclusive in the States of California, Oregon, Washington and Nevada is desired 
by the Headquarters, Western Remount Area, San Mateo, California. Why?  
America is preparing with all possible speed for an all out, long War. Manpower 
is being mustered, industry and production thrown into high gear and economic 
and natural resources marshaled.  
Experience of the present War shows the horse and mule still essential for 
a variety of uses in modern armies. Germany has thus far employed something 
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like a million, Japan has used large numbers in China and Russia currently is 
winning large scale successes with mounted units or units otherwise employing 
horses. 
America has more well-bred useful horses and mules than any country in 
the world. We can use them and may need them anywhere and anytime.  
The letter went on to request that horse and mule owners provide their county agents with 
basic information, including age, sex, color, and type of animal. It also made a point to 
emphasize that “this is not a draft of animal resources and it seems most unlikely this will ever 
be necessary.” If and when animals were needed, the Army would purchase them. Nonetheless, 
“prompt registration of animals of a useful military age is simply a most desirable step in our 
defense preparation,” and, though voluntary, it was “obviously a patriotic obligation.”5 
Quartermaster officers in charge of the Western Remount Area immediately went to 
work. Letters, brochures, and pamphlets announcing the animal census were circulated to all 
County Agents, local newspapers, and radio stations. The census deadline was set for 10 January, 
1942, but Remount officers agreed to an extension because heavy snows across the region made 
it impossible for animal owners to deliver their reports. In spite of dismal winter weather, 
participation in the animal census was quite heavy. The Officer in Charge reported: “The census 
met with popular approval and enjoyed the heartiest cooperation of the County Agents and 
various horse breeding associations, and particularly the newspapers, radio stations and similar 
mediums.”  The report also noted that the census “did not at any time, so far as can be 
determined, arouse any antagonism or objections.”6 
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 A follow-up report indicated that by mid-February participation was thorough enough to 
be “considered satisfactory and most useful….” The report also noted that while the census was 
incomplete, it still provided sufficient information “to justify certain conclusions….” One 
conclusion was that large numbers of animals were potentially available for Army use. Another 
conclusion from the census was a dearth of mules compared to horses. The Army hoped that this 
was simply a lack of reporting by mule owners and not an actual shortage, because many 
realized that the demand for mules would be rising as the war progressed into areas where motor 
transportation must be replaced with animal power, preferably pack mules.
7
 
 A snapshot of Army animals available at Remount depots in May 1942 revealed a surplus 
of horses. Some 11,942 horses were at the Remount depots, and the number increased monthly 
as units underwent motorization or mechanization. Large quantities of horses were available if 
needed.  Horses, however, would not be needed. Instead, mules were in growing demand and in 
short supply.
8
  
The Quartermaster General “strongly recommended” to the Service of Supply “that the 
purchase of 10,000 pack mules be authorized and that purchasing commence at once.” The 
estimated cost for the mules was $2,000,000, a hefty price. Nevertheless, the need for mules 
outweighed the cost and funds were made available for the purchase of mules. As the report 
explained: 
In anticipation of future animal demands not yet made known to this office 
and for which plans are probably in a state of flux in various planning agencies, it 
is believed that a conservative purchasing program should be initiated at once….   
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It is probably not fully realized that at least from five to seven months are 
required to purchase, process, and issue animals, especially pack mules, ready for 
duty with troops, from date notice to purchase is received. 
Due to a competing civilian market, accelerated by a sharp curtailment in 
tire and gasoline supply, great and increasing difficulty may be expected in the 
future purchase of pack mules and the more desirable light draft animals suitable 
for packs.  
Should it develop within a reasonable length of time that animals will not 
be required for military purposes or should a termination of the war render…a 
reserve of animals unnecessary, a ready civilian market is available for prompt 
disposition of the surplus animals by sale. 
The report concluded that it was “impossible at this time to definitely predict what numbers and 
types of animals will be required, the foregoing recommendation is…that the demand will be for 
pack animals.”9  Upper echelons of the Army agreed, and the request for appropriations to 
purchase more mules was approved with few conditions. One of the few recommendations by 
Army leadership was to expedite the formation of a mountain division, which would definitely 
require pack mules, and to discontinue the purchase of horses.
10
 
Procurement of Army mules began in earnest during the spring and summer of 1942. A 
maximum purchase price was set at $250 for draft mules and $225 for pack mules. Procurement 
was to begin immediately. Careful coordination between purchasing officers and Remount Depot 
commanders was urged by the Quartermaster General to ensure that the quantity of mules rose 
without delay, but not at the sacrifice of quality. If it was questionable whether the animal could 
be used satisfactorily by the troops, then the animal should not be purchased. In no way was type 
or condition to be sacrificed in order to complete the procurement of pack mules allotted for 
purchase. The urgency evinced by Army officers in charge of animal procurement was 
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understandable. Yet, there was hardly panic or notions of giving up quality to meet a quota, 
instead the officers adapted.
11
   
The Army Veterinary Corps, the primary care-giver for Army animals, traced its heritage 
back to 1770s and the establishment of the Continental Army. The attention given to Army 
animal care was modest to say the least. In 1792, Congressional legislation provided the four 
light cavalry troops with one farrier to care for their mounts. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
demands for animal care and veterinary service multiplied as the Army’s use of animals rose. 
However, the Army failed to manage the increasing number of animals in Army service. For 
example, the cavalry and artillery arms, and the Quartermaster Department, employed a small 
number of veterinarians and farriers, but these individual arms and department acted without 
oversight or coordination. The National Defense Act of 1916 established the Veterinary Corps 
and began organizing veterinary service within the Army.  
The Veterinary Corps improved Army animal care by creating a corps of commissioned 
veterinary officers within the Medical Department. Also, animal care was consolidated under one 
department, and the organization and expansion of a war-time veterinary service was carried out 
by the Surgeon General during World War I.  These organizational changes were beneficial, but 
more corrections were needed as animal power reached its zenith during World War I. Ironically, 
World War I, often associated with motors and machinery saw the employment of horses and 
mules in epic proportions. It was estimated by the Veterinary Corps that a ratio of one animal to 
every three men was employed/utilized. Horses and mules used by World War I belligerents 
numbered in the millions. Thus, veterinary service was undertaken at an unprecedented level 
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during World War I.
12
  In April 1917, the Veterinary Corps included 203 officers and 597 
enlisted men.  By January 1919, the Veterinary Corps grew to 835 officers and 9,282 enlisted 
men.
13
  The Veterinary Corps was taken aback by the rapidity, size, and distance of animal 
deployments in World War I.  The Veterinary Corps performed admirably on the whole, but at 
times its service was haphazard and grossly inefficient. The Veterinary Corps was determined to 
make corrections in preparations for another war.   
One of the changes within the Veterinary Corps was the establishment of the Army 
Veterinary Service (AVS) in 1922. Its stated mission was to provide for the health and preserve 
the efficiency of Army animals. The AVS was subordinate to the Veterinary Corps and their 
missions were one in the same. The main difference was that the Veterinary Corps primarily 
functioned as an upper-level administrative organization for the Zone of Interior. The AVS, on 
the other hand, conducted daily animal care operations at home and abroad.
14
 
In the coming years, the AVS implemented standard veterinary practices to improve 
Army animal health and performance, such as instituting measures to control communicable 
diseases, quarantining sick animals from healthy animals, conducting thorough physical exams 
before purchasing new animals, and integrating trained AVS personnel into units utilizing 
animals. These measures were not necessarily innovative, but still represent an Army evolving 
and applying lessons learned from the most recent conflict. These actions are also surprising, 
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since the AVS was implementing such programs in the same period that motorization and 
mechanization were occurring.
15
  
The AVS was part of the Army Medical Service and so was also responsible for 
safeguarding the health of all living things Army, including men as well as beasts. The AVS 
totaled some 10,116 officers and men during World War II. One of the primary functions of the 
AVS during the war came to be inspecting food rations for quality and quantity. Approximately 
90% of the AVS personnel served as food inspectors during the war. The other 10% were 
responsible for “the professional care of over 56,000 horses and mules,” as well as thousands of 
war dogs and even Signal Corps pigeons.
16
 The AVS expanded from approximately 126 officers 
in 1939 to 2,116 in August 1945.  Many were professional veterinary care providers, most were 
not professional soldiers, but all served as a core of the troops providing veterinary service to 
Army animals. This cadre joined up with thousands of combat infantrymen, Quartermaster, and 
Service of Supply troops, all with varying levels of skill in animal care, to ensure that Army 
animal transportation functioned. Occasionally animal transportation worked well and at other 
times it performed poorly, but that it functioned at all is a testimony to Army adaptability, 
especially considering that animal power was supposed to be a thing of the past.
17
 
Citizen suppliers met the Army’s urgent need for mules, and a chief responsibility of the 
AVS was to provide professional supervision for the procurement of remount animals. All told, 
the AVS inspected some 140,000 horses and mules from 1941 to 1945, purchasing 
approximately 60,000. The Zone of Interior, or continental United States, was divided into 
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Remount Areas. Remount Area headquarters were located at Front Royal, Virginia; Lexington, 
Kentucky; Sheridan, Wyoming; San Angelo, Texas; Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Pomona, 
California. Each Remount Area was supported by a number of Remount Depots. The number of 
Remount Depots changed during World War II, but four permanent Remount Depots were 
located at Front Royal, Virginia; Ft. Robinson, Nebraska; Ft. Reno, Oklahoma; and Pomona, 
California. Each Remount Area and Remount Depot was under the command of a Veterinary 
Corps officer.  The Veterinary Corps officers were responsible for animal procurement, and AVS 
officers and personnel supported them.
18
  
Aside from animal procurement, the Veterinary Corps officers also served on the 
Purchasing Board for their Area. Veterinary Corps officers examined all animals offered for 
Army procurement and oversaw the conditions under which these animals were delivered. They 
performed preliminary tests for disease, particularly glanders, and made sure that no animals 
were purchased or transferred until the test results were available. Once results were known, the 
animals were given a special brand.  If time was of the essence, the animals might be temporarily 
branded with paint at the purchase point and then given a permanent brand once test results 
showed no signs of contagion.
19
 
The Veterinary Corps officers noted the animal’s age, physical condition, weight, sex, 
and general disposition, such as whether the animal was a biter or kicker, defiant or docile. They 
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recommended a type of service for each remount, such as pack (supply) mule or artillery mule. 
Army procurement regulations were adjusted as the war continued, allowing the pool of 
acceptable animals to widen while maintaining standards.  In June 1943, the Quartermaster 
Corps lowered the minimum height requirement from 14 ¾ hands to 14 ½ hands; and extended 
the maximum age requirement from eight to twelve. These changes were predicated on four 
considerations: 
An anticipated large demand for pack mules by the military service; a diminishing 
supply of mules of suitable type meeting existing specifications; a good, sound mule up 
to and including 12 years of age…is capable of doing the same job as a mule purchased 
under existing specifications; and, as a temporary expedient, since mules purchased now 
will probably be required for the duration of the war only, and in many cases, those sent 
to overseas theaters will not be returned to the U.S. after the war is over.  
The Quartermaster concluded “these minor changes in the specifications will not result in any 
sacrifice in quality, but will assure a more adequate supply of pack mules for the military 
service.”  These small changes were also representative of widespread Army adaptability.20 
 Veterinary Corps officers physically examined 129,942 horses and mules from 1940 to 
1945, of which 60, 230 animals, mainly mules, were purchased. Yet, this large number of 
animals never suffered any serious outbreaks of disease. Strict protocol was followed and 
significant adjustments occurred during the inter-war years. For example, equine influenza was 
observed at civilian assembly points, but the AVS took steps to avoid, or at least lessen, the 
seriousness of this debilitating illness. Veterinary officers insisted that contractors assemble 
animals just prior to visits by the Purchasing Board and then immediately move newly purchased 
animals to Remount Depots, because it had been discovered that minimizing the amount of time 
the animals were gathered in large herds reduced disease outbreaks. Mass herds had been kept 
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for lengthy periods during World War I, and epidemics were much more common. Similarly, the 
dispersal of animals was crucial to the reduction of contagions. Instead of concentrating all 
animals in one or two shipping points, as was the practice during World War I, the AVS 
organized some twenty to thirty shipping points in each Remount Area. These adjustments seem 
minor, but the impact was significant. Disease was reduced, and Army animal efficiency 
increased.
21
 
Upon purchase, animals were transferred to Remount Depots across the Zone of Interior. 
The primary functions of Remount Depots were to receive, condition, and train animals prior to 
their assignment to pack and mounted troops. In many regards, Remount Depots were similar to 
other Army bases, forts or camps where new recruits underwent basic training. The AVS 
maintained continuous care for animals at Remount Depots to avoid illness.  
 Army mules were typically processed as follows.  First, they were immediately inspected 
upon unloading from trucks or trains. Second, all animals were quarantined in special corrals for 
at least twenty-one days, tested for various diseases, and re-tested at the end of the quarantine 
period. They would be tested again just prior to transfer from the Depot to the port of 
embarkation, tested at the port just prior to departure, and tested once more immediately upon 
arrival at their overseas destination. Such redundancy minimized the number of disease 
outbreaks during World War II. Any sign of illness or injury received immediate attention from 
AVS officers, and “it was an inviolate rule that no animal would be shipped…unless it was 
sound, healthy, and free of disease….”22   
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 One of the major improvements instituted by veterinary officers from World War I to 
World War II was prophylactic inoculation. The vaccinations themselves were refined, such as 
the inoculation for equine encephalomyelitis. Perhaps an even more effective advance was 
changing the timing of the vaccination process. but it was not simply the quality or quantity of 
vaccines that improved, but also the timing in which the vaccine was given. For example, 
animals during World War I seldom received tetanus vaccine until after a traumatic injury, and 
the number of cases was widespread.  The AVS implemented a protective vaccination program 
in 1941 that included a battery of tetanus toxin shots before deployment, which imparted 
permanent immunity against tetanus. Only one animal contracted tetanus at Remount Depots 
during World War II, a remarkable record.
23
 
 Training and conditioning followed the quarantine inoculation period, and training not 
only applied to the mules, but to men as well. Unfortunately, there was very little in the way of 
formal training for personnel working with mules. Many brought their knowledge and farm 
experiences when they joined pack and animal supply units, but many did not. The Army lacked 
large numbers of specialized personnel needed to care for animals. Thus, the Army was not too 
selective when filling the ranks and, as one dismayed recruit discovered, “MP” stood for “Mule 
Pack,” not Military Police.  
 According to Jim Sims, a veteran Army mule skinner, “The c.o. said look over in those 
corrals. There was around 1,200 to 1,300 head, mostly horses. He told us they was to be trained 
and ready for cavalry use and that our Army training could wait until after we had them trained.”  
Sims continued, “Then we was shipped to Fort Bliss, Texas. Went on maneuvers in Louisiana, 
used horses there, came back to Texas and dismounted all the horses….Then we trained mules.” 
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Army planners were in an obvious “state of flux” that would require sorting out and serious 
adjustment.
24
 
Mule packers, particularly those working with artillery mules, needed to posses special 
physical requirements, such as height and strength.  The Philips pack saddle alone weighed one 
hundred pounds and had to be placed on the mule’s back, about five feet in height, before 
packing could begin. Longer strides were required for mule packers in order to keep pace with 
their animal charges, and the rate of marching for pack troops was around four miles per hour 
compared to 2 ½ miles per hour of the regular infantry. An adage among mule backers was that 
the Army put a bar up six feet high, and if your head hit the bar or you had to duck, the you were 
qualified. Men with weak arches or bad knees were generally disqualified from serving as 
packers, and often wound up in the motor pool. 
25
  
One of the well-qualified troops to serve in a pack animal unit was Hank Kinder. He was 
raised in the country and spent summers on his grandfather’s farm, where he tended to eight 
mules and a horse. He joined the Army in the summer of 1942 after the military board for his 
county lowered the enlistment age from 21 to 20. He was assigned to the 32
nd
 Field Artillery and 
spent three months at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma. According to Kinder: 
The Army then picked out all men who knew anything about farming or 
ranching and moved me to a pack troop (the 33
rd
 Quartermaster Pack Troop) 
because of my experience with horses and mules. Late in 1942 we went off to Ft. 
Bliss, and it was a big change from artillery to pack mules. I recall thinking we 
were going to be part of the tank corps because there was lots of tracks across the 
desert when we arrived, but that wasn’t the case.  There was around 5,000 mules 
and 320 men. They divided us into two troops and each troop into 4 platoons—I 
was in 3
rd
 Platoon. Each platoon had 4 shoers, 4 saddlers, 4 platoon sergeants, and 
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one pack master. Each platoon had about 70 mules. The 320 of us broke those 
5,000 mules in short order. 
 I got to break some of the worst in the outfit. I asked my sergeant one 
time, “Do I have to break every God-damned mule in the Army?” The sergeant 
told me, “If I say so, you do.”  I got to break the meanest mule in the crowd—his 
name was Santa Clause. He was always the last mule packed and always the 
lightest mule packed on account of being so mean. We were usually paired up to 
help with loading, so my partner, Swede, and I decided to teach Santa Clause a 
lesson. We took two 90 pound anvils, wrapped them in the mannie, and took a 
twitch—you could subdue the meanest mule with a twitch— loaded him down 
with those anvils, and wore Santa Clause completely out. It was a hot day, 
covered about 20 miles, and Santa Clause was last in to camp that evening. It 
wasn’t by any book, but seemed to cure him. He was a pretty good mule after that 
little exercise.
26
 
Men and mules alike were trained. Feed, water, daily inspection, and basic skills, such as 
halter, lead, and handling, were performed in an effort to prepare for the arduous tasks ahead. 
Both men and beasts were conditioned to march and travel great distances at various times and 
under all conditions. “For a while we hiked every night,” noted Kinder, “to break us and the 
mules in to moving in the dark. It was good we did because we packed more at night in Burma 
than in the daytime.”27  
 The Army continued to widen the pool of mules suitable for military service. Height 
requirements were modified again to include a range of 14.2 to 15.2 hands high. The addition in 
height allowed purchasing officers “a certain amount of leeway” when they found “a big mule 
that still is a pack mule.” Aside from adjustments to height, requirements for weight and age 
were amended. The weight of the mule needed to be in keeping with their height and 
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conformation, e.g. generally 1,000 pounds for a 15 hand high pack mule, but “fifty pounds either 
way will be allowed….”  The age requirement remained four to twelve years old, however, when 
buying four year olds “it should be borne in mind that it is not desired to issue any mules under 
five years of age. That means that they must be full four year olds…” before being deployed.  
The amendment to age was because mules did not mature physically or behaviorally until they 
were five.
28
  
The regression to animal transportation created several unanticipated needs. A crucial 
element to maintaining animal efficiency was horseshoeing. Farriers had been part of the Army 
since the formation of cavalry in 1777. However, the need for farriers diminished rapidly with 
the mechanization of the United States military. Records indicate that horseshoeing schools were 
quickly discontinued once a cavalry unit became motorized. Likewise, horseshoes and shoeing 
equipment in the Army all but disappeared.  By 1941, military horseshoeing schools were scarce, 
and the shortage of skilled farriers became evident once combat units needed animal power to 
overcome certain obstacles. One solution was to recruit more soldiers with existing horseshoeing 
skills. Another answer was to allow private contractors to provide farrier service, particularly for 
animals located in the United States. Still another solution was to use local farriers in the 
respective combat zones. If native farriers did not exist, then many locals were given a crash 
course in the art of horseshoeing, as the Army adapted at home and abroad.  
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The China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater of operations experienced an acute shortage of 
farriers, more so than in Italy or the Mediterranean Theater. The AVS was tasked by the theater 
Quartermaster and the Veterinary Corps with assisting the largely animal-dependent Chinese 
Army. The Chinese Army had an estimated 22,000 horses in 1945, of which only about ten 
percent were shod. The AVS taught Chinese Army personnel the benefits of basic veterinary 
medical care, including the necessity of proper shoeing. Local horseshoeing schools were 
established, American-made equipment arrived, and horseshoe production increased dramatically 
in the CBI.  The result of such measures was improved efficiency of Chinese Army animals.
29
 
The average length of processing mules at Remount Depots was seldom less than 120 
days. It was found that issuing animals in less time had risks, particularly a greater susceptibility 
to illness. Before leaving the Remount Depot, all animals were inspected again, particularly for 
respiratory diseases, ring worm, and other skin disease.  Animals were transported via train from 
the Remount Depot to a port of embarkation. Army Port Veterinarians inspected the animals 
immediately upon arrival at the port of embarkation. All animals were re-shod, clipped, 
groomed, and given special rations of food and water during the two days prior to departure. 
Animals only remained in each port of embarkation for a few days, cutting down on potential 
infectious diseases and helping to maintain good physical condition for the arduous voyage 
ahead. The Port Veterinarian reviewed shot and immunization records as the animals were 
loaded aboard the transport ship. Transport personnel were usually from Army Veterinary units 
or animal service detachments. These specially qualified men often accompanied their animal 
charges into the theater of operations.
30
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Army Veterinary Corps and AVS officers inspected each ship prior to loading. The 
transports were inspected on a variety of details that could have a bearing on animal health. For 
example, the ship’s capacity, stall accommodations, feeding, watering, lighting, and ventilation 
systems were all checked, along with feed and water supplies. All equipment, from loading 
cranes to curry combs, was checked before any animals boarded.  Not all ships were rigged with 
the most optimal systems, and some deviations were allowed “in view of the fact that none of the 
American animal transports in use during the war was constructed for such use; at least 18 of 
them were converted vessels.”  Most conversions were from Liberty-type ships or troop 
transports, with a stall capacity of 320 animals. Also, Port Veterinary officers cooperating with 
the War Shipping Administration designed most of the converted ships. In a brilliant 
demonstration of on-the-job training, the Port Veterinarians became nautical engineers and 
designed the conversation of a small fleet of ocean-worthy animal transports. Only enemy bombs 
and torpedoes could keep these ships from successfully delivering their animal cargo. 
Veterinary officers and their assistants, usually at a ratio of one officer and five enlisted 
men for every one hundred animals aboard, accompanied the animals on a trans-oceanic voyage. 
The average transport carried about 320 animals. A protocol was closely followed to include 
exercising, feeding, watering, and cleaning. Manure was removed, and decks flushed daily. 
Ventilation was constantly adjusted to improve air flow. Horses and men often wore masks of 
cloth saturated in chloride of lime to counteract the ammonia build up from urine. Any sick 
animals were separated and treated. The average trans-oceanic voyage took approximately 
twenty-five days or more. One particular voyage from New Orleans to Calcutta, India via the 
Panama Canal took sixty-three days. Records indicate that 20,815 horses and mules left 
119 
 
American ports in 1942-1945. Only sixty of them died or were destroyed en route to the war 
zone, a testimonial to the dedication of the AVS personnel and the hardiness of Army mules.
31
 
Occasionally the U.S. Army used British merchant ships to haul mules on their trans-
oceanic voyage. The British merchant ship Theseus transported some 485 U.S. Army mules 
across the Atlantic, through the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and on to Karachi, Pakistan. 
The mules were used by American and British troops operating in the Burmese jungle.  
Although a British ship, the experience for those aboard Theseus was typical. Cleanliness 
aboard a ship with nearly 500 mules was a constant battle. Bill Bond, a Theseus crew member, 
observed that upon arrival and unloading, “clean up on the ship began in earnest. Dozens of 
workers, mainly women, swarmed aboard with wicker baskets to scrape away at weeks of 
hardened manure. Flies, vermin, and stench were appalling.” The ship was fumigated for forty-
eight hours, refitted with additional stalls to carry more mules, and dispatched to South Africa, 
where it picked up another several hundred African donkeys, mules, and ponies. The animals 
were fitted with body harnesses and loaded using a derrick and winch. The ship now carried 
more animals, which meant more water and food were consumed. As Bond noted, “we had to 
constantly muck out the ship by removing manure and straw overboard. It had to be done after 
dark, under the illusion that this would avoid giving away our position to the enemy.”  Bill Bond 
and  Theseus delivered three shipments of animals to the U.S. and British Army. In the end, 
Theseus was decommissioned as an animal transport and refitted again to carry non-animal 
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cargo. The reason was age: “the acid involved in prolonged animal excreta was playing havoc 
with her aging plates, and the lack of dry-dock cleaning made matters worse.”32 
Men and mules were undoubtedly relieved upon reaching their port of call. As Buck 
Cureton observed,  
 The mules would get antsy when they got close to port. I was at the dock in 
 Calcutta when a shipload arrived…they’d been at sea for over 100 days. The crew turned 
 them loose and let those mules swim to shore. They swam to the beach and you could tell 
 they were tickled to see the ground. They rolled over on the beach like kids.
33
 
Once in theater, the treatment and care for animals was maintained, though the quality of 
care differed from one theater to the next. Food shortages were widespread, and veterinary 
resources were primitive. Nonetheless, the AVS was able to ensure that animal efficiency 
remained high in spite of the abysmal conditions. The Remount Depots at Grossetto and Pisa, 
Italy processed some 15,600 animals, or about 1,725 horses and mules each month for nineteen 
months. These animals originated from different places: 3,900 from Britain and France; 1,100 
from Italy; 2,400 from Sardinia; 2,881 from America; and over 1,000 recovered animal patients 
from unknown origins. Disease should have been high from this diverse and constantly changing 
animal population. However, no serious outbreaks occurred due to the diligent protocol set by 
the AVS. Once the war ended, thousands of these healthy animals were sold or given to war-torn 
countries, including Germany, France, Italy, and Greece, to aid the post-war recovery.
34
 
The mules were generally quarantined, inspected, and transferred to the front. The 
method of movement to the front supply line depended on the theater. In Italy, mules were 
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usually loaded onto converted trucks and hauled from port to supply areas.  In the Southwest 
Pacific, such as at Guadalcanal, mules simply swam to shore and were marched to the supply and 
battle area. Mules sent to India were loaded onto trains, taken to a Remount Depot, and then 
road-marched after the quarantine period. The theater of operations also determined the type of 
animal employed. Supply operations in CBI, for example, relied more on American mules on 
account that the native animal population was considered too small, unhealthy, and scarce. 
Operations in the Mediterranean (Italy) utilized more native animals because a ready supply of 
relatively healthy animals existed.  
Maintaining animal health and physical fitness was a tedious, often complicated task, as 
illustrated in the efforts to meet the most basic of needs, forage. The Quartermaster General 
requested studies because a ration was needed that possessed “the necessary nutrient qualities for 
animals but considerably smaller in bulk for transport.” Indeed, the problem of bulk in forage 
rations had been among the arguments used by motor and mechanization proponents 
championing the efficiency of vehicle transport.   
The AVS and U.S. Department of Agriculture worked diligently to develop a complete 
horse and mule feed. Experiments to create the perfect mixture and consistency of ration were 
conducted. One trial formula included: oats (47%), sugar beet pulp (35%), starch (10%), alfalfa 
(7%), and salt (1%) in a pelletized form. Results of feeding trials during the fall of 1942 proved 
unsatisfactory. Army test boards opted for simplicity, and the emergency forage ration included a 
double-compressed bale of a hay-oat-salt mixture.
35
 
The AVS’s quest for a perfect ration failed, though undertaken in the Zone of Interior  
under optimal conditions. Finding forage overseas proved even more difficult. The AVS 
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attempted to solve the bulk forage dilemma by procuring local resources and developing and 
possibly improving upon indigenous feed. Using local forage removed the trans-oceanic shipping 
problem from the equation, but actual procurement or locating forage of any kind was an issue.  
The increased deployment of local animals in Italy, for example, caused demands for 
feed to skyrocket. The Fifth Army alone was using no less than 12,000 mules in the spring of 
1944. The strain on forage supplies was immense, especially considering that one mule requires 
approximately seventeen pounds of forage and ten gallons of water each day to perform normal 
duties. Procuring forage for these numbers of animals left the Quartermaster and AVS in a 
quandary. The difficulty was compounded by the German Army’s application of scorched earth 
tactics, including the destruction of cropland and animals during retreats. The availability of 
forage in Italy improved when AVS personnel found an undamaged feed manufacturing mill in 
Maddaloni, and several thousand tons of grain in southern Italy and Sardinia. These discoveries, 
coupled with increased forage imports from the United States and Europe, helped avert a feed 
crisis in Italy.
36
 
An acute shortage of forage plagued operations in the China-Burma-India theater. The 
Chinese Army’s indifference to basic animal care and maintenance, coupled with a virtually non-
existent logistical infrastructure left the AVS increasingly frustrated. Yet, the AVS personnel 
accepted these unsatisfactory conditions and adjusted. Resigned to forage scarcity and declining 
animal efficiency, the AVS personnel made do.  
Operations in CBI were largely cut off from motorized supply lines and were most often 
supplied through the air or by subsisting off the land. AVS officers accompanied Army 
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reconnaissance teams prior to operations and mapped out routes with suitable airdrop locations 
and grazing areas. Pre-operation exercises were conducted to determine if animals could subsist 
entirely off of the land, but it was determined that the mules could not and airdrops were 
necessary to provide grain supplements.  
Animals routinely grazed on trails and consumed large quantities of bamboo, which 
provided roughage but very little nutrients.  Small fields and rice paddies were prevalent, but the 
rice fields took up most of the arable land, making good grazing areas rare. Among the most 
favorable places for grazing were graveyards. As one Field Artillery officer noted, “Lay-over 
areas were always chosen with grazing areas uppermost in mind. Graveyards afforded us more 
grass than any other type of area in China, so we camped very often in graveyards.” As Hank 
Kinder observed, “When we went into Burma, and especially China, the graveyards were all 
grown up…not mowed or kept, so we let the mules graze at night. Pretty good grass, too, like 
blue grass over here. They preferred the grass to feed.” Several hundred men and mules 
interrupting the tranquility of a sacred burial ground paints a dark, comedic image, but it is also 
illustrative of the Army adapting to their conditions and utilizing all resources available.
37
  
Grain supplements were air-dropped to supplement the nutrient-poor grazing. Victualling 
pack animals by air was clearly uncharted territory for the Army, and numerous problems and 
mishaps occurred. In the beginning, unmarked, overfilled feed bags with mixtures of grain and 
cracked barley were kicked out of cargo planes. The 100-pound bags free-fell to the ground, 
usually bursting on impact; and causing great waste and delay in the collection process.  
Eventually, the problem was corrected through American ingenuity. Buck Cureton explained: 
“instead of a 100-pound bag packed full of loose grain, we used a 100-pound bag filled with ten, 
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smaller, ten-pound bags. The big bag burst when it hit and all the smaller bags scattered on the 
ground. We could pick them up easy enough and load them onto the mule packs.” The once 
haphazard method of air supply in CBI dramatically improved as the campaign wore on and the 
troops adjusted.
38
 
Another example of AVS adaptability involved working in various theaters with allies 
that held disparate views regarding animal care. The differences between AVS operations in the 
MTO and CBI were stark. The Italian Army shared a Western view of animal care and veterinary 
medicine with the AVS. Both forces were devoted to the basic tenet of veterinary medicine, 
namely the science and art of prevention, cure, or alleviation of disease and injury in animals. 
Veterinary medicine in the Italian Army during the 1930s and 1940s was not in the vanguard of 
development, particularly in medicines, as the AVS discovered during the initial phases of the 
Italian campaign. However, the Italian Army had a Veterinary Service and Remount Program 
upon which the U.S. Army could build.  
The Chinese Army had no modern standard of animal care, nor did they have a recent 
history from which to develop a veterinary medicine program. The Chinese Army was still 
heavily dependent on animal power, but upon arrival in theater American personnel discovered 
native animals in poor condition. The animals were unshod, unkempt, and according to one CBI 
veteran, the Chinese “worked ‘em ‘til they died.” The AVS was appalled, frustrated, and 
determined to impose an efficient veterinary medicine program on the Chinese Army.
39
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The stereotypes of American wastefulness versus Chinese frugality did not apply to 
methods of animal care, and there is a paradox in the contrast between AVS and Chinese 
veterinary practices. The Chinese could afford to be wasteful because animals, like people, were 
plentiful. Likewise, the Chinese considered animal care to be degrading duty. Consequently, the 
Chinese had little concern for animal health, welfare, or efficiency. The AVS and the supposedly 
wasteful GI, in contrast, made every effort to husband resources in CBI. AVS officers showed 
Chinese officers and men the importance of proper animal care as a way to ensure animal 
efficiency, but AVS endeavors to impose a veterinary medicine program on the Chinese were not 
widespread or enduring.  
 Some 56,000 animals were mobilized by the Army Veterinary Service, most of which 
were never deployed; and only 10% of the AVS personnel were actually used for animal care 
since the majority served as food inspectors during World War II. The service of these men and 
mules would not meet the usual definition of heroic, and it is not suggested that mules or the men 
providing them care won the war. Their service, however, was more than just a minor 
contribution to a massive corporate effort that culminated in Allied victory over the Axis. An 
examination of the AVS in World War II also provides a microcosm of Twentieth Century 
America that reveals a penchant for adaptability and organization. 
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 Figure 4-1. American mules unloaded by crane and cargo net at Naples, Italy, September 
1944. The mules will be moved to a corral, placed in quarantine, and then trucked to the 
front supply lines (Army Veterinary Service in World War II).
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Chapter 5: Mules on the Boot—Operations in Italy 
The Allies secured Sicily on August 17, 1943. Their victory was bitter as most of the 
Germans retreated to Italy unscathed. American and British forces spent the next four weeks 
preparing to invade the Italian mainland and pursue the Germans. A few division commanders 
fretted over logistics, particularly the continued need for animal-powered supply. General Lucian 
Truscott noted, “After the Sicilian campaign I intensified the training of the cavalry troop and 
pack train and organized a battery of pack artillery, in anticipation of operations in mountainous 
country in Italy.” Most commanders failed to follow General Truscott’s lead or see the need for 
animal power, and Army supply lines were in disarray shortly after landing on the boot of Italy. 
1
 
The Allied invasion plan for Italy was simple and direct. American and British troops 
would land at specific points in southern Italy, and then steadily work their way up the peninsula, 
converging on Rome. Strategically, Allied leaders hoped to boost morale with a quick Italian 
capitulation and liberation of an Axis capital. Landing in Italy would also divert German troops 
from the cross-channel invasion planned for 1944.  These strategic goals were eventually met, 
but not in the rapid manner envisioned by Allied planners. Instead, the Italian campaign became 
a protracted struggle fought in three grueling phases.  
On September 3, 1943, British Eighth Army troops crossed from Sicily to Calabria on the 
toe of the boot-shaped Italian peninsula.  American Fifth Army troops landed further north at 
Salerno on September 9, 1943. The Italian government soon announced an end of hostilities 
against the United States and Britain, but Italy’s withdrawal from the war did not stop vicious 
counterattacks by German forces determined to fight a delaying action and tie up the Allies 
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indefinitely. The German army controlled the heights overlooking the Salerno beachhead. 
Moreover, the Germans controlled the few roads that snaked across the rugged Italian 
countryside.  Following a precedent set in North Africa and Sicily, the German troops resisted 
stubbornly, and then destroyed these roads as they retreated to the next fighting position. The 
Allied offensive in Italy immediately bogged down, and entered the first phase of the campaign 
in southern Italy.
2
 
The Allied advance was painfully slow for several reasons. First, Allied commanders, 
such as U.S. General Mark Clark and British General Harold Alexander, had difficulty 
conducting coalition warfare. Clark was an openly hostile Anglophobe, and Alexander 
frequently expressed nothing but contempt for American troops. Second, resources were scarce 
as the Italian campaign became a sideshow to the impending cross-channel invasion of France.
3
 
Third, and perhaps of greatest influence, was the terrain. The Fifth Army campaigns of Italy ran 
over the ridges of the Apennines rather than parallel to them. The Fifth Army history notes, “The 
trackless waste in which this ‘mountain hopping’ took place...reduced the pace of the war to a 
crawl and the means of fighting it to primitive methods.” Sweeping movements by combined 
infantry, artillery, and tanks were impossible, because the rocky masses blocked the southern 
approaches to Rome. Victory in Italy came largely by small unit actions in desolate, rugged 
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outposts, most often supplied by pack animals, and fought in what Bill Mauldin dubbed a land of 
“mud, mules and mountains.”4 
Supply operations in Italy employed pack animal extensively, and depended almost 
exclusively on native animals. The U.S. Army Quartermaster Remount Service procured some 
15,000 mules and horses in Italy, and issued over 11,000 to Army forces throughout the 
campaign. Shipping American mules and forage was prohibitively costly, but reliance on local 
stock was not only a matter of cost and efficiency. The main reason for relying on local animals 
was that the Army had made no widespread preparations to use pack animals. War Department 
planners maintained “an implicit faith in the ability of mechanized forces to move over any type 
of terrain” until troops in the field encountered obstacles that disproved this belief. The blitz-
minded Army faced an immediate supply crisis, and an expeditious solution was partially found 
in the improvisation of native mule trains attached to Fifth Army units.
5
 
The Army’s use of Italian pack animals was rife with obstacles, and most of these 
difficulties stemmed from the impoverished state of Italy’s agricultural economy. The Fascist 
government forced hundreds of thousands of farmers into military service prior to World War II, 
and continued to impress men and animals into service after war began. Men and animals died, 
livestock and fields were neglected, and armaments production replaced what little farm 
machinery produced there had been. Italy could not produce guns and butter, and their 
agricultural economy was bankrupt when the Allies landed in September 1943. 
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The Allied arrival did little to alleviate Italy’s state of destitution. Fighting between 
Allied and German forces left thousands of horses and mules killed or wounded, and crops 
damaged. The destruction became even more widespread when Italy surrendered, because this 
triggered a German campaign of unrivaled retribution. All means of agricultural production that 
could not be taken by the German Army were destroyed as they retreated northward. According 
to Fifth Army documents: 
There was little more than destruction to report. In addition to horses, mules, and 
fodder which they had carried off, the Germans burned all the saddles they could find. 
They destroyed all veterinary medicines and instruments. They destroyed all nails and 
horseshoes. They leveled blacksmith shops to the ground. No detail was too small for 
them to overlook. The German claim that Italy would prove an economic liability to the 
Allies was to a large extent true.
6
 
The U.S. Army’s requisitioning of Italian animals did nothing to ameliorate the crisis. 
Army supply chains had an acute need for pack animals.  Likewise, the local population 
desperately needed their animals to survive. Civilian needs conflicted with equally urgent 
military needs, and both sides were desperate. For example, the Army attempted to pay for all 
animals requisitioned. However, money was often not as valuable as the animal. Requisitioning 
authorities offered one farmer $100 for his mule. He countered by offering to pay $200 if they 
would not take his mule.  
Animals capable of limited farm use, but unfit for military service, were considered a 
blessing by Italian farmers. White horses and mules also inspired thanks among the locals 
because most armies would not use light colored animals since they were hard to conceal. The 
majority of Mediterranean horses and mules were light in color, so the Army amended their 
standards and impressed light colored animals into service. Losses of the lighter hued animals 
were high, but dropped significantly when an American quartermaster, demonstrating an 
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ingenious flair, developed a dye from potassium permanganate that darkened the animals. The 
mixture was sprayed on the animals, and they maintained a dull coat for roughly one month. 
Even with such creativity, however, the Army remained desperately short of pack animals in the 
initial phases of the Italian campaign.
7
 
The Army relied upon this depleted source of supply for all activities involving animal 
transportation, and the dependence never slackened. The Italian campaign required prolonged 
mountain warfare, thus, “the employment of pack trains was not a freakish throw-back to an 
outmoded form of warfare” but rather became “an organic aspect of the campaign in Italy.”8  
Animal-powered supply eventually became second nature in Italy, but it was completely 
improvised, because neither animals nor their equipment were included in Army Tables of 
Organization and Equipment. The War Department eventually developed a TO/E that included 
animals and their accouterments. In the interim, the Army collected the “damndest array of 
horses, mules, and asses” and “gradually grew a weird assortment of Italian, French, English, 
German, and American tack and gear.”9 
 Finding personnel with even a rudimentary knowledge of pack animals was as difficult as 
finding the animals. Around half of the troops serving in provisional pack units possessed some 
knowledge of horses and mules, but most men lacked experience with animals and pack 
equipment. The personnel who ended up in divisional pack trains were from different units 
within the divisions. Many came from service of supply ranks, including the motor pool. 
According to the Army Veterinary Service:  
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The troops had been transformed into “mule skinners” from their former roles as 
truck drivers. Though these men possessed the best of intentions, their sincerity 
unaccompanied by knowledge, proved insufficient to produce happy results in 
handling their charges.  
This assessment, though polite, nevertheless explains why there were high casualties among the 
limited quantity of animals desperately needed to move supplies in Italy.
10
 
The abysmal state of Italy’s agricultural economy remained the chief problem. Locals 
often extorted prices because demand was high. The U.S. Army matched Italian government 
requisition prices, but profiteering still occurred. A one hundred to three hundred percent mark-
up often occurred for mules that were used once. When the mules died from overuse, neglect, or 
combat wounds, the locals acquired the carcass and made more profit by selling it on the black-
market.  
Locals were not the only ones taking advantage of shortages during a crisis. Italian 
farmers frequently received hand-written requisitions when American GIs took their animals. 
One farmer presented an American Military Government (AMG) official a slip of paper, upon 
which was written: “Pay to the bearer 120.00 for one horse taken—(signed) Tom Mix.” The 
AMG refused payment, exacerbating poor relations between the Army and local populace.
11
 
 The shortage of animals was so great that many were requisitioned regardless of 
condition. Most animals were old, lame, deformed, small, or immature and generally in poor 
form. Incidents of sickness were uncommonly high, since many animals were stabled prior to 
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purchase and immediately put to hard work. Animal condition was reduced further due to poor 
quality forage. Years of neglect and the German use of scorched earth left fields barren, and 
good forage was nonexistent. Tibben, carob, and mangiene were poor substitutes. The only hay 
obtainable was often musty, moldy, and caked. Several cases of intestinal disorders resulted from 
bad rations. Low quality feed reduced the condition of animals already in poor shape. The 
vicious cycle continued until small shipments of forage arrived from the U.S., and, more 
significantly, the Italian government and Army Veterinary Service gradually rehabilitated the 
countryside.
12
 
November and December 1943 were lean months for animal procurement. The Fifth 
Army Veterinarian, Colonel Clifford E. Pickering, tirelessly worked to locate animals and pack 
train equipment. He discovered that a number of Italian Army horses and mules had been 
dispersed throughout the country to keep them from the Germans. Former Italian cavalry officers 
and local carbinieri volunteered to assist Colonel Pickering procure these animals. The animals 
were in decent condition and trained for military purposes, which expedited their employment by 
the U.S. Army. Their use also avoided some of the animosity generated by military requisition of 
civilian animals. An added bonus was found in a partly demolished animal rations factory at 
Maddaloni, where a sizable quantity of maize was discovered.
13
  
The Fifth Army’s luck regarding animal procurement continued to improve. The island of 
Sardinia fell so rapidly that the Germans had no time to destroy the large number of animals or 
their equipment. There the Fifth Army found  5000 mules, 1500 horses, 3000 saddles, 2500 each 
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of horse and mule shoes, and two well equipped veterinary hospitals. The procurement problem 
was hardly solved, but “the supply of animals and equipment from military sources…proved to 
be the best found in the whole of liberated Italy.”  The Fifth Army orders were approved to 
organize pack trains and move all animals and equipment from Sardinia to the mainland, with the 
first two trains arriving in December 1943.
14
  
Moving these animals and accouterments was a logistical feat of the first order. The 
management of the links in the supply chain provides a testimonial to Army creativity induced 
by supply necessities. First, the mules moved via ship to the port at Naples. Second, the mules 
were unloaded, which proved troublesome. Rarely were mules able to walk off of the ship. 
Individual mules were placed in slings and “flying stalls,” but cargo nets became the preferred 
method of loading and unloading mules on and off the ships, because two or three mules could 
fit in each cargo net and then be lowered from the ship to the shore. Inexperienced civilian port 
labor and daily raids from the Luftwaffe made de-boarding a tedious, time-consuming process, 
but few casualties occurred. Third, the mules were road marched approximately one mile from 
port to railhead. Fourth, the mules were transported via railroad to a truck head. Horse vans or 
trailers were unavailable, so boards were fixed to the sides of Army trucks to transport the mules. 
Six to seven mules were loaded, tied in place, and hauled by truck to the supply area. Finally, the 
mules were unloaded, marched to the end of the truck or jeep line, packed with supplies, and led 
off to the front-line troops.
15
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Another innovative method of animal transport was introduced during the Anzio landing. 
Landing craft or Landing Ship Tank (LST) moved these animals. The animals were packed and 
then loaded into trucks. The trucks were equipped with eighteen-inch side planks, and the floor 
of each truck was covered with dirt or sand to improve footing. Seven animals were loaded onto 
each truck and placed alternately head to tail. Halter shanks were passed under the first two side 
boards and over the third before being tied to the truck body, leaving nose clearance over the top 
board. The trucks backed onto the LST and parked on the upper and lower decks.  The weather 
was foul, and the sea was rough, but no mishaps occurred. Upon arrival at Anzio, the trucks 
quickly exited the LST and drove to the beachhead supply area, where the mules unloaded and 
packed supplies to the front.
16
 
 Animal procurement continued to improve. One unlikely source for pack animals proved 
to be the German Army, particularly as German forces retreated. Some animals suffered from 
shrapnel wounds, many were lousy, and almost all were malnourished, but most horses and 
mules captured from the Germans were in generally fair condition. Their condition could have 
improved with a little rehabilitation. Unfortunately, the Army lacked time, forage, and veterinary 
supplies to provide more than basic subsistence to the newly acquired animals.    
The first year of the Italian campaign was lean for the Army and the animals supplying 
them. One of the most widespread problems was veterinary medicine. Provisional pack trains 
supplied combat operations shortly after landing at Salerno in early September 1943. Yet, only 
two veterinary hospitals existed at the end of 1943, one of which was run by the Italians and the 
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other run by the French.  The shortage of veterinary equipment and medicine was so severe that 
both of the hospitals and the provisional pack units replaced veterinary drugs and instruments 
with regular medical supplies.
17
     
The Veterinary Service of the First Armored Division recognized the need for pack 
animals to supply elements of the division fighting in the mountainous Volturno River region. 
Horses and mules were procured from the locals, and a provisional pack train was formed and 
immediately thrust into service. Animal casualties were high, exacerbated by the severe shortage 
of veterinary medicine. Yet, the few veterinary officers available managed to adapt. According to 
division records, “Regular veterinary supplies were not available, so with improvisations and 
what equipment was available from the Medical Service, a workable chest of materials was made 
up, and proved to be adequate.”18 
The Veterinary Service of the Thirty-Fourth Division formed provisional pack trains in 
November 1943. But veterinary supplies, pack equipment, and shoeing tool were scarce or 
nonexistent. Once again veterinary medicine and equipment were improvised from Medical 
Service stores, which were desperately needed because of rising troop casualties. The Thirty-
Fourth Division went into the line on December 27, 1943 in the Cassino sector, operating a pack 
train of seventy-five mules. When the division was relieved in mid-February, 1944, only thirty 
mules remained; the other forty-five were battle casualties or missing.
19
 
Providing and maintaining shoes were another problem. Men with horseshoeing skills 
were scarce, and material was virtually nonexistent in the Italian theater. According to the 
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Thirty-Sixth Division, very few enlisted men had experience as veterinary assistants, and only 
one man in the division was found who had experience shoeing horses. Likewise, “Horse shoes 
were very difficult to obtain, those being found were largely made from scrap iron and three-
eighths inch rod.” 20 
The First Armored Division returned to mountain warfare in June 1944 during operations 
near the Po River. German forces left the area in haste and a large quantity of German horses and 
mules were discovered. The animals were in very good condition, except they lacked shoes. 
According to the Veterinary Service of the First Armored Division: 
No available blacksmith equipment, shoes, or nails could be procured from Army 
sources, so a search was made…for an Italian blacksmith. One was finally located in a 
small town which had been taken by the Americans a few days previously, and it was 
agreed that he would be taken with the Division and stay in the area with the horses, and 
move along with them. A contract was made with him whereby he furnished the 
equipment, including his own horse shoes and nails, and would be paid twenty lire 
(twenty cents) per hoof shod. His equipment, including the shoeing tools, anvil, and the 
shoes were loaded in a jeep, and he departed rather reluctantly amid the wailing and 
crying of his wife and two small children, who thought he was being taken away for 
good….  He was kept with the Division for about a week, and having fulfilled his 
mission, was returned to his home. In this manner, the horse shoeing problem was taken 
care of very well.
21
  
 
Battle casualties among the pack animals were common and treatment, while generally 
given promptly, was strictly on the fly. Triage areas were established as near the frontline as 
possible. Enlisted personnel with any veterinary first aid training worked in these areas. The 
more seriously injured animals were evacuated to the few hospitals in the rear. According to one 
veterinary service report, “Most of the wounds to animals resulted from artillery shells. Many 
times a pack train came back…with ninety percent of the animals slightly wounded with shell 
fragments.”  Once the fragments were removed and the wounds treated, most of the mules 
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returned to duty the next night. Treating the more serious cases involved improvisation and the 
use of Medical Supply medicines generally applied to human wounds. The report continues, 
“Wounds penetrating the abdominal cavity were successfully treated by drenching the animals 
with three large doses of sulfa powder a few hours apart…and results were excellent.” Division 
veterinarians made field modifications to treat their wounded animal charges, and the supplies 
continued to move.
22
 
In order to marshal their limited animal resources and, more importantly, improve supply 
to front line troops, the Army needed a better system of care for wounded animals. A remount 
program was also necessary to rehabilitate animals that were unfit to serve, which included 
almost all of the animals procured locally or captured from the German Army. The first 
veterinary hospital was built at Persano, Italy in late 1943 from vestiges of the Italian Army’s 
horse breeding station. The station was in poor condition. The Italian staff lacked food and 
clothing and had gone unpaid for months. Animals, likewise, were unkempt and untreated 
because the Germans had seized or destroyed all veterinary instruments, veterinary supplies, and 
food. The Army’s first veterinary hospital in Italy emerged from these austere conditions.23 
The Fifth Army Veterinarian, Colonel Clifford E. Pickering, was in charge of all 
veterinary activities, including procurement, equipment, forage, and maintaining animal health. 
Colonel Pickering’s strain and responsibility was immense, partly because of shortages, and also 
because of the unanticipated need for pack animals in the supply chain. The Fifth Army 
Veterinarian partnered with associates in the Medical Service and obtained medical supplies and 
instruments for rehabilitating sick and wounded animals. Four Italian veterinary officers were 
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also found and placed in charge of the Italian personnel operating the hospital. Eventually, the 
care of pack animals serving in Army supply trains was vested almost exclusively in the hands of 
Italian veterinarians. According to Fifth Army records, “This allotment of responsibility was 
dictated not only by their evident professional capacities, but by the stubborn fact that they were 
the only personnel available for this service.” The requirements of supply forced the Army to 
adapt, relying on creativity and the utilization of local resources.
24
      
  Men, mules and material discovered on Sardinia continued arriving on the Italian 
mainland through January 1944. The number of Italian animals increased slowly as a French 
veterinary company that was transferred from North Africa augmented them. The French 
Expeditionary Corps eventually moved approximately 4,300 animals from North Africa to Italy. 
The Sardinian and French contingents formed the Fifth U.S. Army Provisional Veterinary 
Hospital, and became the foundation of veterinary hospitals serving Army pack animals in 
Italy.
25
        
Moving wounded animals to hospitals was plagued by persistent difficulties. Muddy 
trails, blown bridges, and a lack of transportation complicated quick evacuations.  Finding 
suitable facilities was difficult because most buildings were destroyed. Cooperation between the 
coalition forces regarding the evacuation and treatment of each army’s pack animals was not a 
problem. French pack train casualties were transported by U.S. Army trucks to an Italian 
veterinary hospital, treated, and returned. Allied forces recognized the importance of supply and, 
in this instance, the necessity of supply trumped national pride.
26
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Combat divisions landing at Salerno quickly realized that pack animals were needed for 
supply, and commanders ordered division veterinarians to organize pack trains. As the division 
veterinarians scrambled to develop provisional pack trains, they also rushed to implement a 
corollary remount system to maintain pack animal health. The daunting task was difficult 
because prewar Army supply doctrine focused on motorized transportation and no longer 
included animal power. According to the Quartermaster General of the Mediterranean Theater, 
“The Remount Service in Italy was organized and functioned without the guidance of War Dept. 
Tables of Organization and Equipment or the established experiences of predecessors.”  
Remount was an impromptu affair in Italy and “it was necessary for the unit to develop…its own 
organization, systems, and solutions as it progressed and came to meet its problems.” 27 
In mid-September, 1943 an Italian Army remount station was discovered at Persano and, 
though it was largely staffed by Italians, the Fifth Army Veterinarian “undertook the replacement 
of the animal losses in the divisional pack trains.”  Other remount depots were established at 
Santa Maria and at Bagnoli over the next three months.  The first remount depots originally 
provided longer term care for wounded animals evacuated from the front-area veterinary 
hospitals. The role of the remount depots gradually changed to providing rehabilitation, 
reconditioning, or “remount” in every sense of the word.28  
 A sizable remount depot was set up at Capanello Hippodromo, a large race track on the 
southern outskirts of Rome. Once Rome fell on June 4, 1944, the remount depot moved to 
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Grossetto, one of three Italian Army remount sites prior to World War II. Grosseto served as the 
largest holding, reconditioning, and recuperating station for Army animals in Italy.  The Bagnoli 
depot was relocated to Pisa in September 1944 as fighting moved northward. The Persano depot 
moved in October 1944, when roughly half of all American remount personnel transferred from 
Italy to Southern France.
29
  
The second or central phase of the Italian campaign began after Rome fell in June 1944. 
The terrain north of Rome was relatively flat and coastal compared to southern Italy. The area 
was heavily cultivated and included a road network, which allowed for less dependence on 
animal power. Fortunes improved in the summer of 1944 for Army pack units. Animal 
procurement was no longer a problem. The quantity and quality of local animals improved, 
largely because of increased agricultural production and an ever-improving remount program. 
American animals and supplies began to arrive, though this caused unique problems. The Tenth 
Mountain Division was due to land in late November 1944, bringing some 6,000 mules from the 
United States.  According to a Fifth Army supply officer: 
This is of great concern to me in that the arrival of this unit will present us with a 
new supply problem. No doubt this unit is equipped with large Missouri mules and their 
equipment so adapted to these large mules. 
He also worried that replacements for the American animals and their Phillips pack equipment 
would not come from the United States. Replacement mules and gear arrived from America, but 
another problem developed.  
By this stage of the war, pack trains were served almost exclusively by Italian Army 
muleteers and pack troops. The Italians worked well with native animals, but found the 
American mules uncooperative and difficult to load due to the mules’ enormous size. The 
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standard Army-issue Phillips pack saddle weighed just over one hundred pounds and proved 
almost impossible for Italian packers to place on the back of an American mule. Likewise, the 
Phillips pack saddle would not fit on smaller Italian mules, so equipment was not 
interchangeable. Luckily, the number of American mules used in Italy was small compared to the 
number of native animals employed by supply units.
30
  
The Germans also augmented the growing stock of Army pack animals. The number of 
captured German supply animals steadily increased as the Germans retreated. Allied forces 
discovered thousands of horses and mules after the fall of Rome (June 1944) and particularly 
during the Po River campaign (September 1944). German forces hastily abandoned their supply 
animals, most of which subsequently were impressed into service by Allied supply units.
31
  
The quality of Army supply animals also improved because forage stocks increased.  The 
availability of more shipping space allowed for larger shipments of barley and oats from the 
United States. Similarly, the Italian countryside experienced rehabilitation. Rural areas once 
devastated and fallow were planted and harvested, producing bumper crops. The feed available 
for each animal steadily increased, producing a rapid upturn in animal condition. Food supplies 
for Army pack animals ceased to be a major concern by the end of 1944.
32
  
Veterinary medicine and supplies, such as shoes, nails, halters, and saddle packs also 
arrived from the United States in large quantities. Even the burden of transporting wounded 
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animals eased when typically motor-minded Americans found a solution. For over a year, 
Colonel Pickering, Fifth Army Veterinarian, requested that the Army provide provisional pack 
and veterinary hospitals with motor vehicles.  His appeals were answered in December 1944, 
when “all three Italian veterinary hospitals and the majority of Italian pack trains were supplied 
with reconditioned U.S., 6x6, GMC trucks.”  Motorized transport would now move critically 
wounded and desperately needed supply animals.
33
   
The quantity and quality of Army pack animals improved as the war progressed, but bad 
terrain strained supply chains when the Italian campaign entered its third and final phase. Land 
north of Rome is relatively flat, and the tactical need for pack animals diminished, allowing them 
a brief respite. Operations against the Gothic Line and Po Valley, however, were in terrain and 
conditions more difficult than the campaign preceding the assault on Rome. According to Fifth 
Army records: 
 Pack trains were moved from their rest areas and committed to battle. Once again, 
 heavy rains, flash floods, washed out bridges, snow drifts, landslides, and perpendicular 
 trails and enemy fire provided the background against which the pack trains operated. An 
 index to the character of the fighting is provided in the casualties which took place 
 among animals during the period of 9 September to 31 December: 1110 were killed and 
 765 were wounded.
34
  
Combat operations during the winter of 1944 and the spring of 1945 were as fierce and difficult 
as any previously experienced, and supplying the front line troops was daunting. Fortunately, 
enough improvements occurred in the quality and quantity of pack animals to ensure that breaks 
did not occur in the supply chain. One report lauding the efforts of pack units and the vital nature 
of supply noted: 
  They rarely failed to bring their precious cargoes to men fighting atop steep 
 mountains and precipitous cliffs. Though the supplies they brought on a single trip would 
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 hardly have filled a trailer truck, these supplies often meant the difference between 
 advance or retreat, victory or defeat….35 
 
The uses of mules in mountain fighting were not limited to supply roles.  They often assisted 
troops in direct combat. The chorus to a pack artillery song noted:   
For when there’s trouble brewing 
They always send for me 
To start the fun with a mountain gun 
From the mountain battery 
Pack artillery in which horses or mules transported artillery pieces and accompanying 
ammunition was largely replaced by motor-drawn guns when World War II began. However, the 
Army regressed to a more primitive method of moving artillery when terrain was impassable for 
motor vehicles. Pack artillery was the only effective method of providing fire support to infantry 
troops in the treacherous mountains across Italy.
36
  
 One must examine the details of a typical pack artillery battalion to appreciate fully the 
work required for these units to function. Animal power, particularly mules, was the crucial 
element. A pack artillery battalion consisted of three firing batteries and one headquarters and 
service battery. The service section moved ammunition and general supplies by means of some 
fifty mules led by two mule-mounted men and a bell mare. The headquarters section involved 
communication and the fire direction center (FDC) elements and was serviced by approximately 
fifty more mules. The wire section, which was vital to communication, had three teams of two 
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men and one mule. Each mule carried two large spools of wire, mounted on either side of the 
pack saddle, and unreeled at a walking pace, laying wire from the FDC to the firing battery.
37
  
 A firing battery had four gun sections. Each section consisted of one 75mm pack 
howitzer, eleven men, and ten mules. The howitzer weighed 1,300 pounds and was transported 
by six mules after the gun was disassembled. The mules were numbered and assigned specific 
tasks.  The heaviest piece was the front trail, weighing 240 pounds. The tube (barrel) weighed 
223 pounds. Four men used steel bars to load and unload these two pieces. Each piece made a 
full load, and only the stoutest mules in the section carried these pieces. The other four mules 
carried various items, such as the breech block, front and rear trail, and recoil mechanism. The 
number seven mule carried the pioneering kit, which included a shovel, pick, axe, and sledge 
hammer. The remaining three mules carried ammunition.
38
   
 Gun section personnel were the chief of the section, a gunner, and nine numbered 
cannoneers. The chief supervised gun placement and transmitted fire commands. The gunner 
made settings, adjusted sites, and posted aiming stakes. The Number One cannoneer fired the 
gun, Number Two loaded, Numbers Three and Four adjusted charges and fuse settings, and 
Number Five shifted the trail (rear piece) of the gun after firing. Number Six was armed with a 
Browning Automatic Weapon (BAR) and maintained security. The remaining cannoneers took 
care of the mules that were picketed behind the guns and also provided security to the rest of the 
gun crew. The eleven-man crew was hardly excessive. Additional men and mules were needed 
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during combat, though they were seldom available and quite often pack artillery sections were 
short-handed.
39
    
Prewar Army TO/Es for pack artillery battalions proved inadequate, and after only a few 
months of combat, the units ordered more mules.  Battalion commanders requested ninety 
additional animals per pack artillery battalion: twenty-one to carry ammunition for the firing 
section; seven for the maintenance section to carry feed because good grazing was not available; 
and twenty-five mules for the Headquarters/Service section, including two for wire, two for 
radios, twelve for ammunition, and seven for packers to ride since it was too difficult for packers 
to keep pace with a rapidly moving pack train. The Fifth Army chief, General Mark Clark, 
approved the request, but procuring additional mules and men to handle them took time before 
actual changes occurred in the TO/E.
40
  
The shortage of animals was exacerbated by the poor condition of local mules According 
to a pack artillery report, healthy animals “cannot be expected to carry over 200 pounds pay load, 
while animals issued here which are in such poor condition…cannot carry 200 pounds, if that 
much.” The poor condition of local animals necessitated reduced loads, which diminished a 
combat unit’s performance. For example, the TO/E called for three ammunition mules per gun. 
Experience showed that at least five ammunition mules carrying ten rounds each were needed to 
deliver a minimum amount of fire per gun. Ten rounds per animal were excessive, even for large, 
healthy mules. Poorly conditioned Italian mules struggled to carry a reduced load of six rounds, 
                                                 
 
39
 Ibid., 6-7. When preparing to march, three mules were positioned at the front of the gun facing forward 
and three positioned at the back facing rearward. The gun was quickly disassembled and loaded, which was no mean 
feat. Most of the components weighed over 200 pounds, were lifted up (around five feet high), passed over the 
mule’s rear and placed on the pack saddle.  Once all pieces were secure, the gun, crew, and mules moved out. 
 
 
40
 Memo to Commanding General, NATOUSA from Commanding General, Fifth Army, Request for 
Animals in Excess of T/E Allowance, March 8, 1944, FABN 601-01-9150 History—601st Field Artillery Battalion 
(Pack) April 1942-October 1944, File: Unit History, Box #1750, RG 338, NARA, p. 1; hereafter cited as 601st FAB 
(Pack) Unit History; Memo from General Mark Clark, Equipment for the 601 and 602 FA Bn (Pk) 13 April 1944, 
601st FAB (Pack) Unit History.  
148 
 
or only thirty rounds per gun. In an army reliant on mass fire-power, more mules were needed to 
deliver more ammo.
41
 
The 601 Field Artillery Battalion (Pack) demonstrates the vital nature of supply and 
typifies Army adaptability, particularly units depending on animal power. The 601
st
 arrived at 
Naples on 29 February 1944, where they were assigned to the Fifth Army and moved to the 
nearby remount depot at Persano. The 601
st
 and their fellow unit, the 602
nd
 FAB, underwent 
intense conditioning and training for almost six weeks. The local mules that arrived were in poor 
condition but met the TO/E requirements. The 601
st
 appeared ready for duty, at least on paper. 
All officers over the rank of captain in the 601
st
 FAB toured the front and “obtained ideas 
of tactical employment.”  The officers noted that French and Italian pack units “had at least one 
mule driver per two animals on the march.” The Army method of letting mules loose in a herd to 
follow a bell mare was not practical. Pack trains congested the narrow trails and the mules 
required more guidance. An additional sixty men were requested by pack artillery battalion 
commanders to serve as mule drivers in the Service platoon.
42
  
The 601
st
 was attached to the 88
th
 Infantry Division.  Just prior to occupying tactical 
positions, the battery made provisions to improve transportation and supply in rough terrain. The 
battery was divided into a forward and rear echelon. The rear echelon moved supplies by truck as 
far forward as the “truckhead.” The forward echelon moved supplies by mule from the truckhead 
to the fire sections or guns.  Evacuation of wounded troops was only available by mule. Requests 
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for an ambulance were denied, so a jeep was rigged with litter racks and trailer. The jeep was 
permanently posted at the truckhead and transferred mule-bound casualties to the nearest field 
hospital.
43
 
The forward echelon of the 601
st
 received its battle indoctrination on the night of 15-16 
May 1944. Moving in the darkness over broken ground was hard. Heavy artillery fire from 
positions close to the trail spooked the men and animals and enemy aircraft bombed the area, 
which “excited the men and animals as to create chaos for about an hour.” On 19 May, the attack 
on Itri began. The 601
st
 provided artillery support and Itri was taken, but there were animal 
casualties, and evacuation proved difficult. Several wounded animals were shot while in the 
mountains because evacuation was impossible. The nearest veterinary hospital was fifty miles 
away, and vehicles were not available.  Eventually the 601
st
 battalion commander designated a 
truck for animal evacuation from the truckhead.
44
 
Movement and marches quickly became more grueling. According to unit records, “The 
whole march was a series of spurts with no halt being long enough for the loads to be removed 
from the animals.” On one occasion the battery marched seventeen hours, and “at no time was it 
possible to remove the loads from the animals.”  In action north of Itri, “A” Battery’s mules had 
the loads on continuously for sixteen hours and had not been able to remove the pack saddles for 
over twenty hours. Animal losses rose as a result of exhaustion and minimal rest.
45
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Infantry units often took trails over which mules could not move, so it was necessary to 
reconnoiter rapidly for alternate routes. Infantry frequently moved at night, which was disastrous 
for pack trains and many mules were injured or killed. Batteries moving in the dark generally 
took all night to move over trails that normally took a few hours in the daylight. Optimally, pack 
trains operated from daybreak until about 11:00 a.m., then resumed movement from about 15:00 
until just prior to dark. Optimal circumstances for combat operations, however, were the 
exception in Italy.
46
  
Mule casualties also rose because of poor maintenance. The TO/E called for each gun 
section to have one blacksmith, a forge, and farrier’s equipment. It was often impossible to set up 
a forge because fire for the forge drew enemy gunfire, or there simply was no time. Mules threw 
shoes and became casualties that could have been easily avoided with proper care.  Army farriers 
eventually found an alternative by tying four pre-fitted replacement shoes onto each pack saddle. 
Instead of a full array of blacksmith tools, farriers only carried a small tool roll and a few nails. 
Saddlers were also limited in what they could do. According to one eyewitness, “Riggings were 
changed to new mules without the packmaster having much time to work them over,” and “halter 
shanks went as fast as the mules ate them up.”47  
Each animal casualty meant a diminished capacity for the pack artillery to perform its 
mission. One report noted: 
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Ammunition supply becomes more critical as the operation progresses away from 
the main routes. With the present number of animals, including those authorized in 
excess of T/E, it is not possible to maintain sufficient level of ammunition to adequately 
support attacks. This was demonstrated on at least two occasions, in which the batteries 
exhausted their ammunition before the mission was accomplished. A larger number of 
ammunition mules would be helpful, although this necessarily means more pack 
drivers.
48
  
 
By far the most common theme in 601
st
 FAB after-action reports was the lack of ammunition, or 
the fear of running out and being unable to support the infantry. According to Staff Sergeant 
Floyd H. Kadel: 
Supply was a little shaky. Mostly in regard to ammunition. A couple times I 
didn’t know whether there would be enough or not. If we had had a counter-attack I’m 
afraid we would have run short of ammunition, in the mountains. 
Staff Sergeant Thomas E. Kelly Jr. made a similar observation, “If any large amount of firing 
had been done it would not have been possible to get in enough ammunition.”49  
An army dependent on firepower needed more healthy mules. Yet, a myriad of 
complicating factors diminished pack animal condition.  A nagging problem during the first 
several months of campaign was forage. According to a 601
st
 FAB battery commander, “The 
more forage a unit can carry the longer its animals will remain in condition to do their work.” 
Unfortunately, hay supplies were not available due to a lack of animals to transport it. Grazing 
was not an option because of grass shortages. Mules were forced to carry their own feed, which 
reduced their load of military ordnance. Long marches without adequate feed weakened the 
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animals, requiring frequent rest stops, which “dramatically reduced their rate of march by as 
much as half.”50   
The widespread loss of weak mules had a rippling effect that threatened supply chains 
and, in turn, reduced pack artillery capabilities. Sergeant Richard Hughes observed: 
The mules often slipped and got down on their knees. Tired mules with heavy 
loads had to be unloaded before they could stand again. Some of the trails were very 
steep, and on the side of a cliff with hundreds of feet almost straight down. Once two 
mules, with gun loads, slipped off…and went tumbling down the side of the mountain. 
Both mules had to be replaced by ammunition mules. 
Of course, replacing gun mules with ammunition mules meant discarding precious ammunition, 
since other animals could not carry the extra weight. Injury to all mules was common and 
unwanted, but injury to gun and ammunition mules was particularly troublesome. According to 
Sergeant Hughes: 
Often we left the trails and had to climb over big rocks and other obstacles. On 
these the mules had to take high steps causing their stifles to bump the rear boot hook. 
After hours of this kind of climbing the mules would hesitate, their stifles became very 
sore and swollen. We cut the boot hooks off the gun riggings which solved the problem 
for these mules, but the ammunition mules had to take it, because the boot hooks were 
needed to tie ammunition and supplies. We all agreed that the front trail was the hardest 
load for a mule to carry. More front trail mules “played out” than any other mules.51 
Field modifications were made by Sergeant Hughes and fellow packers, which protected 
animal health and allowed maximum amounts of ammunition and supplies to be transported with 
a minimal number of mules. Sergeant Hughes reported: 
We discarded our wooden wheels for rubber tires, as we like them better and 
found (the) same to our advantage in many different ways, altho (sic) the tires were 
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heavier than the wooden wheels, and required an extra mule, we were able to utilize the 
space between the wheels by placing a few rounds of ammunition there. We were also 
able to carry the camouflage net without overloading the mule. On the breech mule we 
carried the sight box, and tool box, therefore we only used seven gun mules and eight 
ammunition and ration mules.
52
 
 An obvious source of animal losses was enemy fire. Batteries moving in haste to keep 
pace with infantry often found themselves well within range of enemy fire.  “Due to the extreme 
proximity of the enemy, the howitzers were unable to neutralize the machine guns…, and these 
enemy weapons were able to inflict casualties in the gun squads….”  Operating in positions 
directly behind the infantry often proved too close for pack artillery. According to Captain Alvin 
Powers, “Our casualties were too great due to the fact that we were within easy enemy mortar 
range.” Enemy pockets were by-passed by the infantry, leaving snipers and machine gun nests to 
wreak havoc on gun crews and their mules. Enemy positions could be too close for the howitzer 
(a high angle firing piece) to operate.  Pack artillery gun crews relied on small arms and 
Browning Automatic Weapons (BARs) to hold the enemy at bay. Gun crews and their animal 
charges braved the fire, and as one sergeant observed, “All mules behaved well under mortar and 
artillery fire…the animals stood and took all the enemy had too, without being tied.” Yet, as 
laudably as the animals performed under fire, their losses were hard to replace, and supply 
strains mounted as casualties rose.
53
 
 Aside from pack animal casualties, supply in general was a nightmare in the rugged 
terrain of Italy. Constant communication with forward elements was vital, but maintaining good 
communication was a complicated process that involved a forward observer, liaison officer, and 
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artillery liaison plane. Standard communication procedures called for mules to lay wire between 
the Fire Direction Center and gun sections. Laying wire was difficult. The path of least resistance 
was trails, but wire on trails was easily cut by men, mules, and machines or by German fire 
zeroed in on mountain trails. Laying wire off of the trail was hard because the terrain was 
broken.  
 Another communication problem was the cumbersome nature of Army radios. The SCR 
284 radio took thirty minutes to unpack, set up, break down, and repack, so it was impossible to 
carry out this procedure on a ten minute hourly halt. Field and pack artillery adjusted, eventually 
relying on battery-operated radios, which were lighter and easier to set up. Battery shortages 
were a problem, but they were fairly easy to supply since the batteries were light.  Radio 
batteries were often dropped from L-5 forward observation aircraft.  Three radios accompanied 
each firing battery, and the radios were set up in relay stations. One radio stayed with the guns, 
one radio was placed on the highest point and acted as a relay, and one radio stayed with the 
FDC. All in all, the battery-operated radios and relay system worked pretty well.
54
 
Supplying troops with food was also a headache, and next to ammunition shortages the 
most common complaint regarded mess. Hot food was almost impossible to prepare because 
mules transported field ranges, like all other items in the pack artillery section. The portable field 
ovens took too long to set up and were less mobile than anticipated. Meals were frequently left 
half cooked when the men were ordered to move, wasting food and leaving troops unfed. As a 
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gun section chief noted, “We just ate when we had the time, even on halts, many of the boys 
would…open a ration and call it their dinner or supper.”55   
Heating food on open fires was dangerous because of enemy fire. Some troops carried 
individual Coleman stoves, but these were primarily used for heating coffee.  Troops generally 
ate cold K, C, and “ten in one” rations. These rations filled the void but did not satisfy troop 
hunger or needs. According to Sergeant Andrew Vravick, “One ration a day was not enough for 
the average man in the pack artillery. Men (in pack artillery units) are larger and do strenuous 
work therefore requiring more rations.”56   
Mess sergeants became masters of efficiency. Experience showed that the gasoline-fueled 
field oven, or “buzzy cot,” could be folded and packed with one piece inside another. The “buzzy 
cot,” along with one pot from the pack kitchen and a few days ration of coffee, could all fit on 
one mule. The pack battery’s water mule was loaded with four five-gallon cans of gasoline and 
carried about three days of fuel. Water was sacrificed, but as one mess sergeant noted, “Believe 
me a hot cup of coffee for a mule packer is worth this extra effort.”57   
The pack troops made sure that the most important supplies—ammunition, coffee, and a 
little food—were available. According to Sergeant Leonard, “We started dropping everything 
that we didn’t have to have and took rations in place since our supply lines were so long….” 
Rapid advances meant troops moved further from supply depots at the truckhead.  Mule attrition 
rose as supply lines grew longer, and mule shortages forced substitutions, or robbing Peter to pay 
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Paul, to keep supplies moving. Sergeant Leonard observed that the maintenance section “was no 
more than an ammunition train…it took every spare mule to keep ammunition and rations at the 
gun positions. There was no such thing as empty mules.”58    
Occasionally, operations penetrated deep into the mountains and required more than one 
day to make a round trip to the truck head. Additional pack trains could have assisted in covering 
the growing distance from truckhead to gun positions, but animals were not available. One worst 
case scenario occurred during operations near Spigno when it took four days round trip to reach 
the truckhead and return to the guns. The poor condition of supply mules reduced ammunition 
loads down to six rounds, and required impressments of riding mules and kitchen mules for those 
minimal ammunition loads.  
Poor animal condition, personnel shortages, and unbelievably bad terrain forced gun 
crews to adapt. According to Major Edwin C. Mattick: 
The old pack artillery custom of unloading the gun loads at ten-minute hourly 
halts had to be abandoned when the present Tables of Organization were adopted, due to 
the shortage of men available to do the job and still take care of the mules. On the steep 
and narrow trails, over which we operated most of the time, this unloading would have 
been a physical impossibility, no matter how many men or how much time was 
available.
59
 
Terrain improved after the Allied breakout north of Rome. Pack artillery was 
unnecessary, allowing pack mules to recuperate. The respite was short-lived. Operations north of 
the Po River saw terrain and roadways deteriorate, and pack transportation resumed. Offensive 
operations were limited because resources were sent to other theaters, namely North and South 
France. The terrain was bad and fighting in northern Italy became a stalemate. However, 
improved animal condition, better trained personnel, and other transport upgrades reduced 
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supply burdens and pack artillery was effectively employed in spite of the rugged terrain of 
northern Italy. The 601
st
 and 602
nd
 pack artillery battalions did not enjoy these improvements, 
because they were transferred to Southern France in the fall of 1944. 
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Figure 5-1. Private William J. Peters loads plasma and medical supplies on an Italian 
donkey. (U.S. Army Signal Corps, NARA).  
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Figure 5-2.  Muleskinners with the 92
nd
 Infantry Division improvise shoes from iron stakes 
of German beach defenses.  Each stake produced about 16 shoes. (U.S Army Signal Corps, 
NARA). 
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Figure 5-3. Mule train passes overturned Army truck in the rugged Italian countryside. 
(U.S. Army Signal Corps, NARA). 
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Chapter 6: Mules on the Riviera: The Campaign across South 
France and the Vosges 
 
 The decision to invade Southern France, codenamed Operation Anvil, was not without 
controversy and had serious political and military ramifications. The British opposed Operation 
Anvil because it pulled limited resources away from Italy. The British favored ramping up 
operations in Italy, pushing northward and possibly landing in the Balkans, which would divert 
German troops from Western Europe. Also, an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans could  
deny territory in Eastern Europe to Soviet invaders. 
The Americans supported Anvil for a several reasons. First, it would relieve troops 
breaking out of Normandy, France by diverting German forces southward. Second, the seizure of 
Toulon and Marseille in southern France could provide sizable port facilities from which 
desperately needed supplies would flow to the fuel-starved Allies moving across northern 
France.  Finally, Americans had little desire to fight in the Balkans after mountain warfare 
experiences in Italy. In the end, the American position prevailed and Operation Anvil was set 
into motion, but the details of the final plan largely depended on transportation resources. 
Allied leaders supported the cross channel invasion of Western Europe, but the Allies 
lacked the lift capacity to execute a large-scale amphibious assault. The shortage was painfully 
apparent during the Anzio landing in January 1944. Army planners operated under strict time 
constraints so that the limited number of landing craft used at Anzio could then deploy to 
England for the Normandy invasion.  Transportation resources to move troops in Italy, land 
troops at Normandy, and simultaneously put troops ashore in southern France did not exist. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff reluctantly provided additional resources to Europe that had originally been 
allocated to the Pacific. Planned operations in Southeast Asia to relieve China were cancelled, 
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which freed up more landing craft. Likewise, the Joint Chiefs agreed that Anvil occur shortly 
after Overlord, which gave the Anvil invasion force time to procure landing craft from the 
Overlord operation.
1
 
The landing craft shortage counters the “brute force” argument that America 
overwhelmed opponents with mass quantity. In 1944, America was still operating on a 
shoestring and robbed Peter to pay Paul when conducting major, or sometimes minor, military 
operations. Brute force was unequivocally used, but it was seldom the first option for the U.S. 
military. After two years of fighting, American war production was rising, but the production of 
transportation means to move the men, beans, and bullets still lagged behind. The invasion of 
southern France illustrates how transportation concerns forced the Army to make strategic and 
tactical adjustments.  The landing site was decided primarily on port and rail availability. The 
number of divisions landing was determined by landing craft availability or “lift capacity.” And 
once underway, supply was determined by the resources available, which included ports, rails, 
trucks, and, when the terrain changed, mules. 
The Seventh Army, including three Army divisions and an airborne task force, executed 
Operation Anvil, with several French divisions as follow up forces. The plan had three principal 
objectives: the establishment of a suitable beachhead, capturing the ports of Toulon and 
Marseilles, and driving north to join Allied forces breaking out of Normandy. The Anvil landing 
area was a fifty-mile wide strip of beach about thirty miles east of Toulon. The beaches were 
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approachable, with a good area for breaking out and pushing inland, and good coastal roads 
existed for the westward push to Toulon, once German resistance broke.  
Anvil planners expected heavy German resistance. Thus, the landing force was heavily 
loaded with guns and ammunition for a lengthy battle. Mobility was not initially anticipated, so 
very little fuel or vehicles were delivered. The decision to overload the assault force with arms 
and ammunition was very reasonable. Operations at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio showed that bitter 
fighting could be expected, but the landing in southern France was unlike any previous 
operations in Europe or the Mediterranean Theaters.
2
 
Operation Anvil was launched on 15 August 1944.  The landings went unexpectedly 
smoothly. The Third Infantry Division experienced some difficulty on the soft, sandy beaches of 
their landing area. However, the veteran division quickly adapted and, using logs from German 
beach obstacles, built roads from which to exit the beach.  German resistance was light, and most 
of the landing force moved inland unimpeded. Some 86,000 men and 12,000 vehicles were 
ashore by nightfall. Toulon and Marseilles were taken by the end of day two. The tough landing 
and heavy fighting never materialized, and Seventh Army combat forces quickly moved inland 
by the end of August.
3
     
Logistical problems soon developed. Contemporary land armies required a continuous 
supply of fuel and ammunition to engage the enemy successfully, and the Seventh Army was no 
exception. They depended on a logistical pipeline that originated in America, crossed the 
Atlantic Ocean, and moved inland into the European continent, stretching several thousand miles 
from point of origin to final destination. The methods of transport varied as well, from ships and 
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trains, to trucks and mules. Army supplies went on an odyssey fraught with potential bottlenecks. 
Operation Anvil demonstrated how successful campaigns depended on avoiding these 
obstructions or quickly breaking the jams once they occurred.   
Unlike the Normandy operation, the invasion of South France experienced an 
unanticipated, rapid break-out with troops advancing well beyond projected distances. For 
example, American units pushed beyond points by D-plus 30 that they were not scheduled to 
reach until D-plus 120.  Replicating the “Red Ball Express” used in northern France was not an 
option, because there was not enough intrinsic truck strength in the limited number of units in 
southern France; and rail networks had been degraded by tactical air prior to the operation to stop 
German counter attacks.  
One of the most serious miscalculations was the anticipation of heavy fighting on or near 
the landing areas. The assault forces were top-heavy with guns, ammunition and combat troops. 
Service personnel, transport equipment, and fuel were missing from the Anvil assault force. 
When resistance was light and the invasion moved quickly inland, supply lines became clogged 
because personnel and equipment were unavailable to keep supplies flowing. Local labor was 
hired, German POWs were impressed into service, and fine port facilities were in operating 
order. Nevertheless, supply bottlenecks occurred on the beaches, and the rapid advance of 
combat troops quickly overstretched supply lines. Months passed before supplies caught up, and 
by then the fighting had moved to dramatically different terrain.
4
  General Truscott, the 
aggressive Sixth Corps commander, pushed the three American divisions and made great strides 
across South France in August and September 1944. In early October, the Seventh Army entered 
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the foothills of the Vosges Mountains, where a wicked combination of fatigue, supply shortages, 
bad terrain and foul weather brought their pursuit to a standstill.  
The Vosges are 70 miles long and about 40 miles across. Hilly farmland guards the 
approaches, quickly becoming thickly forested large hills and mountains. Prevailing north and 
westerly winds produce heavy rain clouds that feed the dense forest. As a German general 
observed, fighting in the Vosges was comparable to jungle fighting.  The few roads cutting 
across the Vosges follow stream and river valleys, dominated by heavily forested high ground. 
September generally begins a long, rainy season, and 1944 was no exception as rain began 
earlier than anticipated. Constant rain and fog reduced visibility, and air support was almost non-
existent. Rain turned to snow when winter arrived, and veterans of Italy were reminded of the 
misery to which they had to look forward.
5
 
The Germans held every possible defensive edge in the Vosges. When the Army could 
move supplies, then they countered most German advantages. Yet supply shortages still dogged 
the Seventh Army. The Seventh Army requested rail delivery of approximately 4,500 tons of 
supplies and ammunition daily but received only an average of 2,270 tons. Seventh Army 
ammunition expenditures for 5 October totaled some 1,000 tons, but only 20 tons of ammunition 
was received.  Mortars, artillery, and small arms ammunition was dangerously low, and severe 
rationing was the only immediate solution. For example, the minimum howitzer allotment was 
sixty rounds per day, but the allowance was reduced to about thirty rounds. Supply troops were 
stripped of thirty caliber ammunition, the standard for M-1 rifle and light machine guns, and 
their ammunition was given to combat units. Railroads could not deliver adequate supplies. 
Trucks took up the slack, but the trip from port to the front was around four hundred miles. 
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Trucks were in short supply, and maintenance of the vehicles was limited. Bad weather, 
deteriorating roads, and rough terrain added to the supply crisis facing Seventh Army entering 
the Vosges. The terrain problem was partially solved when General Truscott requested the re-
deployment of supply trains and pack artillery from Italy to South France.
6
 
A quick look at the map indicated that Seventh Army forces would encounter 
mountainous terrain. The need for pack trains and pack artillery was obvious to General Truscott. 
The time-table for when these resources were required was less clear. The rapid advance of 
Seventh Army elements to the Vosges Mountain area meant pack animals were needed sooner 
rather than later. In mid-July, 1944, the 601
st
 and 602
nd
 Field Artillery Battalions (Pack) were 
relieved from Fifth Army service and assigned to the Seventh Army. The Seventeenth Veterinary 
Hospital accompanied both pack artillery battalions on the South France campaign. The men and 
animals rested, reconditioned, and then joined the Seventh Army.
7
 
The 602
nd
 traveled from Italy to France by glider, and their mules followed by ship. On 
15 August 1944, the one year anniversary of landing at Kiska, Alaska, the 602
nd
 landed at 
LaMotte, France. The 602
nd
 provided fire support missions throughout September, but by 4 
October there was a widespread ammunition shortage. Firing was suspended for about 6 hours 
“to permit the evacuation of some of the civilian population. Orders were also received limiting 
the ammunition expenditures to thirty-three rounds per gun per day.”  The ammunition shortage 
effectively cut fire missions by half, but the battalion still manage to fire 8, 078 rounds for 
October.
8
  The 602
nd
 was reorganized into four detachments: three were motorized, and one 
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remained an animal detachment, including 200 men and officers, and 124 mules. The animal 
detachment served with the 442
nd
 Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in November 1944 after 
combat echelons and fighting moved to the Vosges Mountains.
9
 
The 601
st
 Field Artillery Battalion (Pack) departed Italy on 13 October and arrived at 
Nice, France on 15 October, 1944. The pack artillery battalion provided fire support to the 1
st
 
Airborne Task Force throughout October and early November. Like their sister battalion (the 
602
nd
), the 601
st
 was not immune to the ammunition shortfalls, but supply problems were not 
limited to ammunition. Animal equipment and forage were so low that pack animal operations 
halted.  
Shortages of the most mundane items broke the supply chain. A prime example was mule 
shoes. The 601
st
 battalion commander acerbically noted: “26 November, emergency requisition 
of mule shoes, none received; although 500 lbs or 10% was promised….” The commander 
added:  
30 November 1944, received information that the 500 lbs of mule shoes promised 
on 26 November are not available. A mistake was made in reading the invoices at 
Marseilles and no mule or horse shoes of any size are available there. 
 
Two officers from the 601
st
 and 602
nd
 Field Artillery Battalions went to Marseilles to obtain the 
equipment, but were unsuccessful. The 601
st
 commander continued: 
 
With regard to mule shoes the animals of this battalion have been without the 
most desirable size of shoe, namely size 3. Since the battalion arrived in France no shoes 
of this size have been received. This is a critical item due to the nature of the terrain upon 
which the battalion is operating. Due to freezing wet weather it is essential that all 
animals be shod with calks to prevent their slipping on the ice and in the mud. At least 
50% of the animals need this size shoe and at present time at least 30 animals are without 
shoes. Within a period of two weeks I estimate that 20% of all our animals will be unable 
to work unless shoes are obtained at once. It must be remembered that even when shoes 
become available the horseshoers can only shoe from 16 to 20 animals a day. At present 
the horseshoers have had to discontinue work entirely due to the lack of shoes. 
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As to the feed situation it has been a serious problem also. At several times the 
battalion has been without a grain ration for a twenty-four hour period; and regarding the 
supply of tibben, a very unsatisfactory substitute for hay, there have been as long as 
seventy hours between rations. The quantity of feed received had been below the 
minimum daily requirement of working mules until a special effort was made by the G-4 
of 1
st
 ABTF (Airborne Task Force) and a larger allowance was obtained.  
As a result this organization is in no condition to engage in an active campaign as 
pack artillery and cannot be until we receive such items.
10
 
Local French farmers helped with the hay shortage. Supplies of mule shoes and animal 
equipment gradually improved with the arrival of a quartermaster pack company and overall 
improvements in rail and truck transportation.   
 Army combat effectiveness decreased as supplies diminished, and battalion and division 
commanders noted this during the Vosges campaign. However, a German soldier observed that 
Americans fought “stubbornly and tenaciously,” and they often “took up the artillery battle, with 
great consumption of ammunition....” Any German attempt at maneuvering and overrunning 
American positions was met “by lively air reconnaissance to guard against further surprises.” 
German forces were cautious to press any attacks since “there was no indication that ground 
would be given up, as the enemy (American) troops were fighting hard for their positions.” In 
spite of bad weather and little air support “the troops, with few exceptions offered stubborn 
resistance….”11 
 Terrain difficulties, supply shortages, and fierce German resistance tested Army mettle in 
the Vosges. The Germans occupied heavily wooded, mountain strongholds. Some were 
avoidable, but most could not be bypassed and tough fighting always ensued. A case in point 
occurred when three American divisions attacked St. Die amidst the Vosges. An enemy 
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stronghold in the Domaniale de Champ forest threatened the American flank, so the Thirty-Sixth 
Division assaulted the German positions in the heavily forested hills. The Americans advanced 
well until the Germans launched a vicious counterattack. By the morning of 25 October, the 
battalion command post was overrun and 241 troops of the First Battalion, 141
st
 Infantry 
Regiment were completely cut off. The only contact First Battalion had with headquarters was 
through the radio of an artillery forward observer. Efforts to relieve the encircled Americans 
failed for nearly one week. Desperately low on ammunition, food, and medical supplies, 
necessity birthed invention in the baleful Vosges woods. An attempt to air-drop supplies failed, 
as the radio communication recorded: 
141
st
 HQ to 1
st
 Bn: Two aircraft at one time will drop—total of ten planes—where 
to drop them? 
1
st
 Bn to HQ:  One hundred yards short of the crest. 
HQ to 1
st
 Bn: Give coordinates where last supplies dropped. 
1
st
 Bn to HQ: We could not find the things we were looking for…. 
 
Bad weather stopped air drops, so a clever solution was devised to deliver emergency supplies by 
firing smoke shells to the battalion.  Using a special wrench, adroit artillerymen removed the 
base-plate of the smoke shell and took the smoke canisters out. Then, the shell “was reloaded 
with six D-ration bars, (in there cellophane wrapper) the cardboard box…removed.” Medical 
supplies included gauze, adhesive tape, iodine swabs, wound tablets, morphine syrettes, and 
halazone tablets. “The chocolate and medicinal supplies were firmly wrapped in about 1 square 
foot of burlap, securely tied on the ends and taped up all around.” The package was then placed 
in the shell, and the base plate was replaced.
12
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Field modification of the shells was relatively simple. Delivery required more 
cacalculations. According to the report: 
 In firing the shells time fire was used. They were fired to burst 200 feet in the air 
 at a range of about 8,000 yards. The supply shells weighed four pounds less than smoke. 
 Since the difference in weight of projectiles was 4 pounds, the range variation was 
 approximately 27 yards….  Smoke was used in adjusting fire. Lt. Blonder was unable to 
 pick up the first round but heard it go over his head. The range was decreased by 200 
 yards. It was still over. The range was decreased 400 yards and he reported “Range 
 correct, fire for effect.”  
 
Changing from smoke to the supply shell led to rounds falling short. The forward artillery officer 
ordered the correction, “Increase the range 50 yards and keep ‘em coming, all you’ve got.” 
Nineteen rounds were fired before the “cease fire” was given. Weather finally improved, and 
aircraft delivered more supplies, including ammunition, K-rations, water, and radio batteries. 
Finally, on 30 October at 1600, headquarters received the message “Patrol 442 here,” when 
members of the 442
nd
 Regimental Combat Team relieved the trapped battalion.
13
  
 American creativity was applied to efficiently maximize fire power in the Vosges. The 
601
st
 began replacing wooden wheels on their howitzers with rubber tires, allowing the guns to 
be towed. French roads in the mountains allowed jeeps to tow howitzers on several occasions. 
The guns were quickly and quietly deployed, firing on enemy strong points or infantry positions 
deep in enemy territory, and then quickly retreating. The battalion commander reported, “This 
would have been impossible…with mules due to their rate of march as well as their presenting a 
much more noticeable target.” He furthered recommended “It would be both tactically and 
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economically sound if pack battalions could be equipped with both mules and jeeps.” The 
commander, however, asserted that mules were irreplaceable and cautioned: 
It is not desired that this plan be in any way interpreted to mean that we feel that 
jeeps can replace the mules. This battalion has supported infantry through many miles of 
terrain through which jeeps could never travel. I strongly feel, however, that with both 
methods of transportation available this battalion would be of greater value to the service 
in the majority of locations where the present war is being fought.
14
  
The commander advocated an odd marriage between old and modern means of transportation to 
better apply brute force against his enemies. 
The bad terrain of the Vosges was not a surprise and the need for animal power was not 
overlooked in plans for the post-Anvil break-out. Indeed, nearly half of the 6742
nd
 Quartermaster 
Remount Depot in Italy moved to Southern France in October 1944, where it evolved into the 
6835
th
 Quartermaster Remount Depot. The headquarters was eventually established in 
Chaumont, France. A veterinary hospital and large remount facility were established. The depot 
kept a reserve of some 600 mules and fifty horses at all times. Mules came directly from the 
United States, while horses were procured locally. The depot at Chaumont processed some 1.800 
animals and issued approximately 750 mules to the 513 Quartermaster Pack Company (QMPC) 
and pack artillery units from November 1944 to May 1945.
15
  
The 513
th
 was an all-black unit comprised of Supply and Quartermaster troops. The 
company was activated on 17 July 1944 and trained for active duty in Southern France at the 
Persano Remount Depot from 25 August to 17 October 1944. The training regimen included 
conditioning of men and mules, animal management, and packing cargo. Training was rigorous. 
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According to the unit history, “Southern Italy’s rugged mountains, winding trails, and rainy 
weather was ideal for pack training,” replicating well the unit’s next tour of duty.16 
On 4 November 1944, the unit’s two officers, 75 men, and 298 mules departed Naples, 
Italy. Six days later “the unit debarked at Marseilles, mounted their mules and rode through the 
city to their bivouac area.” The 513th moved by train approximately 400 miles to Epinal, France, 
where it received orders to join the 45
th
 Infantry Division fighting in the Vosges Mountains. 
There were not enough trucks to transport men, mules, and equipment from the railhead at 
Epinal, providing a “splendid chance” for the unit to put their pack training in practice. Animals 
were packed, riding animals were saddled, and the supply train headed for the front. Trucks 
picked up the First and Second Platoons three days into the march, but the Third and Fourth 
Platoons made the complete march riding their mules.  
The 513
th
 was immediately put into service and received their baptism of fire. Under the 
heading of “Quartermaster in name only,” the unit history noted: 
The Army Quartermaster goes as far forward as the division quartermaster dump. 
The Division Quartermaster goes as far forward as the forward CP (command post). The 
513
th
 Quartermaster Pack Company takes supplies to the infantry in the front lines.
17
  
The links in the supply chain began with rear echelon ease and safety, such as the 7
th
 Army 
Quartermaster depot (at Marselles) moving supplies via train or truck to the 45
th
 Division supply 
dump at Epinal. The last link in an incredibly long supply chain required the arduous packing of 
ammunition, coffee, cigarettes, and any other useful items squirreled away on a Missouri mule. 
Finally, units such as the 513
th
 made the hazardous journey to join a combat outfit (e.g. the 442
nd
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RCT) on some numbered hillside in the High Vosges Mountains. The 513
th
 eventually delivered 
supplies to all three infantry divisions operating in the Vosges. The Company was divided into 
four platoons, and the platoons served various combat units, delivering ammunition and rations 
almost constantly from December 1944 to February 1945. The pack troops operated frequently at 
night to reduce casualties from German fire, and resupply efforts seldom failed even in the most 
difficult terrain.
18
 
 The great threat to a successful supply run was not just German artillery, mines, booby 
traps, or treacherous terrain, but rather shortages of supplies for the supply animals, particularly 
forage. Hay was difficult to procure, and operations during winter left grazing out of the 
question. Men scoured the countryside for hay but found little. Requisitions for forage travelled 
slowly up the supply chain, from the company to the division quartermaster, and finally to the 
Army Quartermaster. Responses from upper supply echelons were often slow. Troops and 
officers at the lower levels generally found solutions on their own, as a division’s G-4 (supply) 
journal read, “Requested permission for a civilian to take a wagon to Zittersheim tomorrow 
morning for a load of hay. Permission granted.”  The wagon returned two days later with hay, 
temporarily solving the 513
th’s forage crisis.19  
 Combat and supply operations in Vosges during November and December 1944 were 
slow. Weather was abysmal and shortages continued to plague combat and supply troops alike. 
Also, December 1944 through January 1945 witnessed two major German offensives in the 
Ardennes and Alsace, both of which required maximum Allied effort to stop. The 513
th
 moved 
supplies to combat units operating in Alsace until the end of February and then moved into the 
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Rhineland in March 1945.
20
  The 513
th
 remained heavily engaged supplying combat units. 
According to one report: 
On 15 March 1945, four platoons were on the front. Three were with the 
42
nd
 Infantry Division and one was with the 103
rd
 Infantry Division. The men 
were under artillery and small arms fire for fifteen (15) days and doing an 
excellent job. 
 
The 513
th
 enjoyed a dramatic decline in action by the end of March 1945. The Company history 
noted: 
On 28 March 1945, all four platoons have been returned to CP at 
Langensoultzbach, France as the regements (sic) are through the mountains and do not 
require the use of the mules any longer. The men and mules have done a superior job and 
have been praised by all the units they worked with. 
The 513
th
 QMPC Headquarters transferred by vehicle to a new bivouac area at Leistadt, 
Germany on March 30, 1945. The Fourth Platoon, including four wagons and 300 mules, 
mounted up and marched to Leistadt, Germany, arriving two days later. 
 Terrain improved in the Rhineland, but the four platoons of the 513
th
 continued packing 
ammunition and supplies to various infantry units. Each platoon had 55 mules, all of which 
required daily care and upkeep by the pack troops. The Company received 250 additional mules 
to help supply several infantry divisions. Extra pack troops were not included, so members of the 
four pack platoons improvised. The Company journal noted, “All the platoons are training and 
teaching men in the various regements (sic) to pack, as we don’t have sufficient men to supply 
the extra animals.” Even at this late stage of the war, personnel were still pulled from the ranks 
and given a crash course on packing supply animals.
21
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 Members of the 513
th
 received a commendation for “work done in December and 
January, under artillery and small arms fire, with the 45
th
 Infantry Division.” Another letter from 
the 222
nd
 Infantry Regiment commended the 513
th
 “for keeping a battalion supplied with 
ammunition and food during the campaign through the rugged terrain of the Hardt Mountains.”  
The vital nature of supply and crucial service of the 513
th
, a segregated unit no less, was 
recognized by the combat troops serving at the end of the supply chain.
22
 
 On 3 May 1945, the 513
th
, including two officers, 75 enlisted men, and 286 mules was 
relieved of duty with the 42
nd
 Division. The Company was bivouacked at Neckargemund, 
Germany when an official end to hostilities was announced on 9 May 1945, resulting in “great 
celebration by the unit.” No supplies were packed or hauled after this date. Troops with enough 
points returned to the United States, but most of the Company remained in Germany over the 
next four months. The 513
th
 became part of the 6835
th
 Remount Depot, assisting remount and 
veterinary units care for some 541 mules, in addition to their own 286 mules.  Exercising, 
feeding, and maintaining the facilities were daily tasks. Hay quantities were adequate during the 
summer, and procuring forage was certainly not the challenge it had been in the winter of 1944. 
Keeping the animals in good condition was the daily routine until decisions were made regarding 
what to do with all of those mules.
23
 
 The situation was similar when World War I ended. Once again, the mountains of surplus 
equipment required disposal and the Army either sold or gave away the excess material to avoid 
shipping it back home. Food, clothes, weapons, equipment, and pack animals were all put up for 
sale or donation. There was little interest in returning the animals to the United States, and Army 
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animals quickly became part of the post-war effort to rebuild a continent. The Army dispatched 
six Veterinary Corps officers from the Zone of Interior to Europe one year before the war ended. 
Their primary functions were to oversee the rehabilitation of veterinary services in war-torn 
areas. Disease control, vaccinations, breeding, and the redistribution of surplus animals were all 
part of the Veterinary Corps officers regimen.  
 Plenty of animals were left behind. In Italy, the 2610 Quartermaster Remount Depot 
(Overhead), formerly the 6742
nd
 Quartermaster Remount Depot, was caring for some 15,600 
mules and horses when the war ended in May 1945. The 6835
th
 Quartermaster Remount Depot 
had around 1,800 animals (mostly mules) in France and Germany on V-E Day. The primary 
objective of both remount depots was the disposal of Army mules and horses. The last six 
months of 1945 witnessed the rapid liquidation of Army surplus animals. Most were sold to 
foreign governments or given away by the American Military Government (AMG) to foreign 
governments. Likewise, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
facilitated animal transfer from the Army to governments and citizens across Europe.
24
  
 Thousands of horses and mules went to rebuild the war-torn countries of Italy, France, 
Germany, and the Low Countries. UNRRA efforts to send Army mules to Poland and East 
Europe were eventually thwarted by Russia, but Greece received 2,500 mules, many of which 
supplied the Greek Army during the civil war of the early 1950s. About 2,000 were given to the 
British military as repayment for reverse Lend-Lease pack animals given to the Army in North 
Africa. Most of the mules, however, did not continue their military service. Instead, the majority 
of the animals returned to their pre-war job, working farms and experiencing more pastoral 
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employment as Europe rebuilt. Military planners intent on getting the troops home quickly and 
returning to business as usual did not give much thought to animal power.
25
   
The fighting in South France did not reveal an American Army exploiting superior 
resources to crush an opponent through “brute force.” Indeed, the shortage of ammunition and 
subsequent lack of mass firepower was chronic throughout the campaign. True, the Army and 
Allied forces had supplies in greater quantities than the Germans, but Allied forces fighting in 
South France were hardly a juggernaut of material. Shortages influenced strategic decisions as 
planners divided limited resources between the continued fighting in Italy, the recent Overlord 
landing in Normandy, and South France. Shortages also influenced operations at the tactical 
level, from cutting the daily fire mission of pack howitzers in half to having unshod mules 
moving the guns. Army strategy and tactics relied on brute force, but it was difficult to apply 
while operating on a shoestring. 
The campaign in South France exposed a number of details about the Army. First, the 
Army was still troubled with limited resources in 1944, which is a point often overshadowed by 
statistics. Any survey text of U.S. history, or scholarly work, such as Richard Overy’s Why the 
Allies Won, depicts a decisive material advantage by the U.S. military over the Axis. It must be 
remembered, however, that these resources were dispersed to forces simultaneously fighting 
around the world on multiple fronts. A study of Operation Anvil provides a stark contrast to the 
stereotypical image of GIs supplied from mountains of material.  
Second, Operation Anvil and the South France campaign illustrate the importance of 
making the proper strategic call regarding the use of limited resources. For example, loading the 
assault force with guns and ammunition instead of fuel because of expected heavy resistance 
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proved incorrect. When an unexpected dash across South France ensued, supply lines were 
stretched to the limit with no means of transporting supplies from the beach to the battle as part 
of the plan. The existence of resources was not always the problem in South France, but rather 
allocating and transporting them.  
Third, Army adaptability and talent for scrounging up material, first seen in North Africa, 
then Sicily, and Italy, was prevalent in South France. Officers and troops adjusted throughout the 
campaign, kept grinding down their opponent, and were actually able to apply aspects of “brute 
force” by waging a war of attrition.  
 Finally, the campaign across South France shows the enormous task and difficulty 
required to defeat the Germans. The standard big picture shows that strategically the tide turned 
against Germany by late 1944. American production of ships, planes, tanks, and trucks were 
reaching phenomenal levels, thus allowing “brute force” to overwhelm the rapidly crumbling 
German military. However, it was less apparent at the tactical level, particularly to the men 
assaulting another wooded hill or the packers slogging through the snow bringing supplies. 
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Figure 6-1. Members of the 513 QMPC prepare supplies for 7th Army units in Alsace, 
France, February 1945. (U.S. Army Signal Corps, NARA).  
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Figure 6-2. Private Lather Moon, Alexander, Alabama, a member of the 513th QMPC, 7th 
U.S. Army, leads a mule laden with supplies through knee-deep snow somewhere in Alsace, 
France. February 1945. (U.S. Army Signal Corps, NARA). 
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Figure 6-3. 7th Army truck loaded with mules moves through Saarebourg, France, March 
1945. 
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Chapter 7: Jungle Mules: Part I—the Southwest Pacific  
 
Japanese Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto claimed he would “run wild in the first six months 
of war with America.”  He was correct.  The Japanese produced an impressive succession of 
victories over America and the Allies, including seizure of the Philippines, Malaya, and dozens 
of islands across the Central and South Pacific.  Australia and New Zealand were directly 
threatened, and the United States, one of the few countries that could interfere with Japanese 
operations, faced a strategic crossroads.  Unquestionably, Japan must be contained.  However, 
Allied planners also determined that the best strategy to defeat the Axis was the “Germany first” 
policy.  Thus, early American strategy against Japan was limited to token resistance using scant 
resources already present in the Pacific.   
Similar to Allied forces in the Mediterranean and Western Europe, the U.S. military in 
the Pacific and Asia were strapped for resources.  Planes, warships, transports, men, and 
equipment were in short supply and required sharing.  Indeed, one of the keys to American 
success was the Joint Chiefs and theater commanders’ ability to compromise and distribute 
limited resources.  Axis opponents were hardly smothered by an avalanche of material by 
Americans applying brute force. Superior firepower and massive expenditures of supply did 
occurr in the Pacific, but resource shortages were always a serious concern and influenced 
almost every strategic decision during the first phases of the war. 
The Allies divided the Pacific War into at least two theaters:  the China-Burma-India 
Theater and the Pacific Theater, which was subdivided into the North, Central, and South Pacific 
Areas.  At no time did the United States possess enough supplies and transportation to provide 
overwhelming forces simultaneously to these theaters.  American strategy was dictated by the 
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amount of supplies available at any given time.  It was not until the last six months of the war 
that the U.S. military could comfortably conduct offensive strategy without chronic supply 
shortages; and this was not widespread, but limited to the Central Pacific drive and the 
Philippines.   
The Japanese ran amok during early 1942, attacking New Britain and capturing the 
bastion at Rabaul in February.  The New Guinea towns of Lae and Salamaua fell to the Japanese 
in March, as did several Solomon Island posts.  Japanese forces moving with impunity launched 
an attack on Port Moresby, Papua, along the southern coast of New Guinea in May 1942.  On 
May 7-8, 1942, five months after Pearl Harbor and within a few days of Admiral Yamamoto’s 
prediction, troop transports headed for Port Moresby were turned back at the Battle of Coral Sea.  
The battle was a tactical draw, but it was the first significant strategic setback for Japan.  A 
month later, the Japanese suffered an epic defeat at Midway, from which the Japanese never 
fully recovered their offensive capabilities.  Of course, American war planners did not recognize 
the full implications of Midway and continued preparing for Australia’s defense, including the 
protection of South Pacific sea lanes and communication lines with the United States.  
A logical place from which to defend Australia was New Caledonia, an island some nine 
hundred miles off Australia’s northeast coast. New Caledonia possessed a deep water harbor, 
was relatively defensible, and provided protection should the Japanese maneuver and hit 
Australia’s populated east coast.  New Caledonia was also a vital link in the supply chain 
between the United States and Australia, along with the New Hebrides, Fiji, and American 
Samoa.  The island’s value was obvious to American planners and Army reinforcements were 
sent to New Caledonia in March 1942.  New Caledonia experienced a military build-up in 
preparation for a defensive showdown with the Japanese.  Once the imminent threat of Japanese 
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invasion subsided, New Caledonia quickly became a staging area for future offensive operations 
in the Solomon Islands.
1
 
One group reinforcing New Caledonia was the 97
th
 Field Artillery Battalion (Pack).  
They arrived, sans mules, in March 1942. Animal procurement was to be “furnished at 
destination.”  The U.S. Army Horse Purchasing Board allocated funds, the Army Veterinary 
Service prepared a remount depot, and battalion veterinarians scoured the island for local stock. 
Unfortunately, procuring native animals in the South Pacific was even more problematic than in 
North Africa or the Mediterranean Theater.  According to the 97
th
 FAB commander, “The 
roundup was never completed, as we soon found that these animals were totally inadequate for 
our purposes.”  The small, grass-fed ponies and horses lacked the size, strength and endurance 
required for packing artillery.  “They could not work two or three days in succession under pack 
artillery loads without deteriorating to the point of uselessness.”2  
The 97
th
 FAB expanded their procurement efforts to Australia, discovering very few 
mules, but a large quantity of horses. According to the battalion commander, “Many of these 
made fine mounts, but the buyer informed me that the type of animal we needed for pack just did 
not exist in quantity.”  The Australian Army shipped several hundred horses to New Caledonia.  
“We broke and partially trained 300 of the Australian horses.  When they proved no better than 
the island horse for pack, we sent an order for mules to the States.”3  
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 On 6-7 July 1942, Troop A of the 252
nd
 Quartermaster Remount Squadron arrived on 
New Caledonia.  The squadron brought 481 mules from the Zone of Interior, which were stout 
American stock described as “fine young mules—Fort Reno’s orneriest.”  Additional ship loads 
of mules arrived from the Zone of Interior and the Panama Canal Department in August, 
bringing the number of mules on New Caledonia to around 1,200. Thanks largely to the naval 
victories at Coral Sea and Midway and ground operations on Guadalcanal, the threat of a 
Japanese assault on New Caledonia passed in the summer of 1942.  The 97
th
 FAB and their 
animals began to train for offensive action in the nearby Solomon Islands and New Guinea.
4
 
America’s first major land offensive in the Pacific began on 7 August 1942, when the 
First Marine Division landed at Guadalcanal.  The Japanese vigorously defended the South 
Solomon Island base, and a grinding war of attrition ensued.  Expenditures of naval, air, and 
ground troop resources were high.  When operations on Guadalcanal finally ended in February 
1943, more troops had been committed to fighting in the Solomon Islands and nearby New 
Guinea than in Europe.  Pressing the initiative was logical to Pacific planners, particularly 
General Douglas MacArthur, Admiral Ernest King, and Admiral Chester Nimitz.  However, the 
“Germany first” policy overruled any major commitment of resources to Pacific operations.  
Thus, offensives in the Southwest Pacific continued, but at a much slower tempo and always 
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with minimal resources.  Army adaptability eased some burden of fighting war on a shoestring, 
particularly on Guadalcanal.
5
 
Operations on Guadalcanal illustrate American dependency on supply, firepower, and a 
knack for adapting to ensure that both were on hand.  The 97
th
 FAB and their full complement of 
947 horses and mules moved to Guadalcanal in January 1943.  America’s first offensive was 
winding down and the 97
th
 FAB provided fire support and supply transportation to U.S. forces 
moving up the North coast.  Moving supplies through heavy jungle and mountainous terrain 
required a variety of transportation modes.  Trucks could only travel around twenty miles per 
hour on the few existing roads, but the front-wheel drive 2½-ton trucks successfully negotiated 
logs, mud, and sand.  The venerable jeep also moved supplies and evacuated wounded across 
rough terrain where most vehicles could not travel.  
Much of the fighting occurred along the coast, where supplies were brought ashore by 
small boats, canoes, and outriggers.  No port facilities (docks) existed, no supply equipment 
(cranes) was available, and most landing craft did not possess drop-down ramps to ease 
unloading.  Cargo was hoisted over the sides and hand carried to the beach. Supplies were loaded 
onto trucks and moved down the few roads, which were often being cut out of jungle trails by 
engineers and combat troops.  Supplies dumps were then set up at the end of the truck line. 
Moving supplies was a labor-intensive, time-consuming process.  Supply dumps were set 
up as far forward as possible, but often the last link in the supply chain was a soldier’s back. 
Average march speed on a jungle trail was about one mile per hour.  Frequently trails did not 
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exist, requiring troops to hack their way through dense foliage with machetes and reducing 
progress to about a half mile an hour.  American troops adapted to their environment and utilized 
what resources were available.  Guadalcanal was crisscrossed with large streams.  Instead of 
moving supplies over land, rafts and outboard motorboats moved supplies along the inland 
waterways.  The labor-saving system worked well since initial operations occurred frequently 
along rivers and streams.
6
  
Fighting on Guadalcanal moved further inland, outpacing road construction, reducing 
waterway access, and encountering mountains.  Pack mules were a logical solution to the 
transportation hurdles, but animal power encountered a multitude of hardships on Guadalcanal. 
The first snag was unloading, since few port facilities existed to get mules from ship to shore. 
Mules most often disembarked using small hoists and cargo nets, though some were removed by 
“flying stalls” and in rare cases, some were forced overboard and swam to shore.7 
Another serious problem for pack units on Guadalcanal was forage.  Procurement was not 
too difficult.  Army Veterinary Service (AVS) studies were conducted to develop the best ration.  
A major priority for the AVS was reducing the bulk to facilitate transport, which was done by 
using compressed oat hay chaff instead of loose hay in the daily forage ration.  The Australian 
Army used this type of ration, and it was readily available in compact bales or packed in bags.  
The compressed rations were adequate and included oat hay, alfalfa, oats, bran, and salt.  The 
Quartermaster Corps procured the compressed bale forage from Australian suppliers through 
reverse Lend-Lease and Army Veterinarians inspected the rations.  The most frequent problem 
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 Everett Miller, Army Veterinary Service in World War II, 544.  “Flying stalls” were wooden crates in 
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Allowing the mules to swim ashore was fast and mules are decent swimmers. However, convincing the mule to go 
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with the ration was bran fermenting in the hot, humid, jungle conditions.  The bran was removed 
from the ingredients, considerably reducing fermentation.
8
 
Finding quality forage was possible, but the transportation of such massive quantities was 
a different story.  For example, each firing battery in the 97
th
 FAB had 193 men and 117 mules 
for moving the 75mm howitzer and 200 rounds of ammunition. One ammunition section from 
the Service battery included 66 mules, which supplemented the movement of ammunition to the 
Firing batteries.  Each mule required eight pounds of grain or oats and 14 pounds of hay every 
day, meaning the 182 mules that kept the four guns in action needed 1,500 pounds of oats and 
2,600 pounds of hay daily. Trucks, if available, often could not move such a large amount of 
feed, and the mules in the firing battery offered no assistance because they could not haul the 
howitzer components, ammunition, and their own feed.
9
  
Supplying the supply animals proved an almost insurmountable task on Guadalcanal. 
Truck transportation was difficult enough, but the presence of animals and trucks complicated 
already serious logistical problems.  Mules on the island had difficulty maneuvering across 
boggy ground or muddy banks and could not always traverse the same ground as a man.  Thus, 
the pack mules generally travelled on roadways.  Pack mules normally travel around four miles 
per hour over good terrain, but mules on Guadalcanal only covered about one mile per hour.  The 
slow pace of the pack animals caused traffic jams, further impeding the flow of supplies.
10
  
The primary asset of pack transportation was the animal’s ability to travel where motor 
vehicles could not go.  However, the tropical conditions of the Solomon Islands created 
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unanticipated problems for pack animals.  First was the mud. Mules are more sure footed than 
horses and are preferred when traveling on rough, rocky ground, but the mule’s smaller hooves 
often sank in the mud. Once the pack mule was mired in the mud, then troops had to perform the 
time-consuming, labor intensive task of unloading the pack and freeing the trapped animal.  The 
generally sure-footed mule had difficulty navigating the muddy traces crisscrossing the island. 
Likewise, the jungle climate was a haven for diseases, further reducing pack animal 
performance and complicating supply transportation.  The most common diseases among pack 
animals were thrush, quittor, and separations of the sole and feet.  Such problems thrived in wet, 
unsanitary conditions and with poor routine foot care, both common on Guadalcanal.  Other 
maladies included fungal dermatitis, sunburn, and a plethora of infectious skin diseases. 
Vaccines for most of these diseases did not exist.  The most effective prevention was routine 
maintenance and a strict sanitation regimen, neither of which was a priority of troops slogging 
around the jungle fighting the Japanese.
11
 
A medical evacuation system would have ameliorated some of the pack animal health 
problems and, thus, improved supply transportation.  No veterinary hospital or remount depot 
developed on Guadalcanal, even though around 1,000 mules were deployed.  Sick and wounded 
pack animals were evacuated back to the veterinary hospital at New Caledonia.  An indicator of 
disease prevalence among Army mules serving in the Solomon Islands is an AVS record, which 
noted that 534 animals suffered from diseases out of 856 processed through the hospital.  Most 
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of these animals suffered from various foot ailments, which greatly inhibited their ability to 
deliver supplies.
12
 
In spite of disease and poor conditions, animal power still performed a valuable service 
on Guadalcanal.  Pack artillery and pack trains delivered much needed supplies and provided 
weary infantry a break. The island’s relatively small size allowed for shorter supply lines and a 
quick turn-around. Thus, pack mules of the 97
th
 FAB Service battery moved supplies for their 
firing batteries as well as various infantry units.
13
 
Some of the hardest fighting on Guadalcanal occurred around the area called the Gifu. 
The terrain was cut by ravines, covered in heavy jungle undergrowth, and surrounded by hills. 
Combat required countless small unit actions using rifle and machine gun fire, hand grenades, 
and flamethrowers to destroy Japanese strong points.  American troops also utilized their 
characteristic mass firepower and heavy artillery against the Gifu.  The 75mm pack howitzer was 
too light, unable to penetrate thick jungle canopy and Japanese fortifications.  The 105mm and 
155mm artillery pieces were more than adequate and provided excellent service.   
Americans liberally used their artillery on Guadalcanal.  According to a Japanese report, 
“Preceding an attack by the American Army, there is always [an] artillery bombardment for at 
least 12 hours.” This was not hyperbole.  A typical attack against a Japanese stronghold saw 
5,700 rounds fired by six field artillery battalions in about thirty minutes.  One of the most 
effective artillery tactical adaptations was time-on-target (TOT) fire, in which all initial rounds 
hit their targets simultaneously.  The tactic required multiple calculations including the distance 
from each battery to the target, velocity of each gun, windage, and any other atmospheric 
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condition that might affect the travel time of each round shot.  Troops on the receiving end of 
artillery were often warned to take cover when shells from the nearest battery landed before the 
main barrage arrived.  TOT fire avoided giving an enemy any early warning, wreaking greater 
destruction on troops caught in the open.
14
 
Americans fighting in the Gifu faced Japanese in hillside positions and in deep ravines. 
Naval gunfire, which had a flat trajectory, was largely ineffective against enemy positions in 
defilade.  Field artillery was only a slight improvement over naval guns, both of which often 
overshot the target.  A higher angle of fire was needed.  One field modification that produced 
marginal success was propping artillery pieces against steep slopes to achieve higher angles of 
fire.  The incoming rounds fell almost straight down onto targets in defilade.
15
  
Another solution was airpower.  Naval, Marine, and Army air support provided some of 
the best results against sheltered enemy positions. One of the most impressive American 
innovations in close air support occurred while fighting around the Gifu.  Navy dive bombers 
loaded with 325-pound depth charges proved remarkably effective.  An artillery officer with the 
25
th
 Infantry Division recounts the discovery, use, and results of this unorthodox method. 
According to Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool:  
Right behind the mountain [Austen] there was a big canyon that was, I guess, the 
logistics area and the reserve area for troops. Because they were down there in that 
canyon the Naval gunfire couldn’t get to it. We fought around there for a good 
while….Finally, we even got some light tanks up there. They weren’t real effective….  In 
the meantime we were burning up everything that would burn and trying to level 
everything…with artillery and aerial bombs. The Japs were taking a terrific beating. The 
Japs wouldn’t get out of that canyon, and we didn’t want to go down into it. So, we 
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th
 Infantry 
Division artillery fired the heavy concentration of fire (described on the preceding page) at a watering hole near Hill 
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decided to sit on the hill and drop ammunition on them. Somebody had a bright idea, 
some Navy liaison officer said, “I think we’ll get some good echo effects down in that 
canyon, why don’t we try it [dropping depth charges].” We were willing to try almost 
anything to make it easier getting across that damn deep ditch. The Naval liaison officer 
brought some depth charges in on Navy planes. I don’t know how many. Oh, they were 
noisy!  He dropped dozens and dozens of depth charges down into that canyon. When we 
finally went across the valley, I’ll bet we didn’t see 200 men who wanted to fight. They 
were dead on the ground, blood running out of their ears, eyes popped out of their faces. 
A lot of them were just in shock. I’ve never seen such a horrible thing in my life as a 
bunch of people hit by high compression sound waves. It really knocked them out. 
Anyway we got across.  
 
Colonel Vanderpool’s story is a prime example of “brute force” in action, reinforcing the 
argument that Americans won the war by relying on mass firepower.  However, the story also 
provides unquestionable evidence of American adaptability and creativity when applying 
superior firepower.
16
  
The climax of combat operations on Guadalcanal occurred in late January 1943 when 
Americans wrested Mount Austen from the Japanese.  According to the 97
th
 FAB commander:  
With the end of organized resistance, there was no present use for the battalion as 
pack artillery. All available animals and the necessary packers were formed into a 
temporary pack train. In the latter part of February it was used to pack a battalion of the 
Infantry into the mountains to round up straggling Japs. 
 
The campaign for Guadalcanal was over. The first major offensive in the Pacific taught the U.S. 
military many lessons, particularly Japanese ways of war. One of the biggest lessons learned was 
in supply.  Improved logistics were required if future campaigns were to succeed.  The U.S. 
military, a mass consumer of resources, must learn to move and judiciously use their limited 
supplies.  Mules still factored into these logistical equations and this mode of transportation was 
not abandoned, even though pack animal performance was dubious on Guadalcanal.  The jungle 
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conditions Americans were guaranteed to encounter during future campaigns left few 
alternatives except animal power.
17
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Chapter 8: Jungle Mules Part II—China-Burma-India 
 Japanese forces took Rangoon, Burma in March 1942, and steadily moved northward.  
British and Chinese forces were powerless to stop the Japanese, and an American contingent led 
by General Joseph Stilwell failed to stem the Japanese tide.  In May 1942, Stilwell bitterly 
professed that America and its allies “got a hell of a beating” and should regroup and retake the 
lost land.  Military planners agreed and, though a sideshow to the main drives across the Central 
and South Pacific, American forces organized and launched an offensive to expel Japanese 
forces from Burma and China.
1
  
 American political and military planners determined that keeping China in the war was 
vital to defeating Japan.  If the United States could rejuvenate an anemic Chinese military, then 
the Chinese could become a crucial member in the Allied coalition.  American adherence to the 
“German First” strategy remained steadfast, and the ETO took priority regarding resource 
allotment.  However, many Americans believed that China was a worthy, reliable ally and would 
pull their weight against Japan.  According to Maurice Matloff, America sought “great aims on 
the Asiatic mainland at small cost.”2 
General Stilwell had the unenviable task of “improving the efficiency of the Chinese 
Army.”3  The Chinese would be forged by the United States into a force capable of expelling the 
Japanese from Burma.  Once Burma was secure, the land line between India, Burma and China 
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 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. Stilwell’s Mission to China, CBI Theater, U.S. Army in World 
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2
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3
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could be re-established, from which a steady flow of supplies could funnel into China.  A well-
supplied China would keep the Japanese busy in East Asia, relieving pressure on American 
forces fighting across the Pacific.  
Similar to the Mediterranean, the CBI Theater became a sideshow. Nevertheless, the 
Allied campaign in CBI helped halt Japanese expansion in South Asia. Allied operations in CBI 
also occupied Japanese troops who would have been fighting in the Pacific.  As a CBI veteran 
claimed, “our job was to entertain as many Japs as possible and keep them tied up in China, and 
so we did.”4   
Taking Myitkyina airfield or reopening the Burma Road during the latter course of the 
conflict had a negligible impact on the war’s outcome. Still, the CBI campaign highlights an 
army prevailing over supply and transportation barriers through adaptability and ingenuity.  
Japan’s initial success was remarkable as they humiliated the Western Allies.  Eventually the 
British and Americans beat Japan at their own game by using jungle-trained units to infiltrate, 
cut supply and communication lines, and then annihilate their enemy. The U.S. Army proved 
particularly adept at modifying tactics, such as aerial re-supply, and beating an allegedly 
martially superior foe.  The strategic value of the CBI Theater is debatable, but one cannot 
question America’s tactical success based on brute force and adaptability.  Few theaters were 
more challenging than CBI concerning combat and supply operations, which is why CBI is 
perhaps the finest example of Army adaptability and, not surprisingly, pack animals were an 
integral part of Army success.
5
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5
 Riley Sunderland, Stilwell As Corps Commander, Burma, 1944, rebuttal to Scott R. McMichael, 
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Strategically, a primary reason for American operations in CBI was to supply the Chinese 
military, and keep them fighting against Japan.  Tactically, the war in CBI was also dominated 
by logistics and complicated by a supply chain that could begin on a Missouri farm and end 
12,000 miles away atop a mountainside in North Burma.  Supplies entered the CBI Theater from 
ships at Calcutta, India, then were moved northeast by rail over one thousand miles on a journey 
taking around 65 days.  Supplies were transferred from the railhead to trucks and hauled over 
poor roadways or placed on ferries and moved up a number of navigable rivers to the North 
Indian province of Assam.  The supply chain from India to China passed through Burma, which 
was occupied by the Japanese in early 1942.  Thus, China was effectively sealed off from all 
overland supply lines. The only method of supplying the feeble Chinese Army was by air.
6
  
Ledo in Assam was the depot from which China’s air supply began its flight over the 
Himalaya Mountains, or “the Hump,” to Kunming, China. The approximately 475-mile air link 
in the supply chain was beset with obstacles, the most obvious being the Himalaya Mountains.  
Pilots flew over or around 15,000 foot peaks and terrain with its own unique weather patterns, 
including vicious updrafts, snow storms, lightning, and blinding downpours.  Early air supply 
missions also had to contend with Japanese fighter planes.  Operating primarily from a large air 
base at Myitkyina, Burma, these Japanese interceptors posed a serious threat to the aerial supply 
line until America established air superiority.  
The transport aircraft were not obsolete but were hardly in prime working condition. 
Routine maintenance of aircraft was difficult because of an aircraft shortage, resulting in overuse 
of the planes available.  Paucity of replacement parts further complicated aircraft upkeep.  The 
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“Germany First” strategy meant that the lion’s share of resources, including transport aircraft, 
was allocated to buildup for a second front in West Europe.  Similar to Mediterranean 
operations, the CBI Theater was seriously underserved.
7
   
The fact that any air supplies arrived at Kunming, China was remarkable considering the 
obstacles. The Army Air Transport Command (ATC) and the Tenth Air Force accomplished a 
great logistical feat and demonstrated Army adaptability by pilots, loadmasters, and ground 
crews. Eventually these pioneers developed an air supply system second to none. However, in 
the first few years of operation (1942-1943), it proved too difficult to move sufficient quantities 
of supplies by air transport alone.  The Chinese, under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi, demanded 
more supplies.  American General Joseph Stilwell also believed that the supply shortage 
hampered China’s fighting ability and accordingly insisted on building a land route from India to 
move more supplies into China. He presented a plan to reclaim Burma as a first step to opening a 
flood of Allied supplies for the beleaguered Chinese.
8
   
Early 1943 found CBI in a state of flux.  Return “Hump” flights brought Chinese 
manpower back to India, where American advisors equipped and trained them into a fighting 
force.  Jiang Jieshi and Chinese Nationalist forces continued receiving life support by air from 
India.  Simultaneously, U.S. Army engineers were extending the Ledo Road through the jungles 
                                                 
 
7
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and mountains of North Burma in the hopes of linking up with a reopened Burma Road, though 
the Japanese must be expelled ahead of the road’s construction.9  
American war planners were unsure how to proceed. Few besides Stilwell wanted to 
invest too heavily.  An unlikely source of inspiration for the United States came from British 
Colonel Orde Wingate.  Described as “often brilliant, sometimes insane, but always convincing,” 
Wingate proposed using “long range penetration groups” (LRPG) to go behind the lines to harass 
the enemy. General Wingate experienced some initial success by personally leading a LRPG into 
Burma, and proving that such operations were possible.  Americans were attracted to the long 
range penetration concept because they required a minimal investment.
10
 
LRPG success depended on two components: continuous re-supply by air and pack 
animal transportation once the supplies were received. Wingate led 3,000 “Chindits” supported 
by 1,000 mules some 200 miles into the jungle behind Japanese lines.  General Wingate’s force 
produced some tactical success, though at a great loss of men and mules.  Only about two thirds 
of his force survived the mission, and most of those were deemed unfit for further duty.  The 
pack animals suffered almost 100 percent losses.  The attrition on men and mules raised 
questions regarding the value of long range penetration missions.  The LRPG missions involved 
a minimal risk of resources but also produced minimal results, and the few resources that were 
deployed suffered very high casualties.  But the LRPGs produced a propaganda bonanza for the 
Allies on the home front; and, more importantly, the Wingate mission served as a template from 
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which the U.S. Army refined the LRPG concept and turned air supply and mule transportation 
into an art.
11
  
Allied leaders, particularly Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, agreed to continue LRPGs 
in Burma. Wingate, promoted now to general, rebuilt his Chindits and led a second mission.  The 
Americans agreed to create their own LRPG, but fierce debate occurred over whom would lead 
the American force.  In the end, General Stilwell’s anti-British sentiments prevailed and his 
demand that an American command American troops was met.  Brigadier General Frank D. 
Merrill commanded what was officially known as the 5307
th
 Composite Unit (Provisional) or 
“Merrill’s Marauders” on Operation Galahad.  
Operating from bases in northeast India, General Stilwell planned to strike in North 
Burma.  The general objective was to open a supply line following the trace from Ledo, India 
and linking up with the Old Burma Road that ran east toward Kunming, China.  Two Chinese 
armies, Y and Z Forces, would launch a campaign to open the Ledo-Burma Road.  Z Forces was 
the product of the Americans’ program to train Chinese troops in India.  The larger Y-Force was 
a Chinese formation equipped and trained by Americans in Kunming. The two forces were to 
converge and establish a land corridor between China and India through northern Burma.   
Spearheading Galahad into North Burma was Merrill’s Marauders, a brigade-sized unit 
that included three battalions of volunteers.  The American unit was to follow the British model, 
taking volunteers with jungle training, and experience in air supply and pack animal 
transportation.  The primary goal of Galahad was Myitkyina, the only significant air base in 
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northern Burma. Seizing “the Mitch,” as the Marauders soon knew it, was crucial to clearing the 
path for the Ledo-Burma Road to China. The Marauders operated closely with the Chinese 22
nd
 
and 38
th
 Divisions moving from India into northwestern Burma.  The Chinese advanced down 
the Hukawng Valley toward Myitkyina while the Marauder vanguard disrupted Japanese supply 
and communication lines.
12
  
Galahad was promoted by the War Department as a “hazardous mission” from which 
heavy casualties were expected.  A mixed bag of volunteers joined the operation.  Only about 
one third of the men had jungle experience, coming from the Southwest Pacific and the 
Caribbean Command.  The majority were state-side Midwestern farmers and city dwellers.  
Some of the latter had animal experience, but almost none had the requisite jungle training.  
Robert E. Passanisi was a prime example of a volunteer with no animal experience. According to 
Passanisi,  
I was a kid from Brooklyn. I sure didn’t know anything about mules, but I knew a 
lot about radios. Our radios were big and had to be loaded and carried on mules, so I got 
acquainted with mules when I became the battalion’s radio man. 
The military request for troops with jungle experience and a certain amount of horse sense went 
largely unfulfilled.  Fortunately, Passinisi and hundreds like him were quick studies, and the unit 
materialized after a short amount of on the job training.
13
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 Galahad accrued about 2,900 of the 3,000 men requested and fewer than 400 of the 1,000 
mules requisitioned.  The number of Galahad mules was drastically reduced when the animal 
transport, Jose Navarro, was torpedoed.  The ship began to sink, and the crew and pack troops 
abandoned ship.  According to Hank Kinder: 
We floated around in the water all night, the ship had not sunk, but there was all 
sorts of things bobbing around like bales of hay and feed bags. Some of the mules got 
loose and they flailed around in the water a long time until the drowned.  You could hear 
those still on board braying.  A couple of times the submarine fired more torpedoes. I was 
in the water with a group of guys, and one (torpedo) went right by us.  Finally, another 
torpedo hit the ship. It sank and we lost all our mules and gear.  
All 320 mules aboard the Jose Navarro were gone. The deadline for the operation was looming, 
and the operation could not wait for future shipments of pack animals from America.  Thus, in 
the end only around 360 mules supported Galahad. Around 300 Australian horses and local 
animals supplementing the operation brought Galahad’s total animal strength to approximately 
700, but the Australian horses had not performed well in the Southwest Pacific and the smaller 
native animals were in poor condition.
14
 
 Men and animals left Ledo, India on February 7, 1944 and road-marched some eighty 
miles down the completed portion of the Ledo Road.  The entire force could have moved by 
truck, but General Merrill ordered the march to better condition them.  Men and animals were 
worn out by the time they reached the end of the road.  On February 24, 1944 the force moved 
off the road and into the jungle, and their ordeal really began. Merrill’s Marauders struggled 
through almost impenetrable jungle, up mountains, and across countless rivers, and occasionally 
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fighting skirmishes with the Japanese.  The Marauders encircled and destroyed Japanese forces 
as they pushed on to their objective at Myitkyina, Burma.
15
  
Conditions grew worse as the Marauders and their Chinese allies moved further east.  
Supply lines grew longer, and casualties from combat and disease mounted.  Following the 
particularly vicious and depleting battle at Nhpum Ga, the Marauders pressed on toward 
Myitkyina.  A crucial part of the operation was the timetable.  Capturing Myitkyina must occur 
before the monsoons began, otherwise troop movement and supply difficulties would be 
compounded.   Thus, a grueling march was ordered by General Stilwell to save time.  The troops 
moved some 65 miles up and over the 6,000-foot Kumon mountain range, but not before the 
monsoon started.  Drenched and struggling through a sea of mud, the exhausted men and mules 
inched forward and eventually reached the Myitkyina airfield on May 16, 1944. 
General Stilwell was jubilant when receiving word that Myitkyina airfield was in 
American hands, but any real triumph was short-lived.  Chinese efforts to capture the town of 
Myitkyina failed, forcing them to retreat to the American-held airbase.  The American troops 
offered little help because their ranks were riddled with disease and fatigue.  A two month long 
siege ensued, during which American casualties steadily rose.  On August 3, 1944, Myitkyina 
was secured as the last Japanese were killed or retreated across the Irrawaddy River.
16
 
The next American objective was Lashio, the western terminus of the Burma Road. 
American forces needed to secure the area ahead of engineers working around the clock to 
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lengthen the Ledo Road to its juncture with the Burma Road, completing the overland 
connection to China. The mission was similar to Galahad in that it called for the entrapment and 
destruction of Japanese forces by a long range penetration group.  The bulk of the original 
Galahad members were too spent to participate in the second phase, so the Army activated and 
deployed a new LRPG known as the 5332
nd
 Brigade (Provisional).  The organization and 
training of the 5332
nd 
took place while Operation Galahad was underway.  Indeed, members of 
the 5332
nd
, known as the Mars Task Force, avoided a great deal of the suffering experienced by 
Merrill’s Marauders. The U.S. Army adapted as lessons were learned from the first LRPG 
experiment, ensuring that the Mars Task Force was dramatically improved.  
Galahad was hurriedly put together and always short on men, mules, and supplies.  Far 
greater attention was paid to the organization of the Mars Task Force.  The 475
th
 Infantry 
Regiment and the 124
th
 Cavalry Regiment were the nucleus of the brigade. The majority of the 
124
th
 Cavalry Regiment were Texas National Guard troops, who served the Mars Task Force as 
dismounted infantry. Their knowledge of animals proved quite valuable since Mars depended on 
a large number of pack animals for supply transportation and artillery.  The Mars Task Force 
also included the few hundred Merrill’s Marauders still fit for combat.  As the unit history noted, 
“the leaven of veteran jungle fighters was mixed with the freshness of volunteers” to form a truly 
formidable LRPG.
17
 
Another major improvement with the Mars Task Force was in support units.  Galahad 
had no field artillery, depending on heavy artillery for tactical or close air support.  Two pack 
artillery battalions deployed with the Mars Task Force.  Each pack artillery battalion included 
sixteen guns and 286 mules.  Six Quartermaster Pack Troops transported supplies. Between pack 
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artillery and pack transportation, Mars deployed some 3,000 pack mules, a staggering increase 
compared to the roughly 700 mules and horses supporting Galahad.  Two Veterinary 
Companies, a Veterinary Hospital, and two Remount Squadrons provided medical care for such 
a large number of pack animals. The Mars Task Force was thus much better equipped and 
supported than its predecessor after the Army recognized changes were required.
18
   
The Mars Task Force still had to perform an arduous mission as they struggled over the 
most grueling terrain in the CBI Theater.  The Mars men also experienced hard fighting and 
strong Japanese resistance as they secured the area preceding the Ledo Road.  On January 25, 
1945 the first truckload of supplies moved down the Ledo Road, connecting with the Burma 
Road.  Finally, the mission of a land route from India through Burma, and into China was 
attained.  Several Mars Task Force members accompanied these supply convoys, which included 
the movement of several thousand pack mules earmarked for the Chinese Army.
19
  
The U.S. Army realized that transporting supplies in CBI required pack animals.  Animal 
power had had limited success at Guadalcanal, where unconditioned animals and logistical 
problems produced a poor showing for animal power.  Americans were still convinced that 
animal power was the only alternative in the harsh terrain of CBI.  Lend-Lease, in support of 
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General Wingate’s Chindits, brought American animals to CBI. By the time Americans decided 
to send their own LRPG, it was understood that pack animals were the lynch pin to CBI supply.
20
   
The U.S. Army required American animals for the CBI campaign, unlike the MTO in 
which the Army relied almost exclusively on local stock.  The Army Veterinary Service believed 
that native animals needed to support the task in CBI were not available in quantity, nor could 
these animals withstand the rigors of pack animal service.  The assumption was only partially 
correct.  Animals native to CBI were smaller, but they were acclimated to the jungle 
environment.  American mules were much larger and stronger, but susceptible to jungle diseases.  
All animals supporting supply operations in CBI, regardless of origins, suffered heavy losses. 
American Remount Depots were extremely active collecting animals for CBI 
deployment.  In all, some 10,703 Army horses and mules disembarked at Calcutta, India to serve 
in CBI.  Approximately half were “veterans” transferred from the Southwest Pacific and recent 
action at Guadalcanal and New Guinea.  A small number transferred from the Caribbean and 
Hawaiian Commands.  The Zone of Interior provided 4,760 fresh recruits.
21
  
U.S. troops preferred American stock, but often supplemented operations with Indian and 
Burmese ponies.  American troops requisitioned countless local animals.  According to one Mars 
man: 
While we was training we found a little pony, just wandering around out there by 
himself, so we cabbaged on to him and it got to where he didn’t want to leave the mules. 
The night before we left out, we checked the picket line to make sure the mules hadn’t 
wondered off, and when we checked, Eight Ball was gone.  First battalion was heading 
out that morning and Eight Ball was with them.  Well, we decided to take him back, so a 
brawl started, and I mean a good one. We got to keep him, and he was with us the whole 
trip, and what that little pony did was he could haul four packs. Well, there were five of 
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us in each group, so one day out of five you had to wear your own pack, but we had a real 
luxury having Eight Ball with us.
22
  
 Veterinary officers were dispatched by the Army Veterinary Service as early as 
September 1942 to help supervise the Chinese training facility at Ramgarh, India.  Army 
Veterinary officers also helped receive and distribute lend-lease animals to the British Army.  
The Army Veterinary Service established a provisional Remount Depot at Ramgarh, and then 
moved to Ledo as American combat teams deployed to North Burma.  Though incomplete, the 
Army developed a good system of veterinary care for the animals.  
 Inexperience with pack animals was widespread, and during the early stages of the CBI 
campaign the pack troop selection followed little protocol.  According to Randy Colvin: 
I was sent to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for my basic training.  Well, there I took 
basic in a 105 (mm) motorized vehicle.  One day they lined us all up, they had a bar 5-
foot ten inches, so we went up and if you hit that bar, they took your name and you went 
this way and if you was short you went another way. We wound up in Muskogee, 
Oklahoma, which was Camp Gruber.  Well, one of the first things we said when we got 
off the train was where’s the trucks.  This one corporal there he looked at us and laughed, 
said you SOB’s have seen your last truck. You’re in the mule pack.  We said what the 
hell is a mule pack?
23
 
 
Randy Colvin at least experienced some animal training prior to deployment.  Others were 
simply picked on the spot in the field.  According to Pete Ewing: 
After Myitkyina we was pretty shot up, so before we started the second part of the 
Central Burma campaign they asked for people that had any knowledge working with 
mules.  Of course, I was a kid from the farm in Indiana and it wasn’t no big deal with me 
to say “Yeah, I know how to handle a mule.”  And so that’s how I got into that.  They 
took five of us and taught us how to pack, and it just became a natural thing.  There was 
no real training program or anything like that; it was really just using common sense.
24
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The early campaign in CBI saw little uniformity or regulation regarding pack troops. The Army 
realized that experience would be beneficial, as seen in the request for volunteers “qualified in 
jungle training” and with air and animal transport experience, but there was hardly time to 
enforce any rigorous standards.  The Army compensated for any deficits in experience by relying 
on adaptability and the American talent for on-the-job training.  
 The Army recognized the value of well-trained pack troops.  As one report noted: 
The mission of a Pack Company is to transport weapons, equipment, and 
whatever other supplies are required for mountain troops where the terrain is so difficult 
that not even specially designed vehicles can move over the hazardous trails and slopes. 
The Pack Company, though not a tactical unit, is frequently with the frontline combat 
troops.  Each man is trained to handle his individual weapon and equipment; to saddle 
and manage the pack mules and care for the cargo.
25
 
Though often omitted when discussing special forces, pack troops were quite specialized and 
often served as the last link in the supply chain. Those who underwent training with a pack troop 
experienced rigorous training.  The 33
rd
 Quartermaster Pack Troop was eventually assigned to 
Merrill’s Marauders and experienced a prime example of training hardships.  The 33rd QMPT 
trained near Fort Bliss, Texas, often marching in the July heat into the mountains of nearby New 
Mexico.  Aside from pack animal training, the men took refresher courses in infantry tactics, first 
aid, and infiltration.
26
   
Veterinary companies also underwent specialized, hard training.  The 44
th
 Veterinary 
Company trained at Fort Riley, Kansas before deployment to CBI. A report on activities by the 
company noted:  
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On July 10, (1944) unit departed Fort Riley, Kansas enroute to Marysville, 
Kansas, a distance of some 78 miles.  Mounted men riding the total distance with three 
bivouac areas in between averaging 26 miles a day.  All movements being made in 
blackout conditions.  Problems (tests) included map reading, scouting, and patrolling and 
concealment of bivouac areas.  Entire problem lasted from 10 July to 21 July, 1944. 
 
Observers related that moving some 360 mules at night was done with remarkable stealth and 
that concealing the animals from aerial observation proved difficult but possible.
27
   
 Transporting the transportation (i.e. the mules) was an arduous job.  The journey usually 
began with rail transport from an Army Remount Depot in the United States to a port of 
embarkation.  Mules were loaded onto an animal transport and shipped out.  A typical voyage 
recorded that “after an uneventful voyage of 18 days,” the transport arrived at Melbourne, 
Australia.  The mules were not allowed to deboard due to Australian quarantine laws, and “after 
14 uneventful days at sea” arrived at Bombay, India.  The transoceanic voyage by animal 
transports or “mule boats” may have been “uneventful,” but the taxing trip was far from over 
after arriving in India.
28
 
A total of twenty nine shipments brought 10,703 Army mules to Bombay or Calcutta, 
India. The voyage took an average of sixty days.  Some mules were marched off the ship, some 
were placed in “flying stalls” or cargo nets, and some just swam to the beach. The mules were 
immediately collected and moved by train from Calcutta to Ramgarh, India or Ledo. The trip by 
train took an average of 60 days.
29
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The Army Veterinary Service preferred moving live stock by train in the Zone of Interior.  
Railroad transportation in India was completely different, and serious health problems developed 
in the herds. The greatest problem was the rapid loss of condition while confined to the train, 
often for eight to ten days at a stretch.  Aboard ships, the mules frequently exercised at least 
every other day or two, but exercise aboard trains was not possible.  Six to ten mules or horses 
were loaded on a freight car or “animal wagon,” usually with five on each end facing inward, 
with food and water placed in the middle.  The steel cars were poorly ventilated and became 
insufferably hot.  Stops for water were infrequent and most often the animals were not unloaded. 
The rail gage changed further northward, requiring stops to switch trains.  This provided some 
exercise for the animals, but it also lengthened the overall trip.   
The 1,450 mile trip to Ledo ended with a road march or truck ride from the railhead to 
the Remount Depot, a part of the trip that was beset with problems.
30
  Hauling the mules by truck 
proved unsuccessful because inexperienced, careless drivers and twisting, poor grade roads often 
left mules seriously injured. 
31
 A safer alternative to truck transportation was road marching, 
though this method was not without its own difficulties.  To avoid the travails of moving mules 
in monsoons, the mules usually moved in the dry season. But herding several hundred mules in 
the stifling heat reduced the already marginal condition of the animals. Choking dust 
accompanied a road march, and was more than an irritant for it damaged material and wore down 
the men and mules.  According to a Mars trooper, the fine sand turned to dust and, “[I]t never 
settles.  It never disappears, but it’s just solid dust and we ate that stuff all day and I’ve never 
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seen a group of men this tired.”  Equipment was quickly abandoned to reduce the load, and this 
was before even entering the combat area.
32
 
Army regulations were very specific regarding the movement of large herds down 
roadways.  Training called for the herd to follow a bell mare as pack troops rode a mule and 
guided the loaded mules down the road.  The herding principle worked well and the 
transportation of supplies was relatively fast until the pack troops were integrated with a moving 
column of infantry.  The mule herd moved faster than the walking infantry, overtaking the men 
and causing congestion.  The pack train could not lead the column when in close proximity of the 
enemy, nor could it play catch-up because the infantry often needed their supplies quickly.  The 
problem was solved when the Army adopted the “brigade” system, in which one pack trooper 
accompanying the infantry column led one or two mules. As a unit history noted, “Although 
previous training of the mules had been along herding principles, the Brigade system of a mule 
leader to each mule paid rich dividends.”33 
 Bell mares normally guided and motivated herds to cross rivers. The absence of bell 
mares in Burma necessitated alternative methods of river crossings.  Crossing rivers required 
great physical strength and skill to induce a mule to cross bodies of water, an almost daily 
occurrence.  According to Colonel Charles Hunter: 
Where there is a gradual slope into the water, you can line up about six men, pass 
a rope under the beast’s haunches, and propel him into the deep water with a rider already 
on his back and yell “sink or swim you bastard.”  The mule starts to sink, paws the water, 
gets vertical, and swims to the far bank...should a mule get too much water in his ears he 
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may lose his sense of equilibrium and drown. So in order to recover the carcass…,t is 
well to attach a float by a long cord to the halter before entering the water. Mule meat is 
quite edible if the carcass is recovered promptly.
34
   
Even with the untimely loss of a prized pack mule, GIs demonstrated a fair amount of ingenuity. 
 Meandering rivers and streams are a prevailing feature in the Burmese low lands.  Units 
often crossed the same river multiple times in one day.  Fording rivers was a skill LRPGs 
developed into an art.  According to Hank Kinder, “[W]e built bamboo rafts to take supplies 
across, and unloaded the mules and let them swim.”  They built split bamboo footbridges, “the 
wider the better, but never more than a few feet across.  The mules crossed them too.”  If time 
permitted, engineers constructed crude bridges from pontoons and planks.  According to Randy 
Colvin: 
  They had a bridge, oh it was about four foot wide, looks like it was made of 
 bamboo.  It was just right down on the water. Of course it gave with the water and when 
 you’re walking with mules it’s going down some….every once in a while they get 
 skittish and one or two of them did fall into the river and was washed away. But as a 
 whole, we made it and the river was at least a quarter of a mile wide.
35
 
 The smallest streams became a dangerous torrent during the monsoons.  Army engineers 
overcame these obstacles by placing platforms on top of several small motor boats to fashion 
make-shift ferries.  Several mules were herded onto the deck, and the men, operating outboard 
motors, drove them across the river.  Most often time was of the essence, so the ferries usually 
had no rails and occasionally mules jumped overboard.  Likewise, mules should have been 
unpacked for safety, but, lazy, harried troops often left the mules fully loaded during the ferry 
ride, which was a time-saving though risky practice.
36
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 Monsoon season also turned the low-lying areas into swamps and bogs.  Heavily loaded 
mules easily fell victim to the marshy ground, at times sinking up to their heads. Trapped 
animals were unloaded, then troops dug under the mule, uncinched the pack saddle, and broke 
the mule free from the mire.  Depending on the size of the swamp, troops fell timber and 
fashioned log roads to bridge the bog.  As Pete Liddy noted:  
They went out and cut these mammoth trees, and they was teak wood. And that’s 
really expensive today…they’d just cut these huge trees and then we’d lay them across 
and they’d call it a corduroy road.  And we’d come along and put a little dirt on it.  Just 
anything to keep them out of the swamp. 
No amount of time, labor, or expense was spared to extract the trapped mules and ensure that 
supplies kept moving.
37
 
 The most innovative method of moving pack animals to frontline troops was by airplane.  
The technologically regressive application of pack animals in a war dominated by machinery 
was surprising, and moving mules via aircraft was supremely ironic.  Indeed, the reason a motor-
bound military needed animal power was that motorization failed in the harsh environment of 
CBI. Yet, the successful marriage between modern and archaic modes of transportation 
demonstrated a real talent for adaptability by the Army.  
 One of the first to express an interest in moving pack animals by airplane was a 
veterinary officer at Fort Riley, Kansas. In 1932, the Cavalry School veterinary noted that it was 
reasonable “in a relatively few years we may expect to witness the practical rapid movement of 
limited numbers of horses and mules by airplane or dirigible.”  Eleven years later on New 
Guinea the 98
th
 Field Artillery Battalion conducted movement of pack units by air.  By 1944 
mules were frequently flying from India into Burma, or over the Himalaya “Hump” to China.38 
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 In the spring of 1944, the British Army became the first to deploy pack animals via 
aircraft in the spring of 1944.  The British Chindits, with the help of the U.S. Army Air Corps, 
moved some 9,000 men and 1,300 mules, by C-47 cargo planes and Waco gliders during 
Wingate’s second foray behind Japanese lines.  Using American planes, equipment, and mules, 
the British successfully landed in Central Burma and demonstrated that pack animal 
transportation by air was quite feasible.
39
  
 Air transporting mules was difficult, and American air crews and veterinary officers 
constantly improved the practice.  First, the transport aircraft was modified.  Temporary stalls 
were constructed from bamboo poles, wired together, and mounted in the plane’s cargo area.  
Special tie-downs, d-rings, and lead ropes were installed.  The floor was covered with plywood, 
tarpaulin, and hay to prevent slippage.  Mules were loaded, two at a time, directly from the truck 
to the plane and lashed down. Altogether, five or six mules were loaded, along with the pack 
saddles. Some twenty minutes later the mules and crew were ready for takeoff.
40
 
 Mules were agitated and fidgety prior to takeoff.  Crew chiefs tried to keep the animals 
calm, and were armed with pistols and carbines in case the animals could not be subdued by 
other means.  The mules quickly calmed once airborne.  Upon reaching an altitude of 12,000 feet 
the mules became quite drowsy.  Landing was similar to take-off in that animals became 
unsettled.  Again, the armed crew chiefs did their best to comfort the animals, but they were 
trained in the proper procedures to put a mule down if the animal panicked.  Mules were quickly 
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unloaded and moved to the supply depot.  Occasionally, the animals were left in their pack 
saddles during the flight, which expedited transportation of supplies to the front.
41
     
 The U.S. Army Air Corps moved flew over 7,000 mules for the British, American, and 
Chinese Armies.  Air transportation of pack animals seemed unorthodox at first, but was easier 
on the animals and cheaper than road marching.  A Remount officer wrote:  
The fact that animals can move under their own power seems to be the only 
argument in favor of their being marched over long distances.  However, it is felt that 
such a contention is ill founded in view of the numerous problems involved in such a 
method of movement.
42
   
Road marches could be as debilitating on mules as combat operations.  Exhaustion, wounds from 
ill-fitting packs, and lameness due to improper shoeing often accompanied road marching.  Road 
marches often diminished pack animal capacity to transport supplies, and thus, good animal care 
while on the move was vital to overall mission success.
43
   
Sound animal care and sound veterinary practices ensured that the animal link in the 
Army supply chain did not break.  Procuring adequate forage was a primary concern.  A typical 
working mule needs 17 pounds of grain and grass and 10 gallons of fresh water daily, though in 
CBI the feed/hay ration was reduced to 12 pounds.  The Army Veterinary Service diligently 
worked at home to develop the perfect ration.  Considerations included nutritional value to 
maintain peak animal health, along with compactness to reduce bulk and facilitate transportation.  
                                                 
 
41
 Ibid. It was particularly important for crew members to control the animals during take-off and landing 
because sudden weight shifts from fractious animals could cause planes to crash. Records indicate that only two 
animals were shot during air transportation. 
 
 
42
 Memo: Transportation of Animals, to Theater G-3 from Captain John A. Rand, Remount Officer, File: 
454 Animals Pack, Box 1750, RG: 338, NARA. Captain Rand was the officer in charge of moving 900 mules from 
Myitkyina, Burma to Kunming, China after Mars Task Force combat operations ended.  
 
 
43
 Miller, 554. The Army eventually employed both methods of moving mules: 5,397 were road marched 
from India-Burma to China; and 4,964 flew over the Hump destined for Kunming, China. 
215 
 
Veterinary officers in theater matched AVS efforts on the home front to produce quality 
forage.  Of particular interest to Army Veterinary Service officers was efficiency, which seemed 
(in the mind of AVS officers) completely lacking in China. An example of AVS efforts to 
improve Chinese efficiency was in hay production.   
In the China theater, the Army Veterinary Service took energetic steps in 
requisitioning hay-baling machines from the United States and having them airlifted over 
the Himalaya Hump into China in order to introduce and to provide hay in baled form 
to…Chinese military forces which had been using unbaled loose hay.44 
 Efforts to create a compressed ration produced generally good results.  Mixtures of 
barley, wheat bran, straw, sugar, and salt were steamed and compressed into small cakes. The 
cakes were wrapped in paper and packed in waterproof boxes.  The boxes could be easily hauled, 
which addressed one component of the ration equation.  An aspect of the ration problem that was 
harder to solve was nutritional value.  If used in emergency or short-term feedings, then these 
rations were adequate. However, prolonged feeding of these compressed rations generally 
produced weight loss and gastrointestinal ills, which diminished ultimate transport capacity. 
 Forage supplies in CBI were short and they never caught up.  A lack of shipping 
prevented the importation of feed from the United States.  The quality of local forage was also 
lacking.  Most of the grasses provided roughage, but little nutritional value.  Operations in areas 
with kunai and elephant grass provided satisfactory grazing, but there was little good grazing in 
the mountains and jungles where most of the pack animals and troops operated.  Bamboo was 
one of the only edible items in the jungle, and it had poor nutritional value and caused intestinal 
impactions if eaten too often.
45
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 Good forage was crucial to mission success, and since there was a widespread paucity of 
grazing areas a primary job of veterinary officers was to locate grazing sites prior to combat 
operations.  During June and July 1943, Army veterinary officers set out on foot to make a 
reconnaissance of North Burma and “to locate and mark areas where animals might be grazed…, 
and to determine whether animals would be able to subsist entirely off the land without 
supplementary forage.”  Operations were scheduled to begin in February 1944 and knowledge of 
feeding locations was essential to planning.
46
   
  A key part of efficient animal transportation was the mundane task of keeping animals 
shod.  Shoeing animals was a problem in the MTO, but it was nightmare in CBI.  The supply of 
shoes was short, and not likely to improve.  Shoe-making equipment was virtually non-existent, 
and there was a complete absence of trained farriers.   The Medical Service tasked the AVS with 
introducing rudimentary veterinary medicine and modernizing Chinese military animal care, and 
a primary objective in that mission was shoeing animals.  As the AVS noted, “[F]or the first time 
in the modern history of the Chinese military forces, proper attention was given to care of the 
feet and shoeing animals.” 47 
 Approximately ten percent of Chinese Army animals were shod in 1942, and raising this 
dismally low number was a challenge.  Efforts by Army Veterinarians to start a farrier training 
course were hampered by the shortage of shoe-making equipment, and instructing the handful of 
Chinese “volunteers” in the mechanical art of farriery was nearly impossible.  Besides the 
language barrier, the lack of equipment meant a shortage of teaching materials and visual aids for 
hands-on learning.  Small quantities of equipment, including anvils and portable kilns, arrived 
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from the United States, but most equipment was improvised in theater by the Army Veterinary 
Service, the Quartermaster, or the Service of Supply.
48
   
 Importing shoes in large quantities was a slow process.  Shipping space was still at a 
premium and hauling a boat-load of horse and mule shoes was low on the Army’s priority list.  
Assuming a shipment of shoes actually arrived from the United States, there was still the 
backbreaking task of moving shoes from Calcutta to a Remount Depot in Ledo. In stome cases, 
the last leg of the journey saw planeloads of horse and mule shoes flown from Ledo over the 
Himalaya Hump, to Kunming, China.  Importing shoes proved too time-consuming and cost 
prohibitive. The only solution to the shoe shortage was to produce the shoes in theater.  The AVS 
built three horseshoe factories and oversaw initial operations until the Services of Supply, 
Chinese Army took over factory control.
49
 
 Another long-term solution to improving Chinese Army animal care was training.  Army 
Veterinary officers at Ramgarh, India and Kunming, China trained some 750 Chinese men. 
Aside from resource shortages, the Army ran into cultural differences that proved hard to bridge.  
For example, animal care was not a priority within the Chinese military, which considered 
certain jobs, such as farriers, to be for inferiors. Thus, a lack of incentive and appreciation for the 
importance of proper animal care produced a tug of war between Army efficiency and what 
appeared to be Chinese apathy.   
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 Allied troops in Italy reconstructed a remount and veterinary service from the remnants 
of an institution that had existed for decades, but China lacked the foundation and history of a 
modern military veterinary service.  Part of persuading the Chinese to adopt a more modern 
veterinary medicine program was starting schools. The Army had already developed schools for 
the Chinese Army for specific services, including the Instructional Schools in Infantry Training 
and the Instructional School in Field Artillery.  On that model, the Army Veterinary Service 
established the Instructional Veterinary Medical Service within the Chinese Army.   
Eventually, 756 officers and men were “given instruction in First Aid, Animal 
Management, Communicable and Non-communicable Diseases of Animals, Restraint, and 
Proper Use of Common Drugs.”  A great percentage of instruction was devoted to basic animal 
management and shoeing, a fundamental in animal care.  Each division throughout the CAI 
(Chinese Army in India) established forges; and under AVS supervision “horseshoe, horseshoe 
nails, and horseshoeing tools were manufactured from salvaged metal (broken auto springs, truck 
frames, etc.)....” American-trained Chinese farriers throughout the CAI divisions, making 
fundamental improvements in animal care and animal efficiency, shod animals.
50
 
A provisional veterinary hospital was set up by the AVS in August 1942 at Ramgarh, 
India to care for Chinese animal evacuees.  The veterinary hospital was formally organized by 
the Army in July 1943 when the 1
st
 Veterinary Company (Separate) arrived for duty.  The 1
st
 
Veterinary Company (Separate) accompanied American and Chinese forces moving to Ledo and 
established a veterinary hospital and remount depot to support combat operations in North 
Burma.  The 1
st
 Veterinary Company (Separate) experienced shortages of men and material, 
which was a common problem shared by all units sent to CBI.  According to the unit history:   
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On May 16, 1943, hospital received its first animal patient from the Chinese 
Army. The unit does its own evacuation, accomplished by converting a 6 x 6 GMC cargo 
truck into a stock rack.
51
 Supplies have been adequate with the exception of…equipment 
necessary to an organization having animals.  Transportation is sufficient except for the 
evacuation of animals.  The receipt of semi-trailers and tractors assigned to this 
organization and believe to be enroute, will alleviate the situation. The problem of 
exercising animals with insufficient personnel available was solved by the construction of 
corrals and feed racks for hay, animals thereby providing themselves with some exercise 
and availing themselves of feed, simultaneously. The shortage of stable equipment has 
made it necessary to utilize other tools and construct some from available material.  Since 
insufficient tools were available it became necessary for the horseshoers and carpenters to 
construct scoops, shovels, forks, and rakes from available scrap materials.  Since no 
animal and cargo portee trailers were available for use as animal ambulances and because 
of the need for motor transport to cover the extended routes of evacuation, it became 
necessary for the organization to construct two stock racks, the racks being placed on a 2 
½ ton GMC Cargo truck chassis.  These have both been very satisfactory.
52
 
From muckrakes to M-4s, Army adaptability overcame the most mundane or most pressing 
obstacles. 
The AVS established additional veterinary companies and veterinary evacuation hospitals 
as operations moved across Burma.  The next veterinary hospital and remount depot was at 
Myitkyina. The necessity and size of both grew because the number of animals in the Mars Task 
Force increased dramatically.  No system of animal evacuation existed when Galahad began in 
February 1944, resulting in an almost ninety percent loss of animals during the Myitkyina 
offensive.  By way of comparison, the Mars Task Force implemented an evacuation plan for 
their pack animals, which included a platoon from the 7
th
 Veterinary Company, and the 18
th
 
Veterinary Evacuation Hospital.  Animal casualties for the Mars Task Force were under five 
percent, even though they used several thousand more mules than their Galahad predecessors.  
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Once operations moved out of Burma, the primary function of Army veterinary units was 
relocating mules to China.  The 7
th
 Veterinary Company (Separate) air transported some 5,000 
animals into China.  The 43
rd
 and 44
th
 Veterinary Companies (Separate) cared for animals in 
India and Burma but were stopped by the War Department when redeployed to China. The 
Chinese objected to the use of black troops in their country, and both companies were racially 
segregated units.  Volunteers from the two field artillery battalions and the Quartermaster Pack 
Troops supporting the Mars Task Force assisted with a road march of some 900 mules to 
Kunming, China after offensive operations ceased in Burma.  Regardless of their method of 
movement or the group responsible for their transfer, all Army mules serving in Burma were sent 
by the War Department to China.
53
 
The strategic goal of keeping China in the war was largely determined by supply. The 
impact of supply on achieving tactical goals was just as acute.  Once the Army moved into the 
rugged terrain of North Burma, keeping the troops supplied proved as difficult as fighting the 
Japanese.  Operations began in the Assam province of India, which includes a combination of 
formidable land features.  The offensive started from Ledo, where upper lowlands are dominated 
by tropical rainforest.  Trees, some twenty feet in diameter and rising up to one hundred feet, 
form a dense canopy of foliage and produce a dank, gloomy underworld.  Very little underbrush 
exists, but a three- to four-foot deep mat of moldy, rotting vegetation lines the forest floor and 
impedes movement.  Innumerable rivers and streams etch the landscape, forming lowland jungle.  
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The river valleys are riddled with dense brush, walls of vines, and bamboo thickets, and are 
scattered throughout mountains ranging from 4,000 to 10,000 feet.  
Humidity in Burma is always high, but marked wet and dry seasons occur.  January 
through April is the dry season.  May through September is the wet season, with yearly rainfall 
totals reaching 250 inches.  Temperatures are hot during the dry season and average 90 to 100 
degrees in the lowlands.  Temperatures drop dramatically as altitude increases. There were 
numerous cases of men passing out from heat exhaustion in the river valleys but waking up the 
next morning with frozen canteen water after mountain climbs.
54
   
Disease was rampant in the diverse, jungle environment.  Malaria and dysentery were 
widespread and nearly all of Merrill’s Marauders suffered from at least one of these illnesses at 
some point.  Typhus was another disease that afflicted Army ranks in Burma.  Immunization 
against the various strains of typhus was ineffective, and American casualties to scrub typhus 
were high.
55
  
The inhospitable environment of Burma also lacked roads, and thus pack animals were 
required to move supplies.  The absence of a transportation network, combined with the nature of 
long range penetration group operations, meant that the only method of re-supply was by air.  
The complicated task of re-supplying armies by air was never mastered by the Japanese.  The 
Americans, on the other hand, successfully incorporated two very diverse modes of 
transportation, aircraft and mules, to keep ground forces supplied and mobile.  No Marauder or 
Mars man would claim that he was lavished with supplies, and he would vehemently disagree 
that the Americans beat the Japanese with “brute force” or smothered them with material.  
                                                 
 
54
 U.S. Army, Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, 
War Department, 1945) CMH Pub 100-4, 16-21, hereafter cited as U.S. Army, Merrill’s Marauders; also available 
at http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/marauders/marauders-fw.htm .   
 
55
 Ibid., 22. 
222 
 
Instead, it was innovative thinking in the realm of logistics that yielded battlefield success 
against an arguably martially superior foe.  The skill and talent with which to apply brute force 
was equally as important as the firepower itself.  One example of this talent was developing air 
power and obtaining complete air supremacy over Burma, which kept American forces supplied 
and able to defeat the Japanese.  
Re-supply by air required the utmost planning.  Packing, loading, and unloading supplies 
involved great skill and cooperation to ensure the last links in the supply chain did not break.  
Supplies were ready at all times, and reliable communication between combat and supply troops 
was imperative.  The lifeline was radios, some of which weighed over 100 pounds and were 
packed by mule.  Radio communication worked remarkably well, and requests went directly to 
supply depots adjacent to airfields at Dinjan, thirty-two miles west of Ledo.   
Major Edward T. Hancock, the Marauder’s supply officer at Dinjan, commanded 250 
enlisted Marauders essentially serving as air transportation and flight crews. Their duties 
included cargo packers, riggers, and container droppers. Once requests arrived, a flurry of 
activity occurred as crews loaded planes from pre-packed supplies.  Planes arrived over the drop 
zone as pilots of the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Troop Carrier Squadron maneuvered at dangerously low levels to 
improve accuracy.  Marauder flight crews frantically pushed, shoved, or kicked containers out to 
anxious comrades below.  Food, medicine and ammunition containers dropped from around 200 
feet.  Clothes and grain free fell from around 150 feet.  Collecting containers was haphazard at 
first.  Mule packers placed some containers on mules and moved them while other troops 
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manhandled the cargo to collection areas. The infantry formed an assembly line of sorts and 
mule packers attempted to distribute supplies.
56
   
Suitable drop areas were difficult to locate.  Flat ground was preferred but scarce in a 
land of hills and mountains.  Close proximity to bivouac areas was optimal, reducing the distance 
and effort of the men and mules to move supplies.  Heavy foliage easily obscured drop zones 
from the air, and even the best efforts to mark a landing area with smoke occasionally went 
unseen.  Parachutes hung in tree-tops, slowing the recovery process if not losing the precious 
cargo outright.   
Maintaining stealth was nearly impossible and the group’s position hardly remained a 
secret during an air drop.  If Japanese forces were within range, drop zones quickly became 
favorite targets for enemy gunners.  According to Harold Burnside, when the Japanese had the 
drop area zeroed in, “it was the one time we didn’t mind letting the Chinese rush the drop zone, 
so the Jap mortars got them instead of us.”  Drop-time was particularly stressful and a sense of 
urgency built with the first noise of approaching planes.
57
 
The air re-supply process quickly evolved and became more efficient.  The first air drops 
were a mad scramble to recover supplies.  Everyone picked up any container available, 
accumulated the contents, and parceled out items on a first-come, first-serve basis.  More 
efficient steps were adopted after a few drops, including better organization and distribution. All 
troops continued helping with the collection process, but pack masters oversaw the removal and 
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loading of containers from the drop zone and they allocated the contents among the troops.  
Troops received ammunition and rations wrapped in a small burlap bag, including food, salt, 
halazone tablets for water purification, and cigarettes.
58
  
Another improvement included the use of colored chutes to indicate the contents of each 
container.  Air transport crews color coded chutes at supply bases to expedite retrieval in the 
field, such as red or pink chutes for ammunition containers or white chutes for food containers. 
The heavy weapons platoon needing machine gun or mortar rounds focused on gathering 
containers with red chutes, while medics gathered containers attached to white chutes. Color 
coding supply chutes by air transport crews was time-consuming, but it expedited supply 
distribution by ground troops.
59
 
The free drop of grain also improved.  Early air drops of mule feed used unlabelled bags.  
Some bags contained pure oats, while some bags contained other ingredients, such as molasses, 
barley, and legumes.  Pack troops blended the contents of both bags and produced the mule’s 
grain ration in the field.  Troops often gathered multiple bags of the same ingredient.  When the 
troops stopped to mix the animal feed, some troops only had oats while others only had grain, 
and neither could be fed by itself without making the animal sick.  Labeling the bags solved this 
problem.  Eventually, the grain was premixed, thus saving time for troops in the field and 
ensuring a better ration for the mules.   
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Early air drops of animal feed used 100 pound bags.  The bags, filled to capacity, usually 
burst when free dropped to the ground, wasting time, effort, and grain as troops scooped up the 
scattered contents.  Air transport crews replaced the one hundred pound bags with fifty-pound, 
double-burlap bags and made sure to not over-fill the bags.  The fifty-pound bags did not burst 
but were heavy.  Feed mules carried three to four bags, and the contents were subsequently 
distributed by pack masters to individual packers and their mules.  The most efficient method of 
grain delivery appeared toward the end of the campaign.  A Mars Task Force member recalled,  
Instead of a 100-pound bag packed full of loose grain, we used a 100-pound bag 
filled with ten, smaller, ten-pound bags. The big bag burst when it hit and all the smaller 
bags scattered on the ground. We could pick them up easy enough and load them onto the 
mule packs.
60
 
One hundred pound bags of free-falling grain made drop zones hazardous.  Several troops were 
injured, and some killed.  According to a Marauder, “They would free-fall double bags of feed.  I 
watched this Chinaman get killed when he got hit by one….”61 Colonel Charles Hunter, the 
second in command of Operation Galahad, observed: 
I headed to the drop zone to observe the drop already in progress.  As I 
approached the open area, there…was a lone Chinese soldier.  I was informed that the 
dead soldier was Colonel Huang’s orderly.  In spite of strict orders to the contrary.., 
Colonel Huang’s orderly had rushed on to the drop zone while grain was being free 
dropped and had been hit squarely on the head. The impact had broken his neck.
62
   
The organized chaos of drop zones and re-supply affected mule behavior.  According to Paul 
Yardley, 
The story went that when General Wingate first took a group of mules into the 
jungle the mules got to braying when the drops happened because they figured out food 
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was coming.  He ordered the mules to get their (vocal) chords cut.  I don’t know if that’s 
true, but my mule couldn’t bray.63 
Mules were occasionally debrayed in order to avoid giving away LRPG positions during covert 
operations.  Veterinarians perfected a surgical procedure in which the mule’s vocal cords were 
cut.  The process required about ten days of recuperation, and the animal made a loud rasping 
sound instead of the noisy bray associated with Equus asinus.  The debraying of mules seemed to 
be more common with the British, though American troops reported that many mules were 
devocalized.  The exact number of debrayed Army mules is unknown.  Colonel Hunter never 
recalled any mules braying, not from any surgery, but rather “we managed to keep our mules too 
tired to bray.”  Buck Cureton recalled a case where a loaded mule fell off a cliff.  The 
veterinarian climbed down and examined the mule, which had suffered no broken bones.  The 
mule was unloaded, pulled up to the trail, and then: 
 The mule ran over to a clearing and started braying. I guess he was scared to 
death.  A big mule standing next to the one making the racket kicked him in the head, and 
that calmed him down.  
Still other troops, such as Fred Randle, distinctly recalled their mules making an “awful hissing 
noise,” and “unable to make a noise like all of the mules I’d been around.”  Randle poignantly 
noted that when his mule died falling off a cliff, “he couldn’t even bray.”64 
 One of the hazards of LRPG operations was an inability to evacuate casualties.  Men and 
mules performed medical evacuation in Italy, where wounded men were transported to the jeep 
or truck head, and then usually driven by medical personnel to an aid station.  No such luxuries 
were afforded in Burma, because troops operated in roadless areas miles behind enemy lines.  
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Occasionally, stretcher-bearers carried wounded to base camps, but distances were usually too 
great.  Likewise, the combat group could not spare any hands to transport the wounded.  Early in 
the North Burma campaign, officers ordered wounded Marauders to remain with Kachins or 
other sympathetic natives in the hope that they would be rescued later.  Some abandoned 
casualties survived, but the Japanese captured some.  Caring for American wounded sparked a 
revolution in Army medical evacuation over the jungles and mountains of Burma.
65
   
 Forward observers with artillery units performed aerial reconnaissance from small liaison 
planes.  These tiny planes occasionally landed in the most challenging places for direct 
communication with infantry units.  According to Hank Kinder, “The L-4 would land on 
sandbars or anywhere they could take off again.”   Long range penetration groups discovered the 
planes had the capacity to carry one passenger, allowing for the air evacuation of wounded.  The 
occasional landing of observation aircraft became routine as casualties increased.  Medical 
corpsmen treated the wounded in the field and then saw to them being flown back to evacuation 
hospitals or larger rear area bases.
66
   
 Air evacuation of wounded required great effort.  According to Hank Kinder, 
We found a paddy field where we made a runway for our planes.  We had to make 
a larger runway, so we had to blast out trees and then smooth out the ground.  This was at 
Walawbum.  The field was not a quarter of a mile from the fighting. One L-4 came in for 
a landing, nosedived, and broke the prop.  The next pilot arrived with a new prop, and 
then when taking out a wounded soldier, they crashed and broke another prop.  We had to 
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move out then and they left a few men to guard the field while they removed the 
wounded.  
Air evacuation was obviously not always successful, but the practice evolved and was integrated 
into Army tactics, dramatically reducing casualties and increasing combat troop morale.
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 Galahad commenced in early February 1944 with the objective of capturing Myitkyina.  
American troops cleared the Japanese from Walawbum, Shaduzup, and Nhpum Ga. The 
Marauder’s Second Battalion suffered heavy casualties after Nhpum Ga, of which there were no 
Marauder replacements and the battalion required complete reorganization. The Marauder’s First 
and Third Battalions remained intact but General Stilwell ordered the reinforcement of their 
depleted ranks with Kachins and Chinese troops from the 30
th
 and 50
th
 Divisions.  On April 27 
the force was ordered by General Merrill to move on Myitkyina.
68
  
 Reaching Myitkyina before the monsoon season was doubtful so to save time, General 
Stilwell ordered Galahad to turn east, cross the Kumon Range, and move on Myitkyina some 65 
miles away.  Traversing the Kumon Range was backbreaking, as the force climbed from around 
1,300 feet to over 6,000 feet in about one mile.  Troops struggling up the mountainside 
frequently grabbed a passing mule by the tail for assistance, which was against regulations and 
simply unadvisable.  “My mule was a kicker,” noted Hank Kinder, “nobody hung on his tail.”  
Nevertheless, exhausted men attempted to find any help while struggling over the mountains.
69
  
 The monsoons started early, making efforts at crossing the Kumon Range all the more 
difficult.  Flights were grounded and the Marauders missed air drops due to foul weather. Even 
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with clear skies, the steep terrain complicated air drops.  Many containers rolled down the 
mountain or over the cliff.  Mud and terrain caused the generally sure-footed mules to slip, and 
the toll on pack animals grew heavy.  Pack troops unloaded the mules, and then they pushed and 
pulled their animals while the cargo was hand-carried by the troops.  The Marauders frequently 
carved steps into the hillside to give men and mules better footing.  
 Climbing up the Kumon Range sapped the strength from Galahad, and going downhill 
was just as treacherous.  Casualties mounted from sliding or falling off of the nearly invisible, 
muddy trails.  Mules often survived a fall off of cliffs, and a tedious rescue process ensued.  
Muleskinners climbed down to the bottom and unloaded the mule.  All hands available then led, 
drug, or hoisted the mule back to the trail.   Many mules died from the fall. Fred Randle noted:  
We were climbing up a steep slope, pouring rain, and slipping in the mud.  Jude 
and another mule began to sliding and went over, into the jungle down below.  He 
couldn’t even bray, just off the cliff and out of sight.70 
Randle’s mule was too far down to check for injuries or recover the supplies.  The true worth of 
pack animals were felt when each one died.  Pack masters redistributed supply loads, but 
eventually the loads could not be shared and pack troops abandoned every item that was not 
absolutely essential. The ability to transport supplies diminished with each mule loss, and as with 
losses of men, there were no replacements.  Galahad faced a crisis not from the Japanese 
military as much as the erosion of transportation capabilities.   
 Struggling over the Kumon Range during the monsoon produced new necessities, which 
were met with typical American creativity.  According to Hank Kinder: 
We left Nhpum Ga and headed over to Myitkyina when monsoons started.  Mud 
was everywhere and you couldn’t get any traction.  I remembered from working on 
Granddad’s farm and from some Amish, in the winter we’d put cork (cleats) on the 
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mules’ shoes so they wouldn’t slip on the ice.  I thought it would work here (Burma) with 
the mud, so I decided one night to make corks for my mule’s shoes. On the farm you 
could bend the end of the shoe down and there was a hole in the end of the shoe. We 
would screw in a metal cork, looked like a Christmas tree, into the hole, pointed down so 
it would grab into the ice.  Well, there were no holes in these shoes, but you could bend 
the end down, there wasn’t much temper so they were easy to bend. You could make a 
cork or cleat with just about ½ inch or less of an overhang; just bend the ends down even 
5/8 of an inch and it gave traction.  They weren’t sharp like the Christmas trees; they 
were blunt, but worked alright.  My buddy, the blacksmith, asked what I was doing and 
after I told him he said, “You can’t do that, you don’t have permission.”  I told him 
they’ll never notice.  Well, the next morning the vet captain was at the top of a steep hill 
and asked, “How is that mule doing with those cleats, private?”  I told him, “He’s fine, 
sir!”  We laid over two days and put cork on the shoes, and re-shoed about 200 mules.  
My buddy the blacksmith swore he’d get even with me. I always thought I should get a 
rating for that idea because within a few weeks all battalions had put corks on their 
mules’ shoes.  They just got around a lot better after putting on those corks.71  
 
Rain was constant and, as one Marauder recalled, it was “like being under a fire hose at 
times.”  It was also unbearably hot, and troops discarded accouterments when the operation 
began.  Now, heavy rains water logged the remaining articles, such as bedrolls or extra clothes, 
and these were left on the trail.  Officers and pack masters discarded some supplies under orders, 
but troops often lightened their loads against Army regulations. A typical GI in CBI reduced 
their load to a personal weapon, ammunition, food, and two ponchos—one for lying on the wet 
ground and one for cover.  Mule packers had a slight advantage when bivouacking in rainy 
weather.  As Hank Kinder observed, “Most guys that packed mules put their head under the 
saddle to keep your head dry, but those saddles smelled so bad it was hard to take.”72  
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After scaling the Kumon Range, Galahad began their descent toward Myitkyina in early 
May 1944.  American and Chinese troops cleared the Japanese from Ritpong on May 9 after five 
days of brisk fighting.  On May 11, Galahad split up into H Force (Colonel Charles N. Hunter) 
and K Force (Colonel Henry L. Kinnison), with H Force moving on toward Myitkyina and K 
Force moving toward Tingkrukawng. K Force would divert the Japanese at Tingkrukawng from 
H Force closing on Myitkyina.  The American combat teams and their Chinese counterparts 
battled the Japanese at Tingkrukawng for two days.  The weather was some of the hottest yet 
experienced and terrain was so rugged that Colonel Kinnison ordered the mules and heavy 
weapons temporarily abandoned during the last assault on Tingkrukawng.  K Force was stopped 
and retreated late in the day on May 13, but the diversion succeeded as H Force moved 
undetected toward Myitkyina.
73
    
Finally, on May 17, the disease-ridden, malnourished, physically exhausted Marauders 
and Chinese troops captured the Japanese airfield at Myitkyina.  Generals Stilwell proclaimed 
victory, but this proved premature since Japanese forces remained in the town of Myitkyina.  
Chinese efforts to take the town were repulsed by the Japanese, who launched a counter attack 
against the airbase.  A desperate struggle for the airfield followed, but the Americans and 
Chinese held.  In early June, supplies and some 2,600 American replacements arrived via the 
airfield.  The replacements joined the few remaining Marauder veterans to form New Galahad.  
A two-month siege ensued, with the American-Chinese forces occupying the airfield and the 
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Japanese controlling the town.  Finally, members of New Galahad and a large force from the 
Chinese 50
th
 Division expelled the Japanese from Myitkyina on August 3, 1944.
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Replacements for Galahad arrived shortly after the Marauders and Chinese captured 
Myitkyina airfield.  Initially called New Galahad, the replacements eventually formed the Mars 
Task Force.  The Mars Task Force was much better prepared and equipped for a long range 
penetration operation than their Galahad predecessors.  The approximately 7,000 men and 3,000 
mules were obviously a larger force, and operated with the added benefit of applying lessons 
learned during Operation Galahad.  Mars Task Force also integrated some of the surviving 
members of Galahad into the new operation.   
 Hank Kinder, a Marauder, was hospitalized after the battle for Myitkyina.  He was 
informed that a new group was about to embark on a mission to China.  As Kinder recalled, “I 
was always interested in China from looking at pictures in my school books.”  Kinder asked the 
doctor for a release from the hospital.  The doctor questioned Kinder’s sense, “You’ve spent the 
last six months sleeping on wet ground.  Why do you want to give up clean sheets and good 
chow?”  Kinder replied, “I’ve always wanted to go to China, and they can use me with the 
mules.”  Hank Kinder received his discharge card, and was one of a few hundred Marauders that 
accompanied the Mars men for part two of the North Burma campaign.
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 The goal of Mars Task Force was to push eastward to the Burma Road.  American troops 
left Myitkyina on December 16, 1944 headed to Bhamo.  The Ledo Road (at times merely a trail) 
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led to Tonkwa, where the Mars Task Force was to rally.  The road march was hot, dry, and dusty.  
As a Mars man noted, “No climbing was required during this first stage, nothing but a dogged 
plodding through the dust and heat.”76  On December 31, 1944 Mars moved out of Tonkwa and 
immediately encountered treacherous terrain.  According to John Randolph, “Our first day’s 
march into the mountains took us from the road at a 456-foot level to a mountaintop 4,600 feet 
high.  March schedules changed many times during the day.”  Typical march routine was fifty 
minutes of walking followed by a 10-minute break, but Mars men quickly adjusted to a “ten and 
ten” march schedule.  A few days off of the road found the Mars Task Force nearing the Schweli 
River and terrain so exhausting that only one or two minutes of moving were followed by a five 
minute rest.
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 Ascending mountains was fraught with difficulty.  The popular image of the war in 
Burma features steaming jungles. Yet, as a unit history noted, “Elevations as great as 8,000 feet 
were surmounted.  On three successive days of fair weather, water froze in canteens and 
helmets.”  Clouds also formed as troops ascended the mountains and elevation increased.  
Visibility was obscured, further complicating tricky air drops.  On more than one occasion air 
drops were impossible due to stormy weather and negative visibility.
78
  
 On January 6, 1945 the Mars Task Force descended on the Schweli River.  Bundles of 
bamboo pontoons and decking were used to cross the 400 foot wide river.  The Task Force was 
prepared to cross when the “Christmas monsoons” began.  Three days of torrential rain turned 
the fine red clay into a slippery sea of mud, making it difficult for men and mules to keep their 
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footing, and flooding the Schweli River.  The bamboo bridge was unstable and required repairs.  
All mules were unloaded, led individually over the bridge, and repacked by muleskinners once 
across, which was time-consuming and exhausting.
79
   
 Standard operating procedure required the Task Force to move out early in the morning.  
Men and mules moved before the heat of the day, rested in the early afternoon, and then 
resuming the march until early evening.  Mules needed time for grazing, watering, and 
grooming.  Routine schedules were impossible to keep, however, and marches easily lasted into 
the dark, which came quite early due to dense jungle foliage.  According to John Randolph:  
I’ve seen the end of march serials pull into bivouac areas after dark, a good twelve 
hours of ups and downs behind them, having had a half hour halt for a cold lunch of C or 
K rations.  The mules had carried their loads the entire time, perhaps without water since 
early morning and without promise of anything green that evening.  
 
It was usually too late to build fires for a hot meal or bathe in nearby streams.   According to 
Randolph, the only consolation for the pack troops was, “We were too tired to care, and we did 
not need a bath or a hot meal to make us sleep.”80 
 The typical pack troop’s day did not end after reaching camp, rather, they tended to the 
mules and then cared for themselves.
81
  Likewise, pack troops attached to long range penetration 
groups were frequently in harm’s way, fighting and engaging the enemy.  Each packer qualified 
with a weapon during training and often went to great risk delivering supplies to frontline troops, 
though there really was no front or rear echelon on most LRPG operations.  All pack troops 
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participating in Galahad and the Mars Task Force received the combat infantry badge following 
the campaign.  As Hank Kinder recalled: 
We set up a roadblock in what we called a wagon wheel.   The outer wheel or rim 
was guys on guard duty around the perimeter, then machine guns and mortars a little 
further in, and last you had the hub or inner circle.  Here was the officers, radios, medics, 
packers, and mules.  We’d place ammo dumps around the hub, and we’d run ammo up to 
the machine guns or rim.  I took a case of machine gun ammo one time, rounds going 
right over my head as I got close to the rim, so I laid down, dragging my rifle in one hand 
and pulling the ammo crate by the rope handles, but I wasn’t making no time, so I pulled 
the rope out, and eventually pulled the ammo crate up to the rim.  The gunner yelled, 
“You’re just in time, we’re damn near out!”  Daylight came and I was about to eat my 
breakfast. Fire broke out again…and all hell broke loose, and I carried ammo ‘til about 
four that afternoon.  I ate breakfast, lunch, and dinner all at once.
82
 
 
 Troops under constant physical and mental strain became exhausted and were often too 
spent to function.  For example, the Mars Task Force pushed hard to reach the Burma Road and 
interdict Japanese supply lines.  Pete Ewing accompanied one of the first American units to cut 
the Burma Road.  Ewing recounted:  
We marched twenty seven hours continuously. Take a ten minute break, move 
another hour, and then a ten minute break, and that’s the way we came.  We got there 
about three in the morning, and as daylight came we went across this valley, took a hill 
and there was a little creek there called the Ho-say (Hosi) Valley, and this was the drop 
field.  At daylight those C-46s just poured in, kicking out the stuff.  Us muleskinners had 
to go haul that stuff.  We worked all day, after a twenty seven hour march. Well, we were 
exhausted, running up and down that mountain.  Dark came and we couldn’t go back 
down to the drop field, so I jerked the saddles off, each one of us had three mules, so I 
jerked the saddles off and throwed them old sweaty blankets underneath, and I crawled 
under there and went to sleep.  That night they had a banzai attack and I didn’t even 
know what happened.  Next morning I woke up and they told me “You’ve gotta go down 
there and help I Company remove mules that got blowed up in the banzai attack. They 
killed twenty mules, so we went down and dragged those twenty mules over to a ditch 
like and buried them right there. I didn’t even know it happened.83  
 
Another muleskinner recounted a similar incident.  According to Lloyd Hackenberg, 
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A lot of the time we were too tired to dig foxholes.  I usually slept under the 
saddles.  We got mortared one night and I got under the saddles, they were big and heavy 
and gave you pretty good protection unless you got a direct hit.  Those rounds went off 
close but I was pretty safe.
84
 
Tired men and tired mules sparked non-regulation practices.  Pete Ewing recalled, 
Every morning, my mule, Pat, was raring to go, she’d even step on my heels. But 
by noon her head would be dropped down about normal, and as the day wore on she’d 
hang her head way down; and when she got into this position I let my pack lay right on 
top of her head, and she’d push me.  And of course we all used their tails to pull us up a 
hill.
85
 
Tail pulling was frowned upon, but common, even among officers.  Buck Cureton recalled,  
A new lieutenant was ordering us to stop holding on to the mules’ tails.  We were 
crawling up a mountain a day or so later, and I saw the same lieutenant getting pulled up 
the mountain, holding on the tail.
86
 
The Mars Task Force reached their objective, cutting the Burma Road in early February 1945.  
The Japanese retreated after an intense counter-attack.  By the end of February the men and 
mules of Mars were recuperating and waiting for reassignment. The Mars mules losses were less 
than ten percent, so mules were plentiful for another mission.  One reason for the low pack mule 
loss rate was mule characteristics.  Horses, for their fine tradition in cavalry operations, are 
inferior to mule in pack operations.  Hank Kinder observed, “A shell could explode right next to 
you and they’d never move.  If we’d had horses, we’d have spent all our time trying to catch 
them.”  Mules were easier to handle. According to Pete Ewing, “Mules were so herd-bound that 
they weren’t about to run off…we’d turn twenty five loose and picket twenty five, and they all 
stayed close.”  Mules also provided more than transportation of supplies.  “We used them like 
watchdogs,” recalled Ewing.  “When they were grazing they’d …make some noise, but the 
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moment they got still, you better get ready because you got company.”  Lloyd Hackenberg 
recalled,  
Mule’s ears were like radar.  One time, the big red mule that was visiting us 
started turning in circles and snorting, and the advisor said “That mule’s heard 
something” and told us if the mule hits the ground, then we do the same thing and keep 
an eye on it until it acts normal.  The mule hit the ground about the time we heard an 
artillery piece sound off in the distance.  The mule raised its head up and those big ears 
started turning like a radar antenna, and then it flattened out with its head laying on the 
ground. We all hit the ground and an artillery shell hit about twenty five or thirty yards 
away.  Dynamite (Hackenberg’s mule) raised its head and began turning those ears and 
laid that head back down, and another shell hit a little closer than the first one.  The Japs 
threw one more shell and quit a while, and Dynamite got up and began grazing again.  
None of us got hit that day.
87
  
 
 Another reason for lower pack mule casualties was a greater appreciation by the troops 
for the vital service that animals provided.  True, mule stubbornness did little to ingratiate the 
beasts with many GIs. Nonetheless, great pains were often taken by muleskinners and regular 
troops to protect the animals and their cargo.  A Mars man noted that after a 36-hour forced 
march “the mules got so tired they was tryin’ to sit down.” A number of mules slipped and “we 
had one, our number two mule, he fell over, he must’ve rolled a quarter of a mile.”  The troops 
stoically moved through the darkness, down the mountain, and “we had to unload the gun, the 
tube off of it.  Unload the saddle, carry them up, and lead the mule back up.”88  Another Mars 
man recalled a similar incident, 
We had two of ‘em to fall down over the side of the mountain.  Oh God, I don’t 
know how far it was down there.  We was up above the clouds and they rolled over the 
side and went to the bottom….  They just rolled over that cliff and we went down there 
and unpacked ‘em and brought ‘em back up the hill.89   
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Exhausted troops diligently recovered lost pack animals because without the mules, the last link 
in the supply chain was broken.     
The Mars Task Force spent March and April 1945 in bivouac near Myitkyina.  Most of 
the Mars men assumed non-combat duties as Japanese resistance subsided.  According to Buck 
Cureton, “We gave our mules to the Chinese, and I started driving trucks.  I was in a truck at the 
junction of the Burma and Ledo Roads when I heard the war ended.”90  Pete Ewing shared a 
similar experience.  According to Ewing, 
The Chinese wouldn’t let us fight as infantry on Chinese soil.  I thought that was 
the greatest idea in the world!  So, they made us into a trucking company.  In my 
company there was only six of us out of two hundred men who knew how to drive a 6-by 
truck, so as soon as they found out you knew how, you were made an instructor.  These 
guys that lived in the big cities or always rode a streetcar or taxi or whatever didn’t drive, 
they didn’t know how to drive, didn’t even know how to shift gears.  And so we trained 
them guys, and took off on a convoy seven hundred miles into China, down an old gravel 
road [the Old Burma Road] with one lane and twenty-one switch backs in one spot.
91
  
 
Because of improved terrain and the semblance of a road, the Army (and GIs) rapidly 
transitioned to motorized and mechanized transportation of supplies. 
In late April 1945, orders circulated that all mules in Burma and India would transfer to 
China.  The Mars mules included nearly 3,000 mules, and around 4,000 Chinese Army in India 
(CAI) mules.  The six Quartermaster Pack Troops attached to the Mars Task Force assisted with 
the mule transfer to China. A total of approximately 4,000 men participated in the final phase of 
the campaign.
92
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The logistical planning and quantity of supplies required to move the pack animal 
transport were staggering.  To travel the relatively short distance of 85 miles from Lashio to 
Wanting, China, the Army estimated, would consume some 400 tons of grain and forage and 128 
tons of “subsistence, etc. for personnel.”  The nearly 600-mile journey from Wanting to 
Kunming, China, would consume 3,000 tons of grain and forage for the mules and 800 tons of 
supplies for the men.  In the end, around half of the mules flew to China, while the other half 
were road-marched.
93
 
The movement of 900 Mars artillery mules from Burma to China was well documented 
by Captain John A. Rand, the field artillery officer in charge of the last operation.  Rand divided 
the 900 mules into three 300-mule serials that travelled a day apart.  The mules were only 
partially shod and hurriedly prepared when the first serial of fully-loaded mules departed 
Myitkyina, Burma on 26 May 1945 in the pouring rain.  The serials crossed the flooding 
Irrawaddy River on improvised ferries.  Army engineers took six flat-bottomed boats equipped 
with outboard motors, lashed the boats together, attached some decking, and carefully moved ten 
to twelve mules at a time across the swollen river. No mules were lost during the river crossing.
94
 
Hardship was common even though combat operations were virtually over in this theater.  
Pouring rain and slippery ground created poor footing for men and mules.  The rain and 
dampness was inescapable, and it was often too wet to build a fire to cook or boil water.  
Portable forges brought by AVS troops to produce mule shoes were useless in the wet 
conditions, and farriers seldom caught up with the demand for new shoes.  Weather dried 
considerably when the serials entered China on 2 June 1945 at an elevation of some 12,000 feet.  
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Fresh water and good grazing were sparse on the leeward side of the Himalayas, and advance 
parties of AVS personnel often found the best grass in unkempt graveyards.  No combat was 
experienced, but excessive work and inadequate feeding caused rapid deterioration in the mules’ 
condition.  The rate of march decreased and the first serial arrived on the outskirts of Kunming, 
China, sixty-four days after departing Myitkyina.  The two other serials stopped at various 
intervals on the road to Kunming. Only 27 mules were lost by “death or humane destruction” 
during the march from Burma to China.
95
   
Unfortunately, the greatest number of mule casualties occurred after their arrival in 
China.  The Army planned from the beginning to declare the mules surplus and give them to the 
Chinese Nationalist forces.  Returning the Army mules to America was not an option, at least not 
one given serious consideration, because of cost.  An American characteristic has been to spare 
no expense during the conflict, but cost-saving measures often govern decisions as conflicts 
wane. Captain Rand summed up Army investment and cost considerations of mules in China at 
war’s end:  
Our nine hundred mules may have been one of the most precious herds in history, 
for each represented an outlay by the United States of perhaps three thousand dollars, for 
purchase, transport, training, feeding, and care, but, looking at them another way,…they 
were worth nothing at all, for they had been classified in Burma as expendable and it was 
only by chance that they hadn’t been expended.96 
The most efficient, expeditious decision was to leave the mules with America’s Chinese 
ally.  However, China was in chaos, teetering on the brink of civil war as the war with Japan 
ended.  The United States was growing disenchanted with the Chinese Nationalists, and typically 
impatient Americans wanted their Army of citizen-soldiers to return home as soon as possible.  
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The welfare of several thousand Army mules was not a priority, and the venerable mules paid 
dearly. 
The movement of mules to China slowed in late July 1945 following a communication 
and transportation breakdown between the Chinese and American armies.  In early August, a 
disease struck some of the mules within the serials, and all delivery of Army mules to the 
Chinese halted.  According to Captain Rand, 
Surra, a communicable blood disease, broke out in the mules.  Veterinarian 
 personnel collaborated in a program of testing and isolation and it was hoped that a new 
 drug, being developed in the United States, could be procured.  At this point the war 
 ended and the problem became one of disposition of the animals to Chinese SOS 
 (Services of Supply).  The decision was made about 1 September to destroy all positive 
 animals and this was accomplished immediately.  Those 1
st
 serial animals showing a 
 negative test were distributed to Chinese Pack Artillery Battalions….  About 6 
 September, on the advice of competent Veterinary Officers, the Commanding 
 General…decided the remaining animals of the 2nd and 3rd serials should be destroyed.  
 This was a wise decision.  It undoubtedly prevented the spread of the disease, and 
 consequently all sorts of complications with China.  
In a little known yet controversial decision, around one thousand of the mules were 
unceremoniously shot.  Their carcasses were then pushed into ravines, where engineers and 
grief-stricken muleskinners dynamited the hillside to bury the dead.
97
  
 Approximately 2,000 mules were destroyed at the end of the CBI campaign, though the 
exact number is unknown.  Likewise, the reason behind the decision is debatable.  The Army 
argument that it wanted to prevent the spread of disease was plausible.  Surra, however, is a 
vector-borne disease, which means it is spread by infected insects (e.g. flies or mosquitoes) 
biting an uninfected mule.  It is not air-borne, thus it is far less communicable than the Army 
feared.  Also, many of the native animals appeared to have immunity to the disease.  Surra was 
                                                 
 
97
 Rand, Report on Animal Movement. According to eyewitnesses, the dust had not settled from the blasts 
when Chinese peasants began frantically digging up the carcasses for the meat. 
242 
 
not imported to China by American mules, so the argument that American mules were shot to 
prevent an outbreak among Chinese animals is not particularly credible.
98
  
 A more humane reason was to spare the animals suffering, though the argument is 
paradoxical.  The image of a GI about to apply the coup d’ grace to his mule with a sidearm is 
hardly humane. Yet, as Captain Rand concluded, “It is my belief that compassionate 
veterinarians and affectionate mulemen believed the better fate for their mules was a bullet than 
to face a future of cruelty, disease, and starvation….”  Americans, such as Loyd Hackenberg, 
were suspicious of leaving their animals in the hands of the Chinese. According to Hackenberg, 
“This Chinaman tried to take Dynamite, and I drew down on him.  I found out they was going to 
eat him, and I wasn’t going to have it.”  After discussing the animal’s fate with his commanding 
officer, Hackenberg tearfully shot his mule.  Captain Rand observed, “Our mules were not made 
for Chinese life.  Forcing them to fit into it, we believed, might be worse than a humane death.”99  
 A more dispassionate explanation for the “great mule shoot” was that it simply saved 
time and effort.  The war ended, and the Army no longer needed the service of several thousand 
mules.  American hopes that China would be a strong ally proved false, and Army decisions to 
leave any surplus material with the Jiang Jieshi government were re-evaluated.  It was simply 
cheaper to dispose of the mules than leave them in China or return them to the United States.  
The sad ending of Army mules in CBI is indicative of other cultural traits, including chronic 
impatience and a penchant for wastefulness.  Americans spare no expense during a crisis, but 
once the crisis has passed, they revert to doing things quickly and on the cheap.  The disposal of 
mules in CBI at the end of World War II does not represent Army adaptability or the importance 
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of logistics, transportation, and supply. However, the humble end for several thousand mules in 
China during 1945 illustrates the underlying theme of this work, which is the influence of 
historical traditions on how America waged World War II.   
 Several thousand Army mules survived the war in CBI, and their liquidation and disposal 
soon followed the war’s end. Parameters for the sale of surplus animals were established, 
including orders that “no horse will be sold for more the $52.81” and “no mule will be sold for 
more than $250.00.”  All sales “must be in cash, paid in Indian rupees prior to delivery...,” and 
the “Government has no responsibility for transportation.” 100  The Foreign Liquidation 
Commission processed some 3,000 horses and mules at the Shillong Remount Depot in Assam, 
India.  The animals were prepared for dispersal and moved via train in two large shipments from 
northern India to Calcutta.  The Foreign Liquidation Commission ordered the first group to East 
Europe, and the second shipment sailed for China and the Philippines.
101
  
 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNRRA) worked to transfer 
Army surplus mules to needy countries, though UNRAA efforts in China were not as successful 
as those in Europe.  UNRRA requested a shipment of 2,200 animals from India to Shanghai and 
arranged the use of two liberty ships for transportation, but finding enough Army personnel to 
handle the animals was a problem.  According to an UNRRA memo, “each shipload of 300 
animals required approximately thirty EM (enlisted men) animal handlers.”  Unfortunately, only 
seventy-four enlisted men remained in the various Remount Troops still in theater, and these 
men were rapidly accumulating enough points to go home.  Likewise, the movement of animals 
via train from Shillong to Calcutta took a minimum of four weeks, further complicating the 
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UNRRA timetable for trains, ships, men, and mules.  A flurry of memos, radio messages, and 
promises that handlers “would be sent home immediately after reaching their destination,” 
helped overcome the logistical barriers and deliver UNRRA mules to China.
102
 
 The Army kept meticulous records on animal transfer, use, and disposal during the CBI 
campaign.  Records are less precise during the immediate postwar period.  Several thousand 
mules became part of the Chinese Nationalist Army, thus accomplishing an original U.S. Army 
goal.  In an ironic twist, however, many of these Army mules were discovered by American 
troops when they deployed to South Korea some six to eight years later.  The Army had no 
contingencies for pack animal use in Korea and, in typical GI fashion, troops quickly adapted 
and requisitioned local animals for transportation purposes.  Many animals were captured by GIs 
from North Korean and Chinese forces and impressed into service by the Americans.  The 
Americans were surprised to discover that several animals had previously served in the U.S. 
Army.  Operating in the mountainous area between Seoul and the Imjin River, the First Cavalry 
redeployed a captured mule already bearing Preston Brand 08K0.  In all likelihood, the mule had 
been in Captain Rand’s first serial that survived the trek from Myitkyina to Kunming in 1945.103 
The campaign in CBI was stereotypically American.  GIs endured hardships and the 
Army spent untold resources to accomplish a mission.  The American effort even impressed the 
Japanese, who refused to believe the Americans had marched overland into China.  According to 
Pete Ewing,  
When we got to the Burma Road we took a couple of prisoners and the first 
question they asked was how did you parachute all them mules to the ground without 
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breaking their backs?  They thought that land was impenetrable, that it couldn’t be done 
by infantry. They thought we was paratroopers. 
104
 
 
The troops who fought and trekked nearly one thousand miles over the most treacherous terrain 
on earth quickly adjusted to non-combat duties and displayed a GI preoccupation with getting 
home.  In the rush to return home, any surplus, including several thousand Army mules, was 
unceremoniously abandoned as the Army rapidly adjusted to postwar conditions. The 
abandonment of several thousand Army mules in CBI was a gross waste but hardly surprising 
and transcended a simple c’est la guerre attitude by the Army. The mule’s demise followed an 
Army protocol consistent with America’s historical traditions. 
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Figure 8-1. Merrill's Marauders and mules cross one of the countless streams in North 
Burma. (U.S. Army Signal Corps, NARA). 
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Figure 8-2. Marauders and mules crossing the Irrawaddy River by pontoon ferry. (U.S. 
Army Signal Corps, NARA). 
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Figure 8-3. Loading mules onto C-47 planes for flight over the Himalaya "Hump." (U.S. 
Army Veterinary Service in World War II).  
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Figure 8-4. Mars Task Force and mules nearing the Burma Road, January 1945. (U.S. 
Army Signal Corps, NARA). 
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Conclusion: Constants, Regressive Adaptability, and the American 
Way of War 
 
 Flushed with victory, a stampede for demobilization swept the country in the late summer 
and autumn of 1945.  Like Cincinnatus, the American tradition of citizen-soldiers fueled one of 
the most rapid, widespread demobilization efforts in history.  As one veteran recounted,  
You know that famous picture of the guy kissing the girl?  Well it wasn’t like that 
for a lot of us. We were glad it was over, but there wasn’t much celebration.  It was over 
and that was that.  I was discharged from the Army in September of ‘45, and I was back 
by October driving a bread-truck.  
  
This telling statement reflects two components to the American way of war.  First, it reflects the 
dependence on citizen-soldiers instead of standing, professional armies.  Second, it demonstrates 
a certain level of impatience with war or the peace process that follows.  Approximately 
5,000,000 men deployed overseas between1942 and 1945, and were slated to return over 
fourteen months (roughly 360,000 men each month).  Every ocean-worthy vessel, from aircraft 
carriers, battleships, and cargo ships, to the Queen Mary, transported returning service personnel.  
The unplanned repatriation of several million Americans was another logistical headache, but the 
problem of moving millions of men was resolved.
1
   
Transporting and disposing of surplus material, however, was another matter.  One 
problem was the manpower shortage in the Service of Supply.  Soldiers accumulated credit, 
quantified as “points,” for length and nature of service.  Combat troops, suffering higher casualty 
rates, often earned fewer points for time served compared to service troops.  So, service troops 
were often discharged earlier, yet these were the personnel with expertise in handling and 
managing surplus supplies.   
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Another problem was deciding what was surplus, which could be liquidated, and what 
was necessary for the reduced, peacetime military.  The method of disposal for items declared 
surplus spawned additional headaches. Selling items at nominal costs could depress local 
markets, or black marketers could acquire them and make huge profits at the expense of the 
locals.  Likewise, sharp criticism incurred if material was destroyed or left to ruin.
2
 
Surplus Army animal disposal methods varied post bellum.  Early in the war, the Army 
implemented the Civil Affairs and Military Government (CA/MG) division of the War 
Department’s Special Staff. The Army Veterinary Service worked with the CA/MG in recently 
liberated areas, helping locals by providing rudimentary veterinary care to native livestock 
populations.  One of their post-war missions was the supervision of surplus animal disposition to 
organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
and various Marshall Plan rebuilding efforts.  The AVS set prices, instituted transportation and 
transfer protocols, and taught basic veterinary medicine to the new owners of Army surplus 
animals.  Animals in Europe and the MTO were sold at nominal fees by the Army and eventually 
by the State Department’s Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commission, or given away through 
various charitable organizations helping war refugees.  Animals serving in China were not as 
fortunate, since most were shot by Army troops or died shortly after being impressed into the 
Chinese Nationalist Army.
3
 
                                                 
 
2
 Ibid., 562, 564. 
 
 
3
 Miller, AVS in WWII, 441-442.  Some programs within the Marshall Plan included giving Army mules to 
war refugees in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia. The Surplus Property Act of 1944 governed 
property disposal until 1949. The disposal of surplus material became a source of contention between the War 
Department and State Department. Supervision of surplus disposal ultimately came under the Office of the Foreign 
Liquidation Commission: see Huston, 564-567. 
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Army interest in animal power waned immediately after V-E and V-J Day.  Animals 
were declared surplus, their disposition prompt and definitive as the Army made no serious 
contingencies for animal power. Some 2,500 surplus Army mules were transferred by the State 
Department from Italy to Greece when civil war erupted in 1946.  The State Department 
negotiated the transfer of an additional 10,000 mules from the USDA to Greece from 1947-1949.  
Shiploads of surplus war material, including several thousand mules, were also sent to Turkey in 
1949 as a cost effective implementation of Truman Doctrine promises “to support free 
peoples…resisting attempted subjugation…by outside pressures.”  The Army, however, made no 
efforts to keep a large contingent of pack animals, which proved problematic when direct 
American military intervention later occurred in areas where terrain necessitated animal 
transportation. 
4
  
 The deployment of pack troops to the inhospitable terrain of Korea, though logical, never 
occurred during America’s three-year involvement in the “police action.”  Belief in the 
superiority of motor transportation and faith in advancing technology, particularly the helicopter, 
rendered pack units obsolete.  Thus, trained pack units were unavailable for deployment to the 
frozen hills of Korea. The U.S. military was aware of the unique problems associated with 
fighting in the frigid mountains of the Korean peninsula.  The U.S. Marine Corps opened the 
Mountain Warfare Battalion in 1951 to prepare replacements bound for Korea. Yet, the art of 
pack transportation was not part of the Mountain Warfare curriculum.   
The Army’s failure to deploy trained pack units did not stop the use of animal 
transportation by GIs in Korea.  As a former Cavalry officer noted: 
In March 1951, north of Kumyanjung Ni, the famous Wolfhound Regiment had 
33 mules with one machine gun unit. There were many others in use in the same sector. 
                                                 
 
4
 Ibid., see also Essin, Shavetails and Bell Sharps, 194. 
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Troops were reluctant to give information as to where captured animals were located, or 
in what numbers, for fear they would be denied their use and they would be moved to 
another area. On the drive north from Seoul late in May, the 1st Cavalry Division moved 
the animals they had acquired earlier by trucks. (The QMC 6x6 truck is readily adaptable 
for this purpose and required no major change.) In the mountainous sector north of Seoul 
to the Imjin River, captured animals were used to pack in barbed wire, steel stakes, 
mines, etc.
5
  
     
The problem was not new.  Poor infrastructure and inhospitable terrain blocked supply lines, and 
the Table of Organization/Equipment (TO/E) provided no remedies.  Troops resolved the crisis 
by adapting supply transportation, which was hardly a novel concept. The answers found in 
scorched Tunisian wastes or parched Sicilian hills were rediscovered by GIs on frozen Korean 
mountainsides.  The U.S. military did not adjust by reducing the amount of supply and firepower 
utilized; and in this regard American forces employed characteristic ways of war, including 
excessive supply consumption and unfathomable quantities of firepower.  However, U.S. troops 
in Korea also applied another American characteristic by incorporating local, native stock into 
the transportation chain to ensure the delivery of supplies.   
 The Army discontinued pack animal units and programs four years after the cease fire in 
Korea.  The inauguration of the Special Forces and Special Warfare Center during the early 60s 
saw training for unconventional warfare earnestly pursued by the Army. Army preparations and 
prosecution of war in Vietnam demonstrated creativity, particularly in the application of 
advancing technology.  The reliance on advancing technology by American forces permeated the 
battlefield.  For example, combat transportation, fire support, and supply transport was moved 
almost exclusively by the ubiquitous helicopter.  Contingencies for animal power by the Army in 
                                                 
 
5
 Colonel R.E. Ireland quoted in Waller, 31. 
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Vietnam were never seriously considered because no breaks in the supply chain ever occurred 
where animal power was needed.
6
 
 Preparations for a showdown between NATO and Warsaw Pact members governed U.S. 
military strategy for two decades after Vietnam.  The Defense Department and various think-
tanks projected a short-lived conflict in which advanced technology and mass army maneuvers 
through the Fulda Gap and across the North German Plain would determine the outcome.  
Eclipsed in these plans were considerations of animal power by the Army.  The period was 
reminiscent of the Army’s “shifting gears” during the late 1930s, when the Army converted to 
motorization and mechanization.  Contemporary wisdom held that technology had advanced to a 
point where alternative methods of transportation were a waste of time and resources.  Military 
planners limited the question of animal transportation to scant studies analyzing unconventional 
wars on the periphery, such as the remote jungles of Latin America or the inhospitable Hindu 
Kush of Afghanistan. 
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.  Over the next nine years Russian and 
loyal Afghan forces waged a grueling campaign to return Afghanistan into the Soviet Union’s 
orbit.  Resistance to the Soviet and pro-Soviet Afghan government by the mujahideen, though 
fragmented, was widespread.  Support for the rebels grew from small amounts of humanitarian 
aid to sizable amounts of money and military hardware.  The mujahideen received large 
quantities of small arms, an untold number of technologically-advanced anti-aircraft Stinger 
missiles, and approximately 700 American mules upon which to haul the supplies.  Mujahideen 
resistance rose while Russian resolve fell.  The toll of a protracted campaign forced Soviet 
                                                 
 
6
 Essin, 196.  American military advisors to South Vietnam in 1959 used local animals for pack 
transportation, but these operations never advanced beyond experiments.  With the exception of canine units, U.S. 
forces in Vietnam were dependent on mechanized and motorized technology throughout the conflict.  
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withdrawal in 1989.  Afghanistan lapsed into civil war until the Taliban quelled the fighting 
through brutally repressive measures in 1996.  Taliban-supported allies, such as al-Queda, struck 
various Western targets during the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, including the 
spectacular attacks against the World Trade Centers and Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
7
   
The United States formally launched the War on Terror by deploying troops to 
Afghanistan in October 2001.  Arguably the most technologically advanced military ever to take 
the field, American forces deployed to one of the most inhospitable regions on earth and quickly 
realized the value of adaptability. The opening phases of Operation Enduring Freedom involved 
Special Forces riding horses and packing gear on mules and donkeys.  Animal power was not in 
the TO/E.  Only a few of these elite operatives possessed some knowledge of riding, and even 
fewer were familiar with pack transportation.  Just like the Army of 1942, the Special Forces sent 
to Afghanistan in 2001 had almost no formal training in animal packing because most military 
planners were confident that technology had rendered animal power obsolete.  Yet, similar to GIs 
in World War II or Korea, American Special Forces demonstrated a seamless application of 
adaptability.  Cadres of experienced riders procured native stock, coached the novices, and then 
packed and rode to war in twenty-first century Afghanistan.
8
 
                                                 
 
7
 Lester Grau, Editor, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996). www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA316729 
(accessed August 21, 2012); see also C.J. Dick, Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, (Royal Military 
Academy, Sandhurst, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2002).   
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/559/rec/12 (accessed August 20, 2012); and 
Bradley, 434.  Hub Reese, a Tennessee broker, with cooperation by the U.S. State Department, assembled and flew 
over 700 mules to Islamabad, Pakistan to assist Afghan rebels. See Associated Press, “U.S. Aids Afghans with 
Mules.” http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/U-S-Aids-Afghans-With-Mules/id-
d5ba7f12bc005b580c0bfd4040a8836d (accessed September 1, 2012).  
 
 
8
 James Hargett, U.S. Army Special Forces Medical Sergeant, Interview and email correspondence, June 
30, 2012; see also Doug Stanton, Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of U.S. Soldiers Who Rode to 
Victory in Afghanistan. (New York: Scribner, 2009). 
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Special Forces infiltrated the rugged Afghan mountains and within a few weeks 
demonstrated a devastating martial presence.   The Americans incorporated a unique blend of 
high technology and antiquity.  Typical missions occurred under the cover of darkness, with one 
or two Special Forces soldiers perched atop a desolate mountain-top scanning the countryside 
with night vision equipment.  Special Forces troops acquired and confirmed targets with the 
command post via satellite phone. The troops typed coordinates into a lap-top computer.  A laser 
range-finder provided additional information, and the troops marked or “painted” the target with 
the laser.  A few minutes later, two 1,000-pound precision-guided bombs launched from a jet 
aircraft some 30,000 feet above hit the target.  The Special Forces soldier carefully placed the 
lap-top, laser, and satellite phone in a saddle bag, packed it on a horse, mule, or donkey, and rode 
back to the base of operations.
9
 
 The Special Forces soldier personified the most technologically advanced military in the 
twenty-first century.  The fact that he was on horseback seems astonishing, yet this soldier was 
not an aberration.  He represents two distinctly American characteristics displayed in war.  First, 
Americans frequently spare no expense and employ whatever means necessary to accomplish a 
mission.  Second, Americans, often deemed over reliant on advanced technology, have often 
“advanced” backward, adapting and applying antiquated means to achieve an end.  
Americans arriving in Afghanistan were the best-equipped warriors in military history.  
However, they quickly learned that Humvees and helicopters did not guarantee mission success.  
The remarkably dynamic society in which the American soldier trained and outfitted left him 
momentarily in a quandary.  He was firmly gripped by what Lewis Mumford called the “atrophy 
                                                 
 
9
 Ibid., see also Donatella Lorch, “Green Berets Up Close,” News Week 14 January 2002.  
http://www.groups.sfahq.com/5th/02_01_14_green_berets_up_close.htm (accessed August 20, 2012); Anthony 
Davis, “Special Forces ‘Painting’ Afghan Targets for U.S. Strikes,” Janes Defence Weekly 22 October 2001. 
http://www.strangecosmos.com/content/item/22284.html (accessed August 22, 2012). 
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of human capacities,” a victim of that alluring panacea called technology.  Then, demonstrating a 
certain nature of adaptability, the American soldier bought a horse from the locals, learned about 
war in primitive places, and applied skills long forgotten.  Triumph in Afghanistan in the 
political-military sense is still undecided, but a tactical victory through American ingenuity and 
technological retrogression in the mountains of Afghanistan is indisputable.
10
  
 Army adjustments to the unplanned use of animal power in Afghanistan were rapid.  
According to James Hargett,  
The first teams to utilize horses did so without any formal training but had 
experienced riders to coach the others. Shortly after, the use of these animals became 
doctrine and, at least in SF (Special Forces), riders courses began as did training in the 
care of these animals. I only recently left active duty but am aware of at least one Special 
Forces mobility training course involving horses. A lot of focus is on large animal vet 
care in the medical course. I can't think of any conventional forces who have used 
animals, but they are common in the smaller unconventional units.
11
 
 
Quick modifications were impressive, particularly by an institution inclined to caution.  
 Numerous field manuals on pack animal care and use were dusted off or re-published 
after U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan in October 2001. Published in 2000, the United States 
Army Field Manual 31-27, Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Operations Forces became 
the standard for special operations units.  The Army also produced another field manual called 
Special Forces Use of Pack Animals, FM 3-05.213 in 2004.  Most recently, the Advanced Skills 
                                                 
 
10
 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Reprint Edition, 
2010), quoted in David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism, 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), xvii; for an excellent narrative on the impact of technology 
in American society see Carroll Purcell, The Machine in America: A Social History of Technology, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
 
 
11
 Hargett Interview, June 30, 2012. 
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Branch of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center introduced a six-part CD-ROM video to 
accompany FM 3-05.213 on procedures for working with pack animals.
12
   
Courses in pack transportation were quickly incorporated into training throughout the 
U.S. military.  During World War II, pack troop selection was random and training lengthy. 
Contemporary programs are abbreviated and concentrated, focusing on small groups engaged in 
unconventional warfare.  Army Special Forces offer a one to four-week course simply titled 
“Special Operations Animal Packing Course” at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  Likewise, the 
United States Marine Corps Mountain Training Center at Bridgeport, California started courses 
in pack training shortly after fighting began in Afghanistan.  Small unit pack training continues 
at Bridgeport, which is located in the eastern Sierra Nevada Mountains and most closely 
replicates Afghan terrain and conditions (See Appendix C-1). Troops steeped with advanced 
technology training quickly learn the benefits of animal power and, like veterans of World War 
II, rapidly learned the behavioral characteristics of their animal charges so they can better 
perform the mission at hand. 
U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan have not been accompanied by American-bred 
mules.  U.S. forces depend primarily on native horses and donkeys for two reasons.  First, it is 
more cost-effective to use local stock, particularly since there is an adequate number available.   
Afghanistan, in this regard, is similar to the Mediterranean (and unlike CBI) in World War II. 
Second, native animals are already conditioned to the environment, providing immediate service.  
Afghan donkeys are smaller and cannot carry the same load as American mules, but their 
numbers are plentiful and their performance quite satisfactory.  
                                                 
 12 FM 31-27 Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Operations Force. http://publicintelligence.net/fm-
31-27-pack-animals-in-support-of-special-operations-forces/ (accessed August 24, 2012); FM 3-05.213 Special 
Forces Use of Pack Animals.  http://www.scribd.com/doc/12776241/fm305 (accessed August 24, 2012). Both Field 
Manuals are available in PDF. 
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The integration of advanced technology, such as computers and laser-guided munitions, 
with something as basic as a native donkey remains challenging in Afghanistan.  An obstacle for 
the U.S. military is resisting the promise of technological panaceas and instead finding a balance 
between old and new technologies.  In recent years, Lockheed-Martin attempted to build robotic 
pack animals.  The Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment, or MULE, was a 
computerized, six-wheeled, one-ton vehicle capable of carrying 1,000 pounds, remotely 
controlled by a soldier.  The MULE would move burdensome amounts of supplies and be most 
useful for bringing gear “that last few hundred meters, to where the fighting was going on.”  The 
Army was interested, but MULE failed nearly all field tests.  One is reminded that “war cannot 
be refined.”  The sweat and toil of war can be reduced by technology, but circumstances will 
always arise where mission success depends on the performance of men and beasts of burden.
13
     
 Adaptability permeates American military history.  Indeed, this dissertation asserts that 
adaptability has been as much of an American way of war as advancing technology, mass 
supply, or superior firepower.  The Army’s technological regression to animal power in World 
War II is one example of adaptability in America’s military heritage.  The use of animal power in 
remote, peripheral campaigns did not in and of itself win the war, no more so than hedge-row 
cutting tanks, floating dry-docks, or sea trains.  Collectively, however, the particular nature of 
American ability at all levels, including strategic and tactical, domestic and foreign, was as vital 
to Allied success as mountains of material.   
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 “Son of MULE Fails in Afghanistan,” November, 28, 2011, 
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htinf/articles/20111128.aspx (accessed August 23, 2012); see also Lester Grau 
and Lt. Col. Hernan Vazquez, “Ground Combat at High Altitude,” Military Review, January-February 2002. 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/groundcombat/groundcombat.htm (accessed August 20, 2012) for 
unique problems associated with high altitude fighting including physical conditioning, inefficiency of vehicle 
motors and helicopter engines, and pros and cons of pack animals. 
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The methods of waging war, and particularly the technology applied, change, but even 
the methods of war are often dictated by constants, such as geography.  For example, 
motorization and mechanization revolutionized war up to a point, but only changed the face of 
battle so far.  In the face of immutable realities such as inhospitable terrain, victory went to the 
side that more rapidly adjusted. Like superiority in firepower and material, adaptability is an 
American characteristic during war.  This dissertation examines the U.S. Army’s adoption of 
animal power, a millennial-old technology, in a conflict best known for machines and motors.  
  There are many reasons the Army failed to recognize a need for animal power prior to 
the crises of World War II, Korea, or Afghanistan, and these reasons have helped determine an 
American way of war.  The first reason was arrogance.  Making no transportation contingencies 
in areas with no roads and inhospitable terrain was hubris born of an absolute faith in advanced 
technology. As Adna Chaffee proclaimed, “In any important war involving armies and fought in 
terrain where important wars are fought, mechanized cavalry is a vastly more powerful, mobile, 
and decisive force than…horse cavalry.”14  Technological advances render weapons obsolete, 
such as when smokeless powder and the machine gun replaced the muzzle-loading, black-
powder musket.  However, some elements are constant, such as climate and geography, and only 
reckless arrogance suggests otherwise.  The notion that unalterable elements are conquered is 
folly, and so is the removal of these factors from the calculus of war.  
Another reason the Army failed to see a need for animal power before World War II was 
an ignorance of history.  Similar to mistakes in Korea and Afghanistan could have been 
ameliorated, if not avoided altogether, had assessments of the past been made with greater 
                                                 
 
14
 Brig. General Adna Chaffee, “Some Observations and Recommendations Pertinant to Any Future 
Expansion and Development of Mechanized Cavalry which May Be Contemplated by the War Department,” Memo 
to Adjutant General, September 15, 1939, File 322.02, Mechanized Cavalry, Box 7, RG 177, NARA 
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objectivity.  Leopold von Ranke urged historians to “tell how it really was.”  The von Ranke 
model is untrendy, but historians, particularly military historians who might advise military 
planners and policy makers, must be more dispassionate.  Brutally painful honesty in historical 
assessments can provide good counsel for decision makers under wartime pressures.   
Livy noted at the end of the first century BCE, “Nowhere do events correspond less to 
men’s expectations than in war.”  This sobering assessment of war holds true in a couple of 
ways.  The first is emotional.  Livy’s remark is a sad reminder that wholesale destruction and 
killing so common in war is something for which no one can adequately prepare.  But emotional 
unpreparedness is linked to rational unpreparedness. If Livy is correct, then war will always have 
certain unpredictable elements.  After all of the war-gaming, simulations, and data are processed, 
militaries must make rapid adjustments to these unforeseen twists.
15
   
An American proclivity for adaptation proved one of the greatest contributions to Allied 
success in World War II.  Mountains of resources helped, but material alone did not win World 
War II.  Enemies were defeated because America adapted faster than her foes, overcoming the 
fog and friction of war during the immediate crisis.  Examining the Army’s archaic use of animal 
power in a highly mechanized, motorized war, creates an awareness of an American way of war 
not limited to vast supply or mass firepower. The U.S. military would do well to embrace and 
cultivate America’s adaptive nature in preparation for future conflicts.  
According to Williamson Murray: 
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 Livy, History of Rome, XXX, quoted in Gerald Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of 
Combat in the American Civil War, (New York: Free Press, 1987); see also Willaimson Murray, Military Adaptation 
in War: With Fear of Change. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For contemporary efforts promoting 
adaptability within military ranks see Al Grasso and William L. LaPlante, Report of the Defense Science Board 2010 
Summer Study on Enhancing Adaptability of U.S Military Forces, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board). 
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www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf (accessed August 26, 2012). 
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 In a period of accelerating strategic and technological change, it is all the more 
 essential that soldiers confront the future with a firm understanding of war’s continuities, 
 and that scholars furnish them the best historical analysis…in which to ground that 
 understanding.
16
 
 
The U.S. Army’s use of mules in World War II is a story of such continuities and the adaptability 
borne of historical analysis that overcame them. 
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 Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, Editors, The Past as Prologue: the Importance of 
History to the Military Profession, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-11. 
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Figure C-1. While not quite using the "jawbone of an ass," U.S. Marines in the 21st century 
still employ the venerable mule. (Image available at http://www.militaryphotos.net, 
accessed November 1, 2012).  
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